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INTRODUCTION

Biodiversity conservation has emerged recently as a leading goal
of scientists, environmentalists, and policymakers, both globally' and
in the United States. 2 In the popular literature, biodiversity conservation 3 is closely associated with halting the destruction of tropical

1

Biodiversity and the related concept of ecosystem management were prominently

featured at the 1992 Rio dejaneiro Earth Summit, in the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, and the nonbinding Statement of Forest Principles. Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development: Agenda 21 (June 3-14, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/4 (1992); Report of the
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: ForestPrinciples(June 3-14, 1992), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/5 (1992); Report of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declarationon Environment and Development (June 3-14, 1992), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6
(1992). Biodiversity conservation is a leading concern of the U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development and is the principal focus of project financing by the Global Environment Facility ("GEF"), a U.N. and World Bank sponsored facility to help developing
nations address global environmental concerns. See Scott Hajost & Curtis Fish, Biodiversity
Conservation and InternationalInstruments, in BIODIVERSriY AND THE LAW 131, 133, 137-38
(William J. Snape III ed., 1996) (indicating that nearly half of GEF funding goes to biodiversity projects).
2 See, e.g., David Farrier, ConservingBiodiversity on PrivateLand Incentives for Management or Compensationfor Lost Expectations?, 19 HARv. ENVrL. L. Rxv. 303, 304-05 (1995);J.B.
Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and theEver-ExpandingWeb ofFederalLaws RegulatingNonfederal
Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 555, 558 (1995); A. Dan
Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism,54 MD. L. REV. 1315, 1315 (1995) [hereinafter Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism];A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its
Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 556 (1993) [hereinafter Tarlock, LocalBiodiversity]. Calls for
preservation of wildlife and wilderness areas date to the mid-19th Century, but these were
based on arguments from the aesthetic, spiritual, and recreational values of wilderness. See
RODERICK NASH, WILDER'SS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 44 (3d ed. 1982). In the 1940s, the
visionary ecologist Aldo Leopold identified preservation of the diversity of species and ecosystems as a goal. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 214-17 (Ballantine Books
1966) (1949). Only recently have such demands been raised under the rubric of
"biodiversity."
3 The Biodiversity Convention defines biological diversity (or biodiversity) as "the
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine
and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this
includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems." United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 2, at 818, 823
(June 5, 1992) (entered into force on Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention
or Convention]. More simply, the Office of Technology Assessment defines it as "the variety and variability among living organisms and the ecological complexes in which they

occur." OFFcE

OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 3

(1987) [hereinafter OTA]. Biodiversity thus encompasses genetic, species, and ecosystem
diversity among both domesticated and wild flora and fauna on land and in the seas. Biodiversity conservation includes both onsite (in situ) and offsite (ex situ) measures.
Although declining diversity of domesticated species and ex situ conservation of highly endangered species in zoos, botanical gardens, and seed banks are important components of
an overall biodiversity conservation strategy, the focus of this Article is in situ conservation
of biodiversity in the wild, particularly, terrestrial (as opposed to marine) species and

ecosystems.
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rainforests, especially in Amazonia. 4 But if biodiversity is worth conserving, 5 then we should consider the full range of biodiversity, including North American species, ecosystems, and gene pools, as
candidates for protection. 6 Contrary to popular impression, the
United States is actually quite rich in biodiversity, with relatively high
levels of species richness and endemism spread over a diverse array of
ecosystem types and climatic conditions.7 But biodiversity loss is at an
4
See TIMOTHY BEATLEY, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: ENDANGERED SPECIES AND
URBAN GROWTH 1 (1994). By some estimates, up to 50% of all species inhabit tropical

rainforests, which are being lost at an alarming rate.
5 There is extensive literature documenting the benefits of biodiversity. Naturally
functioning ecosystems provide nonconsumptive recreational and aesthetic benefits; crucial environmental services like flood control, watershed protection, soil formation, nutrient cycling, and carbon sequestration; and marketable natural resources that we rely on for
food, medicine, fiber, and fuel. They also contain an irreplaceable store of biochemical
and genetic information that may produce future medical, agricultural, and other biotechnological advances of unknown dimensions. Some further argue that because species and ecosystems are interdependent in ways we neither understand nor control, their
loss may take on a "snowball" or "cascading" effect, potentially producing conditions substantially more adverse to human life. See, e.g., KATRINA BROWN ET AL., ECONOMICS AND THE
CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVRsITY 13-14 (GEF Working Paper No. 2, 1993); JEFFREY

A. MCNEELY,

ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL

DVERsns.

DEVELOPING AND USING ECONOMIC IN-

CENTIVES TO CONSERVE BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 19-29 (1988); DAVID PEARCE & DOMINIC MORAN, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BIODWERSIY 18-22 (1994); John M. Gowdy, The Value of
Biodiversity: Markets, Society, and Ecosystems, 73 LAND ECON. 25, 34-36 (1997); Alan Randall,
What MainstreamEconomists Have to Say About the Value of Biodiversity, in BIODrvERsrlY 217,

219-20 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988); see also Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World'sEcosystem Services and Natural Capita4 387 NATURE 253 (1997) (estimating annual value of global
ecosystem services at $33 trillion, or almost twice the global GDP). Many also argue that,
beyond these instrumental values, living creatures are entitled to our respect, concern, and
protection based on ethical considerations. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Comment, Patching
the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of BiologicalDiversity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 273-75 (1991).
6 See BEA=L , supra note 4, at 1-3; Natalie Angier, Redefining Diversity: Biologists Urge
Look Beyond Rain Forests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, at Cl; Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Forget the
Tropics, PharmaceuticalsMay Lie in Nearby Woods, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1996, at C4. Species
and ecosystems are generally more threatened in temperate regions, where land conversion and habitat fragmentation are at a more advanced stage. See Cynthia Carlson, NEPA
and the Conservationof BiologicalDiversity, 19 ENVTL. L. 15, 22 (1988). Given regional differentials in species richness, land costs, and the opportunity costs of restricting land use, it
might be more cost-effective to focus global conservation efforts on areas like Amazonia
where land is relatively cheap and biodiversity abundant, but that analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article.
7 See LINDA K. LANGNER & CURTIS H. FLATHER, BIOLOGICAL DIVERSrr. STATUS AND
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (U.S. Dep't of Agric. Forest Serv. Gen. Tech. Rep. No. RM244, 1994) (stating that U.S. species richness exceeds that of other temperate countries,
and includes as many mammal and reptile species as Brazil, but Brazil has 50% more birds

and nearly three times as many plant species); Thomas D. Sisk et al., Identifying Extinction
Threats: Global Analyses of the Distributionof Biodiversity and the Expansion of the Human Enterprise,in ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: SELECrED READINGS 53, 63 tbl.4 (Fred B. Sampson & Fritz
L. Knopf eds., 1996) (indicating that the U.S. ranks twenty-first in species richness and

ninth in endemism). Species richness refers to the total number of species found within a
given geographical area. Endemism refers to the number of species unique to a given
area. Global biodiversity protection depends not only on the protection of especially species-rich areas (such as tropical rainforests) but also on the preservation of unique species
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advanced stage in this country, as it is throughout the temperate
zone.8 In all regions of the United States (with the possible exception
of Alaska where human disturbance of natural systems has been more
limited), entire ecosystems are nearing extinction 9 and in some cases
are being destroyed at a faster rate than the Amazonian rain forest. 10
Consequently, scientists and environmentalists have urged a refocusing of our domestic environmental laws and public lands management policies to place the goal of biodiversity conservation at center
stage.1 " The federal bureaucracy has, at least to some extent, heeded
these appeals, but for the most part, Congress has not.' 2 Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt has identified biodiversity conservation as a central goal of public lands management. 13 Babbitt has stitched together
and ecosystems throughout the world. See, e.g., Michael Soul6 & Daniel Simberloff, What
Do Genetics and Ecology Tell Us About the Design of NatureReserves?, inENVIRONMENTAL POUCY
AND BIODIvERsrrv 55, 56-57 (R. Edward Grumbine ed., 1994). All the estimates cited here
are, of course, imprecise because not all species have been identified nor their full ranges
determined. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIvERSI OF LIFE 132-33 (1992); World Wildlife
Fund, Forest Ecoregions (visited June 7, 1997) <http://ww.wwf.org/forests/protected.htm>
(identifying ninety-eight distinct forest ecoregion types in the U.S. and Canada, ranging
from tropical forests in Florida and Hawaii to boreal forests in Alaska and Canada); World
Wildlife Fund, ForestMaps, ConservationAssessment of North American ForestEcoregions:Biological Distinctiveness-U.S. and Canada (visited June 7, 1997) <http://www.wwEorg/forests/
maps/global-importance.htm> (listing one-third of these types as providing "globally outstanding" levels of species richness, endemism, and habitats; these include half the world's
temperate rainforests).
8
See INTER-AMERICAN INST. FOR GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
REPORT ON THE IAI WORKSHOP ON THE COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF TEMPERATE TERRESTRIAL
EcOsYsTEMs 9-13 (1994) (stating that although temperate regions are "home to a rich diversity of wild plant and animal comnunities" and "range of natural ecosystems," human
population and conversion of land to agricultural and urban uses have left "spotty remnants of natural vegetation," caused numerous species extinctions, and practically eliminated entire ecosystems); REED F. Noss FT AL., ENDANGERED EcosYEMS OF THE UNITED
STATES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF Loss AND DEGRADATION 3 (Nat'l Biol. Serv., Biol.
Rep. No. 28, 1995).
9 See LANGNER & FLATHER, supra note 7, at 14-15; Noss ET AL., supranote 8, at 17-20.
10 See Noss ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 (citing freshwater aquatic ecosystems in California
and old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest as examples).
11 See, e.g., Farrier, supra note 2, at 304-09; Scott W. Hardt, FederalLand Management in
the Tweniy-First Century: From Wise Use to Wise Stewardship, 18 HARv. E'rrL. L. REv. 345, 38796 (1994); Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructinga Law of Ecosystem Managemen 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 293, 328-31 (1994); Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supranote 2, at
555-56; Doremus, supra note 5, at 318-33.
12 SeeDavid E. Blockstein, Toward a FederalPlanforBiologicalDiversity, 5 IssuEs INScI. &
TECH., Summer 1989, at 63, 67 ("Currently, Congress has been more eager to deal with the
loss of biological diversity abroad than at home.").
13 See William IL Stevens, Interior Secretary Is Pushing a New Way to Save Species, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1993, at Al (noting that Babbitt named the biodiversity policy as his "most
urgent task" in his first month as Interior Secretary). The three Interior Department land
management agencies-the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service,
and the National Park Service-have recently identified ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation as policy priorities, as has the Department of Agriculture's Forest
Service. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 60 Fed. Reg.
18,886, 18,892-96 (proposed 1995) (the "principal goal" of national forest management
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the research capabilities of various Interior Department bureaus into
a national biological service whose mission is to gather and analyze
data on species, habitats, and ecosystems, and thus to provide the basis
for scientifically informed ecosystem management planning. 14 In addition, Babbitt is creatively employing the authority of the Endangered Species Act to induce ecosystem-wide, multispecies habitat
conservation planning by state and local officials, landowners, and
community and environmental groups.' 5 The Environmental Protection Agency, 16 the Council on Environmental Quality, 17 the State Department, i8 and Vice-President Al Gore have all acknowledged
biodiversity conservation as an important policy objective. 19

would be "to maintain or restore the sustainability of ecosystems," inter alia by " [p] roviding
for diversity of plant and animal communities"); BuREAu OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF

EcosYsTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE BLM: FROM CONCEPT
(BLM/SC/GI-94/005 & 1736, 1994); FISH & WILDIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T

THE INTERIOR,

TO COMMITMENT
OF THE INTERIOR,
AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO MORE
EFFECTIVELY CONSERVE THE NATION'S BIODIVERSrIY (1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING
APPROACH (GAO/RCED-94-11, 1994) [hereinafter GAO, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT]; FoRE T
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., & BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FOREST ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: AN ECOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASSESSMENT (1993).

14 See WilliamJ. Snape III, Who Owns WhatA Public TrustforBiodiversity,in BIODIVERSrrY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 145, 147-48. Originally named the National Biological
Survey, the service was later renamed the National Biological Service, and then in 1996
transferred to the U.S. Geological Survey and renamed the Biological Resources Division
to comply with a congressional directive. See Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the

Interior, Transferof the NationalBiologicalService to the U.S. GeologicalSurvey as a New Biological
Resources Division (visited Oct. 17, 1997) <http://elips.doi.gov/cgi-win/goto.sec.exe/
findorder>.
15
See infra notes 306-29 and accompanying text.
16
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THREATS TO BIOLOGICAL DIERsrry IN THE UNITED
STATES (1990); U.S. ENVrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK:
SETTING PRIORImES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
17
E.g., COUNCIL ON ENVTL QUALrIY, INCORPORATING BIODERSITY CONSIDERATIONS
INTO ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER-THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
(1993) [hereinafter CEQ INCORPORATING BIODIVERSriY]; COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QuALrIY,
LINKING ECOSYSTEMS AND BIODIvERSrrY (1992); COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, THE GLOBAL
2000 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (1980); COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NATIONAL
REPORT (1992) [hereinafter CEQUNCED REPORT]. The Council on Environmental Qual-

ity has also convened an Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force to implement an
ecosystem approach to environmental management. See GAO, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT,
supra note 13, at 6.

U.S.

U.S. FOR(1997) (on file with author) (identifying protection of biological diversity as
one of the United States' "strategic interests" in post-Cold War era).
19 E.g., OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEw REPORT OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (pt. 2) (1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW
REPORT], available in 1994 WL 53795, at *2-3 (recommending consolidation of scattered
18

DEP'T OF STATE, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY. THE ENVIRONMENT AND

EIGN POLICY 1

federal land holdings to improve ecosystem management and maintain biological
diversity).
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However, despite these recent developments, the articulated goal
of biodiversity conservation has yet to develop into clear, effective, and
coordinated policy in the United States. 20 Although President Clinton signed the Biodiversity Convention ("Convention") in 1993 and
submitted it to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification,
the Senate has thus far failed to act, 21 and the Administration's posture remains an oddly ambiguous one. President Clinton's transmittal
message argued that the Convention would place the United States
under no new substantive obligations because it already has in place a
"tightly woven" web of laws and programs to protect biological diversity. 2 2 But, as this Article will show, the President's assessment of our
present biodiversity conservation efforts vastly overstates their significance. 23 Although some federal laws and land management policies
have a salutary effect on biodiversity conservation, others fall short or
are downright destructive. In the aggregate, they are neither a strong
web nor a coherent strategy, but rather a patchwork of halfway measures, interstitial tinkering, and missed opportunities for conserving biodiversity, even on those lands for which the federal government
bears direct management responsibility. To protect our own valuable
20 See CEQ, UNCED REPORT, supra note 17, at 292-93, 298 (acknowledging that current U.S. laws and institutions are not designed to protect ecosystems or genetic diversity,
and are likely inadequate to do so); OTA, supra note 3, at 8; Blockstein, supranote 12, at
65-66; Lee P. Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape: The Institutional Challengesof Ecosystem
Managementfor Lands in Private Ownership, 19 VT. L. REv. 363, 382 nn.68-70 (1995); William
J. Snape III, Biodiversity and the Law: An Introduction, 8 TUL. ENvr. L.J. 5, 10 (1994).
21
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably reported the Convention by a
vote of 16-3 over the opposition of the committee chairman, Sen. Jesse Helms, but majority
leader Sen. Robert Dole blocked a floor vote in the 104th Congress. SeeWilliam J. Snape
III, InternationalProtection: Beyond Human Boundaries, in BIODIVERsrrY AND THE LAW, supra
note 1, at 81, 81-82.
22 Biological diversity conservation in the United States is addressed through a
tightly woven partnership of Federal, State, and private sector programs in
management of our land and waters and their resident and migratory species.... These existing programs and authorities are considered sufficient
to enable any activities necessary to effectively implement our responsibilities under the Convention.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the Convention on Biological Diversity, 1993 PUB. PAPERS 2029 (Nov. 19, 1993).
23
The Convention requires that "in accordance with its particular conditions and
capabilities," each state party shall "[d]evelop national strategies, plans or program[s] for
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity or adapt for this purpose existing" programs. Biodiversity Convention, art. 6, supra note 3, at 825. Further, each contracting state must "[e]stablish a system of protected areas or areas where special measures
need to be taken to conserve biological diversity"; "[r]egnlate or manage biological resources important for the conservation of biological diversity whether within or outside
protected areas"; "[p]romote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings"; and "[r] ehabilitate and
restore degraded ecosystems." Id., art. 8, at 825-26. Although these obligations are broadly
worded and allow great flexibility in the means chosen to achieve them, the United States
cannot be fairly said to have developed a national strategy to achieve these purposes, or to
have successfully adapted existing programs to achieve them.
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biological resources, and to demonstrate to the nations of the world
that our commitment to biodiversity conservation is more than mere
rhetoric, the United States must enact laws that not only authorize,
but also require far-reaching biodiversity conservation measures.
It is generally acknowledged that the principal cause of biodiversity loss is the fragmentation, degradation, and destruction of ecosystems and habitats through conversion of land to economically
productive uses, 24 especially agriculture, 25 forestry, 26 mineral and fossil fuel extraction, 27 and urban development. 28 We can expect, then,
that land use policy will play a central role in biodiversity conservation
policy,29 and that as pressure builds to place biodiversity conservation
at the forefront of the national and international environmental
agenda, environmental advocates will demand increasingly stringent
controls on both federal land management and private land use. 30
24
Land conversion is the principal cause of biodiversity loss for most terrestrial species and ecosystems. See, e.g., BROWN ET AL., supra note 5, at 28-35; COUNCIL ON ENVTL.
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1980: THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALTy (1980). Other causes include pollution, overharvesting, in-

tentional extermination by humans, and climate changes. See C.S. Holling et al., Biodiversity in the Functioning of Ecosystems: An Ecological Synthesis, in BIODIVERSITY Loss: ECONOMIC
AND ECOLOGICAL IssUES 44, 78-83 (Charles Perrings et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter BIODIVERsrnr Loss]. An important and frequently overlooked cause is the human-assisted introduction of exotic (non-native) species, which at first may appear to enhance biodiversity but
often puts pressure on native species through competition, predation, infection, hybridization, or adverse alteration of basic ecosystem processes. See Peter Jenkins, Harmful Exotics
in the United States, in BIODrvERsTY AND THE LAW, supranote 1, at 105, 105-07. For aquatic

species, overharvesting, pollution, climate change, alteration of habitats, and introduction
of exotics are often the critical factors. See Suzanne ludicello, ProtectingGlobal MarineDiversity, in id. at 120, 121.
25 Timothy Swanson argues that global biodiversity loss is the logical outcome of the
process of agricultural conversion which has systematically displaced diverse, naturally occurring plants and animals with a narrow range of specialized domesticated and cultivated
species over the last 10,000 years. Timothy Swanson, The InternationalRegulation of Biodiversity Decline: Optimal Policy and Evolutionary Product, in BIODIWERSny Loss, supra note 24, at
225, 226-28. By neglecting other factors, Swanson overstates the role of agricultural conversion, especially in developed countries where agricultural conversion is substantially
complete. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 5, at 32; David Western, Population,Resources, and
Environment in the Twenty-First Century, in CONSERVATION FOR THE TWENTrY-FIRsr CENTURY 11,

19-20 (David Western & Mary C. Pearl eds., 1989).
26
See Keiter, supra note 11, at 331-32. The most celebrated recent conflict is the
northern spotted owl controversy, which pitted the spotted owl as proxy for its diminishing
old-growth forest habitat against the timber industry and timber-dependent communities
in the Pacific Northwest. See STEVEN LEWis YAFFEE, THE WISDOM OF THE SPOTTED OwL:
POLICY LESSONS FOR A NEw CENTURY 3-6 (1994).
27 See, e.g., RichardJ. Fink, The NationalWildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice,and Prospect, 18
HARv. ENVmL. L. REV. 1, 65-66 (1994) (describing damage to habitat in National Wildlife
Refuges).
28 See Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 558-59.
29 See Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, supra note 2, at 1318; Tarlock, Local Biodiversity,
supra note 2, at 557-58.
SO
See Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, supra note 2, at 1332-33.
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There can be little doubt that any significant new effort to conserve biological resources will require a strong federal role. 3 ' Yet, it is
equally certain that major federal initiatives in this area will be controversial. 32 Land use is traditionally a matter of state and local concern,
and an expanded federal role in this field will raise serious federalism
concerns. Because the externalized effects of land-use decisions were
once thought to be principally, if not exclusively, local in nature, federal intrusion into land use matters was generally regarded as unwise
and contrary to the spirit of our federalist structure, if not flatly proscribed by the Constitution. An expansive federal biodiversity policy is
sure to challenge this traditional understanding.
Additional legal obstacles may lie in the minefield of "takings"
law. In recent years, some landowners, operating loosely under the
banner of a new "property rights" movement, have insisted that environmental regulation-including regulation aimed at protecting wetlands and endangered species-has already gone too far, infringing
on private property rights thought to be foundational to our economic structure, constitutional architecture, and legal and cultural
traditions. 33 Paralleling and closely allied with this movement is a
"wise-use" movement that seeks to overturn environmental restrictions
on the use of the Western federal lands in favor of private grazing,
timber, and mineral production rights. 3 4 Thus far, the property-rights
3'
See infra Part III.
32 See infra Part IV (discussing federalism concerns) and Part V (discussing takings
and fairness concerns). Additionally, many believe that the federal government has simply
grown too big and needs to be downsized. A bipartisan political commitment to reduce
budget deficits while avoiding tax increases or even tax cuts further constrains new federal
initiatives. These are political rather than legal constraints, and this Article does not examine them.
33
See generally R. MCGREGGOR CAWLEY, FEDERAL LAND, WESTERN ANGER (1993) (discussing Western opposition to the shift from traditional conservation policy to more stringent environmental protection); WILLIAM L. GRAF, WILDERNESS PRESERVATION AND THE
SAGEBRUSH REBELLIONS (1990) (discussing organized resistance to federal public land poli-

cies in the West);

DAVID HELVARG, THE WAR AGAINST THE GREENS: THE WISE USE MovEMENT, THE NEW RIGHT, AND ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLENCE 1-14 (1994) (describing the

growing tension between the property-rights movement and environmentalists). At its
root, this movement rests on the belief that private property in land "may be our most
cherished institution." DONALD WORSTER, THE WEALTH OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL HisTORY AND THE ECOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 98 (1993).
34
See Keiter, supra note 11, at 321-22; John D. Leshy, Unravelingthe SagebrushRebellion:

Law, Politics and FederalLands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 317, 343-48 (1980) (discussing the

genesis and roots of the "sagebrush rebellion," a particular example of the wise-use movement's actions). The "wise use" movement generally contends that federal land management policies overemphasize environmental considerations at the expense of local human
costs, undercut the autonomy of local communities, and infringe on vested rights-which

amount to property interests that can be protected-of private parties (especially commodity producers). SeeAndrea Hungerford, "Custom and Culture" Ordinances:Not a Wise Movefor
the Wise Use Movement, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 457, 458-61 (1995); Patrick Austin Perry, Comment, Law West of the Pecos: The Growth of the Wise-Use Movement and the Challenge to Federal
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and wise-use movements have had only limited success in the courts,
state legislatures, and Congress. Litigation challenging federal statutes and regulations to protect wetlands and endangered species habitats has produced only isolated and qualified victories, 35 and the wiseuse movement's litigation strategy has failed dismally.3 6 Although the
104th Congress produced a spate of legislative compensation proposals, many of which specifically targeted wetlands and endangered species regulation, 37 none was enacted into law.
This Article undertakes a broad evaluation of contemporary federal biodiversity policy and offers a sweeping proposal for reform.
Part I describes proposals for biodiversity conservation strategies advanced by conservation biologists and other experts. Part II examines
biodiversity conservation on the federal lands, which constitute nearly
one-third of our national land area. It concludes that although the
current portfolio of federal landholdings, legal authorities, and federal land management policies falls well short of a coherent biodiversity conservation strategy, the federal government-as the nation's
largest landowner-is nevertheless the logical starting point and
should be the principal focal point for such a strategy. This Part then
advances a proposal to establish a new category of federally owned
and managed biological reserves, carved out of current federal landholdings, as well as other lands acquired expressly for that purpose
and managed primarily to protect representative ecosystems.
Part III reviews current federal laws attempting, albeit indirectly,
to protect biodiversity conservation on private lands, as well as proposals to strengthen and expand the federal regulatory role in order to
PublicLand-Use Policy, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 275, 276-78 (1996). The claims of the wise-use

movement thus span both federalism and private property concerns.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 461-505.
36 See Perry,supra note 34, at 319-20; Jim Carrier, Rebels on the Range: Nevadans Take on
Federal Sovereignty, DENy. Posr, Jan. 21, 1996, at Al ("For all the fury and publicity,
sagebrushers have yet to win a substantive case.").
37 See, e.g., Private Property Protection Act, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995) (passed by
House March 3, 1995) (landowner entitled to compensation if the fair-market value of
"any portion" of property is diminished by 10% or more as a result of Clean Water Act,
Endangered Species Act, Food Security Act, and other specified laws); Private Property
Owners' Bill of Rights, H.R. 790, 104th Cong. (1995) (landowner entitled to compensation
if federal action to protect wetlands or endangered species causes diminution of property
value of 50% or more); Clean Water Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (passed
by House May 16, 1995) (landowner entitled to compensation if value of "any portion" of
property is diminished by 20% or more as a result of section 404 wetlands permit action);
Endangered Species Recovery and Conservation Incentives Act of 1995, H.R. 2364, 104th
Cong. (1995) (landowner entitled to compensation if value of "any portion" of property is
diminished by 20% or more by any action taken under Endangered Species Act). The
leading proposal in the Senate, co-sponsored by Senators Gramm and Dole, was not so
narrowly targeted; it would have required compensation anytime governmental regulation
reduced property values by 25% or more. Private Property Rights Restoration Act, S. 145,
104th Cong. (1995).
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achieve biodiversity conservation objectives. Part IV discusses the federalism implications of biodiversity conservation policy. It concludes
that because the benefits of biodiversity are national or even global in
scope, the federal government should have principal responsibility for
biodiversity conservation; but because the costs of biodiversity conservation are likely to be locally concentrated, serious federalism concerns are implicated. The proposal this Article advances, which
focuses on federally owned reserves, while not without drawbacks,
goes further toward addressing these federalism concerns than the alternative of general federal regulation of private land use.
Part V examines private landowners' and property-rights advocates' resistance to federal land use regulation, and concludes that
only in limited circumstances are they likely to prevail in attacking
biodiversity protection measures on takings grounds. Nonetheless, a
federal biodiversity protection strategy must address the underlying
questions of fundamental fairness in the distribution of society's burdens that animate these claims. On this score too, this Article's proposal is superior to the regulatory alternative.
Although the Article recommends federal ownership rather than
regulation of private land use as the centerpiece of a federal biodiversity strategy, ancillary federal regulation of privately owned lands adjacent to federal reserves is probably necessary to optimize their
conservation value, while permitting economically viable land uses
compatible with that goal. Part VI proposes that such federal regulation be based on context-specific, ecosystem-wide land use plans created jointly by landowners, conservation groups, state and local
governments, and federal land managers.
I
TowARD BIODIvERSrrv CONSERVATION

A. Large Reserves Where Possible, Small Reserves Where
Necessary

There is a broad, though not universal, consensus within the scientific community that a biodiversity conservation strategy should be
built on the foundation of a system of biological reserves3 8 containing
38
See, e.g., David W. Crumpacker et al., A PreliminaryAssessment of the Status of Major
Terrestial and Wetland Ecosystems on Federal and Indian Lands in the United States, CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, March 1988, at 103, 104 ("The most cost-effective and practical method of
maintaining large amounts of biological diversity is on-site in natural ecosystems.") (citation omitted); S.J. McNaughton, Ecosystems and Conservation in the Twenty-First Century, in
CONSERVATION FOR THE TwENTY-FiRsT CFENTURY, supra note 25, at 109, 119-20; Edwin M.
Smith, The Endangered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 361, 406-07
(1984) (arguing that biological reserves efficiently and prophylactically protect multiple

species and, because they typically rely on minimizing human-caused disturbances, require
less intensive management than regulatory approaches). But cf. David Western, Conserva-
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relatively undisturbed habitats3 9 for diverse communities of species,
40
linked where possible by a network of wildlife migration corridors.
It is also widely agreed that, other things being equal,- large reserves
are preferable to small ones. 41 This preference exists for several reasons. First, reserves large enough to protect naturally functioning ecosystems containing viable populations of resident species protect far
more biodiversity-at the genetic, species, and ecosystem levels-at a
far lower cost than do species-by-species management strategies. 42
These reserves are also generally cheaper to acquire and maintain per
unit of protected area than a series of smaller reserves of comparable
total size. 43 Second, some species, especially large mammals, have
large home ranges, low natural growth rates, and low population densities, and therefore require large areas of protected habitai.44 Third,
tion Without Parks: Wildlife in the Rural Landscape, in CONSERVATION FOR THE TWENTY-FrRST
supranote 25, at 158, 158-65 (explaining that because biological reserves do not
represent all species or ecosystems and are themselves subject to mismanagement, the best
opportunities for biodiversity conservation may lie in human-disturbed landscapes). Western acknowledges, however, that the "shortcomings in nature reserves are [no] reason ...
to reduce effort in them." Id. at 165.
39 A recent sea-change in thinking among ecologists and conservation biologists has
rejected the "balance of nature" paradigm, in which ecosystems were thought to remain in
equilibrium if undisturbed by human intervention, in favor of a dynamic view of communities and ecosystems as constantly evolving, disorderly mosaics in creative disequilibrium.
SeeDANIEL B. BOTKIN, DiscoRmANT HARMONrs: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-nRST CENCENTURY,

TURY 8-12 (1990); DONALD WORsTER, NATURE'S ECONoMY. A HISTORY OF ECOLOGIcAL IDEAS

389-94 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1977); Brian Walker, Diversity and Stability in
Ecosystem Conservation, in CONSERVATION FOR THE TwENT-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 25, at

121, 122-24. This view by no means requires rejection of the notion of conservation
reserves, however. Conservation biologists now emphasize the importance of allowing species and ecosystem processes to evolve on their own trajectory with a minimum of human
intervention. See WoRsERm, supra, at 417-20; Walker, supra, at 130.
40 Such corridors allow recolonization of habitats where various kinds of disturbances
have resulted in population loss, and encourage interpopulation gene flow, thus preventing inbreeding and genetic depression. See Robert C. Vrijenhoek, Population Genetics and
Conservation, in CONSERVATION FOR THE TwENTY-FIRsr CENTURY, supranote 25, at 89, 97-98.
41
See R. Edward Grumbine, Vable Populations,Reserve Size, and FederalLands Management: A Critique,CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, June 1990, at 127, 128 ("There is a broad consensus among biologists that long-term protection of viable populations requires large
reserves."); Reed F. Noss, The Wildlands Project: Land ConservationStrategy, in ENVIRONMENTAL Pouicy AND BIODIVERSrrY, supra note 7, at 233, 254-55 ("The desirability of large
reserves, all else being equal, is one of the few almost universally accepted principles of
conservation biology.").
42 See David S. Woodruff, The Problems of Conserving Genes and Species, in CONSERVATION
FOR THE TWxNTY-FiRsr CENTURY, supra note 25, at 76, 77.

See Noss, supra note 41, at 254; Soul6 & Simberloff, supra note 7, at 55, 57.
Noss estimates that populations of large carnivores and ungulates may require protected areas of 1-10 million hectares (2.5 to 24 million acres) to be reasonably assured of
survival. Noss, supranote 41, at 255. Many conservation biologists argue that setting aside
reserves large enough for such species would have the salutary effect of providing an "umbrella" to protect numerous other species of vegetation, birds, reptiles, amphibians, small
mammals, insects, and invertebrates whose habitat requirements are much smaller. See,
e.g., R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, GHOST BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIvERsrIY CRISIS 58 (1992).
43
44
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larger protected areas can generally support larger and more genetically diverse populations and "metapopulations," thus supporting genetic diversity within species and reducing the risk of extinction from
human or natural disturbances, invasion by exotics, predation, disease, demographic events, or genetic depression. 45 Fourth, other
things being equal, larger protected areas are less likely to suffer from
adverse "edge effects," including both human and natural distur46
bances from adjacent unprotected lands.
Nonetheless, large reserves are not always possible. In many parts
of the country, habitats are already so fragmented that large blocks of
relatively undisturbed land may be impossible to assemble. In such
regions, species and ecosystems are most likely to be threatened or
endangered precisely because habitat fragmentation is so advanced.
In these regions, small reserves may be essential to protect the last
valuable ecosystem fragments and habitat patches which, despite their
shortcomings, may represent the best hope for survival of species on
47
the brink of extinction.
There is also a high degree of consensus on reserve selection and
management principles. R. Edward Grumbine, for example, identifies the following goals of conservation planning:
1. Maintain viable populations of all native species in situ.
2. Represent, within protected areas, all native ecosystem types
across their natural range of variation.
3. Maintain evolutionary and ecological processes (e.g., disturbance regimes, hydrological processes, nutrient cycles, etc.).
45

See GRUMBINE,

supra note 44, at 53-56; Soul6 & Simberloff, supra note 7, at 60-61

(stating that species survival requires habitat adequate to support a "minimum viable popu-

lation," which varies by species but is more likely to be found in larger protected areas).
46
See Soul6 & Simberloff, supra note 7, at 59 (Factors include "penetration of preserves by . . . wind, disease, exotic species, and increase in the densities of species that
prefer 'edge habitats'"). In addition to its size, the shape of the reserve is a major factor in
determining the ratio of edge to protected area; generally, the "rounder" the shape, the
less edge per acre of interior protected area, and the higher the conservation value. See
GRUMBINE, supranote 44, at 49-51; Todd G. Olson, Biodiversity and PrivateProperty: Conflict or
Opportunity?, in BIODIVERsrr AND THE LAW supra note 1, at 67, 73-75.

See generallyDennis D. Murphy, Invertebrate Conservation, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK
Acr AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 181, 186
(Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991) [hereinafter BALANCING ON THE BRINK] (indicating that in
areas of intensive urban development, large vertebrates are often already extirpated, while
small habitat patches remain for small vertebrates, invertebrates, and plants in greatest
jeopardy of extinction); Soul6 & Simberloff, supra note 7, at 57 (small reserves are sometimes necessary "to protect the last refugia of endangered species and habitats," especially
in regions where land conversion and disturbance are more advanced); Craig L. Shafer,
Values and Shortcomings of Small Reserves, BIOSCIENCE, Feb. 1995, at 80, 81-82 (noting that
although large reserves are generally preferable, small reserves are sometimes all that is
possible and can make an important contribution to the conservation of most species except large mammals).
47
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4.

Manage, over substantial periods of time, to maintain the evolutionary potential of species and ecosystems.
5. Accommodate human use and occupancy within the above
48
constraints.
Similarly, Reed Noss proposes that the "fundamental objectives"
of biodiversity conservation planning are to (1) represent, in a system
of protected areas, all native ecosystem types and several stages across
their natural range of variation; (2) maintain viable populations of all
native species; (3) maintain ecological and evolutionary processes;
and (4) design and manage the system to be responsive to environmental changes and to maintain evolutionary potential. 49 Noss would
select for immediate protection areas of high species richness, high
endemism, high sensitivity to human pressure, and high levels of
stress from human-caused disturbances. 50 Michael Souls and Daniel
Simberloff concur, suggesting that reserves should be selected so as to
include optimal habitats for any species of special concern; areas
where habitat and species diversity are greatest; areas of maximum
endemicity; and, finally, sites that are particularly secure for long-term
conservation. 5 1
B.

Buffer Zones

Many commentators have pointed out that areas set aside as
reserves are often relatively small "islands" representing only fragments of larger regional ecosystems. Consequently, they argue, the
ability of reserve managers to achieve biodiversity conservation objectives is limited. 5 2 One obvious solution is to create larger reserves.
However, this is prohibitively costly not only in terms of land acquisition and management costs, but also in consideration of the opportunity costs of foregoing development on all the land necessary to
protect the full array of representative ecosystems. Consequently,
scientists and policy experts have recommended the establishment of
"buffer zones" adjacent to protected reserves, thereby allowing some
productive land uses, but restricting other uses to provide extended
habitat for some species and limit adverse spillover effects on the core
protected reserve. 53
48

GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 184-85.

49
50

Noss, supra note 41, at 235.
Reed F. Noss, From Endangered Species to Biodiversity, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK,

supra note 47, at 227, 240.

51

Sou6 & Simberloff, supranote 7, at 56.
See GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 41-44; Western, supra note 38, at 158-59.
53 See, e.g., Reed F. Noss, Conservationof Biodiversity at the LandscapeScale, in BIODrVERSrry IN MANAGED LANDscAPEs: THEORY AND PRAcncF 574, 584-85 (Robert C. Szaro & David
52

W. Johnston eds., 1996) [hereinafter MANAGED LANDSCAPES).
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As early as 1933, the visionary ecologist Victor Shelford recommended the core-and-buffer concept as a strategy for wildlife conservation. 54 Its more recent incarnations include the UNESCO Man and
the Biosphere program's biosphere reserve concept 55 and the "multiple-use module" (or "MUM") concept developed by Reed Noss and
Larry Harris, essentially an elaboration on the biosphere reserve con56
centric zoning model.
II
BIODIVERSITY AND THE FEDERAL LANDS

A. The Present Situation
The federal government owns some 650 million acres, or about
thirty percent of our national land area. Most of this land is in eleven
Western states5 7 and Alaska. 58 The vast majority of these lands-623
million acres, or twenty-seven percent of our national land area-is
managed by four large federal agencies: the Forest Service (192 million acres), the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") (267 million),
54 Shelford was the leading wildlife ecologist of his day and a co-founder of the Ecologists' Union, which later became the Nature Conservancy. See WORSTER, supra note 39, at
214, 363 & n.29.
55 The Biosphere Reserve concept contemplates three concentric land-use zones: a
central protected "core" reserve, surrounded by a "managed use area" or "buffer" allowing

limited land uses consistent with protection of the core, and finally a peripheral "transition
area" or "zone of cooperation" in which more intensive land uses are permitted. Some 337
sites in 85 countries, including 45 in the United States, have been designated as Biosphere
Reserves. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE UNITED STATES MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE PROGRAM
8-9 (1997). Although an area must include a "legally protected core" to qualify for Biosphere Reserve designation, in the U.S. (as in most nations) that designation itself neither
alters the legal authorities under which the core area is managed, nor does it confer additional regulatory authority over adjacent land uses.
56 See GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 190-92 (describing Noss's and Harris's work); see
also Reed F. Noss, The Wildlands Project: Land ConseruationStrategy, WILD EARTH Special Issue, 1992, at 10, 14-18 (describing an ambitious proposal for a connected system of core
reserves surrounded by partially protected buffer zones, amounting to about half the land
area of the United States, to allow the recovery of whole ecosystems and landscapes in
every region).
57 In descending order of federal dominance, they are: Nevada (82.9% federally
owned), Utah (63.9%), Idaho (61.6%), Oregon (52.4%), Wyoming (48.9%), Arizona
(47.2%), California (44.6%), Colorado (36.3%), New Mexico (32.4%), Washington
(28.3%), and Montana (28.0%). See BuREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, PuBLIc LAND STATISTICS 1993, at 5 tbl.3 (1994).

Outside this region and Alaska,

the federal government owns less than 4% of the land, ranging from a low of 0.2% (Connecticut) to a high of 15.5% (Hawaii). See id. Note that federal land statistics cited in this
Article may vary slightly by source and date of publication as a result of ongoing programs
of federal land acquisition, disposition, and interagency transfers.
58 The federal government owns 67.8% of Alaska's land, see id., and these vast Alaskan
holdings account for 38.6% of the four principal federal agencies' total land holdings. See
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LAND OWNERSHIP: INFORMATION ON THE ACREAGE, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF FEDERAL AND OTHER LANDS 24-26 (GAO/RCED-96-40, 1996) [hereinafter GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP].
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the Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") (87 million), and the National
Park Service (77 million).59 These federal lands include most of the
largest remaining undeveloped tracts in the nation. 60 Some 272 million acres-nearly forty-four percent of the land these agencies manage-are designated for "conservation" purposes, such as national
parks and monuments, recreation areas, research areas, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas. 6 1 Given the vast scope of federal landholdings, and given that federal lands are already managed in large blocks
and are already subject to land use restrictions of varying degrees of
stringency, it is clear that federal land management policies will be an
important component in any national biodiversity conservation strategy. 62 Yet, conservation of natural biological resources on these lands
has historically taken a back seat to other objectives, and although
biodiversity conservation has now become an explicit policy goal, it is
still in tension with other governmental priorities and is subject to
conflicting statutory mandates.
1.

Cross-CuttingStatutes Affecting Biodiversity Conservation

Each federal land management agency is subject to unique statutory requirements and constraints, but all must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 63 and the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA").64 Although these statutes
remain important pieces of the biodiversity conservation policy puzzle, as presently written, they neither constitute nor require a broad
biodiversity strategy.
a. NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act
Under NEPA, federal land managers are required to prepare detailed environmental impact statements ("EIS") to accompany all
"proposals for legislation and other major [f]ederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 65 Biodiversity
59

See GAO, LAND OwNERsHIP, supra note 58, at 18-19 (as of Sept. 30, 1994). The

Forest Service is part of the Department of Agriculture, while the BLM, Fish and Wildlife
Service, and National Park Service are all divisions of the Department of Interior. The
Department of Defense is the next largest federal land manager with less than 2% of the
nation's land. See id. at 2. The rest of the federal lands are small holdings spread among
various agencies.
60 See generally id. (detailing federal land holdings).
61 See id. at 25-26. The GAO lists all National Park Service lands, all units of the National Wildlife Refuge System, all designated Wilderness Areas, and various other use-restricted areas such as Research Natural Areas, Wild and Scenic Rivers, and Areas of Critical
Environmental Concern as "conservation" acreage. Id.
62 SeeJack Ward Thomas & Hal Salwasser, BringingConservationBiology into a Position of
Influence in NaturalResource Managemen, CONSERVA-rION BIoLocw, June 1989, at 123, 125.
63 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
64 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994).
65 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
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considerations are clearly within NEPA's ambit; binding regulations
promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality direct that federal agencies are to report impacts on ecosystems, including "effects
on natural resources and on the components, structures, and functioning of affected ecosystems," in an EIS. 66 But as valuable as NEPA
might become as an information-generating statute under which federal agencies may be compelled to study and disclose the biodiversity
impacts of their actions, 67 courts have interpreted the requirements of
NEPA to be purely procedural. 68 Agencies must produce the required
information, but are not required to act in such a way as to reduce
adverse environmental impacts or to increase environmental benefits. 69 NEPA's defenders nonetheless claim that the threat of NEPA
litigation creates a powerful incentive for agencies to carefully sift and
evaluate environmental impacts.7 0 In some instances, production of
the required information may be sufficient to alter their behavior,
either alone or in combination with a fear of political backlash, if
dearly adverse environmental impacts are identified through the
NEPA process. NEPA can thus be a useful educational tool, compelling federal managers to study and consider the biodiversity implications of their management policy, but its substantive effect is limited.
b. Endangered Species Act
Federal land managers must also comply with the ESA, a powerful
71
measure aimed explicitly at preventing the extinction of species.
Unlike NEPA, the ESA imposes not only procedural requirements,
but also substantive constraints on the actions of federal land manag66 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1996); see also CEQ, INCORPORATING BIODIvERsry, supranote 17,
at 23 (stating that NEPA requires federal agencies to "consider all reasonably foreseeable
environmental effects of their actions. To the extent that federal actions affect biodiversity, and that it is possible to both anticipate and evaluate those effects, NEPA requires
federal agencies to do so.").
67 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1483 (W.D. Wash.
1992) (stating that NEPA requires the Forest Service to consider the biodiversity implications of logging in old-growth forests), affid sub nom, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Espy, 998
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993).
68 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (holding that NEPA does not mandate particular results, but
only a fully informed decision).
69 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989) (noting that so long as the agency has identified and evaluated the environmental impacts of
the proposed action, NEPA does not bar it from concluding that other factors outweigh
environmental values). For a more detailed discussion, see Carlson, supra note 6, at 25-29.
70 See Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management of the
PublicLands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REv. 43, 45 (1990).
71 See BeATu, supra note 4, at 21-22 (ESA is "powerful law" providing "the cornerstone of federal efforts to protect species and biodiversity"); Doremus, supranote 5, at 265
(ESA is "widely regarded as the strongest legislation ever devised for the protection of
nonhuman species").
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ers. Under the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior is required to list a
species as "endangered" if he finds that it is "in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range, '72 or as
"threatened" if it is "likely to become an endangered species within
the foreseeable future."7 3 Listing determinations are required to be
made solely on the basis of the best scientific information, without
regard to economic consequences. 74 At present, more than one thou75
sand U.S. species are listed as endangered or threatened.
The ESA contains provisions for preservation that have been implemented with mixed results. The Act requires the Secretary to designate critical habitats for listed species when "prudent and
determinable," 76 and to prepare and implement recovery plans
designed to ensure the species' long-term viability.77 However, critical
habitats have been identified for only about one out of every eight
listed species, 78 and only about two-thirds of listed species have approved recovery plans. 79 The Act also authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to acquire lands containing habitats for listed species 8 ° using
72
16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), 1533(a)(1) (1994). In the case of marine and anadromous
species, this responsibility is shared with the Secretary of Commerce. See id. § 1533(a) (2).
78
Id. § 1532(20). There is no bright line separating "endangered" from "threatened"
species, leaving the Secretary considerable discretion in the listing process. See infra notes
97-99 and accompanying text.
74 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (1) (A). The listing process can be cumbersome and
lengthy. SeeJon Welner, Note, Natural Communities ConservationPlanning:An Ecosystem Approach to ProtectingEndangered Species, 47 STAN. L. REV. 319, 327 (1995). The U.S. Department of the Interior's Inspector General noted in 1990 that at then-current rates of listing,
it could take up to forty-eight years to make listing determinations for all species then on
the candidate list, and that thirty-four species had already become extinct while awaiting
listing. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, AuDrr REPORT: THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES PROGRAM 5, 7 (Rep. No. 90-98, 1990).
75
Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Box Score: Listings and
Recovery Plans (as of Oct. 31, 1997) (visited Nov. 6, 1997) <http://www.fRvs.gov/-r9endspp/
boxscore.html> [hereinafter Box Score] (listing 1,074 U.S. species as "endangered" or
"threatened").
76
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (3). Critical habitats are habitats "essential for the conservation
of the species" which "may require special management considerations or protection." Ia
§ 1532 (5) (A) (i). Critical habitat designation is based not only on scientific criteria, but
also on "economic impact, and any other relevant impact." Id. § 1533(b) (2).
77 See id. § 1533(f).
78
See Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species
General Statistics (as of Jan. 31, 1997) (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <http://ww.fws.gov/
-r9endspp/esastats.htnl> [hereinafter Endangered Species Statistics] (providing that critical
habitat had been designated for 123 of the 1067 species then listed as "endangered" or
"threatened").
79 See id. (noting that 644 of 1067 listed species had approved recovery plans). An
approved recovery plan is merely a plan, however, and carries no guarantee that funds will
be appropriated to carry out the concrete measures necessary to implement the plan. See
ICHARDJ. TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE: U.S. PoLrTms AND THE PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL Divensrry 245 (1990).

80

16 U.S.C. § 1534(a).
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funds from the Land and Water Conservation Fund.8 ' However, ex82
penditures for endangered species habitats have been quite modest.
Once a species is listed as threatened or endangered, the ESA
prohibits federal agencies from taking any action that "is likely to
jeopardize [its] continued existence" or "result in the destruction or
adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species."8 3 Prior to

taking any action that might adversely affect a listed species or land
designated as its critical habitat, the agency must consult with the
FWS,8 4 which then issues a "biological opinion" as to whether the action would jeopardize the species and recommends mitigation
85
measures.
In restricting the actions of federal agencies, the ESA has sometimes produced dramatic effects. The listing of an undistinguished
three-inch fish, the snail darter, as an endangered species resulted in
suspension of construction of the Tellico Dam on the Tennessee
River, despite an $80 million investment in the projectR6 The identification of the northern spotted owl as a threatened species led to the
suspension of timber sales throughout thousands of acres of old
87
growth forest in the Pacific Northwest.
81 The Land and Water Conservation Fund, created by the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 4601-4 to -11 (1994)), consists of revenues from surplus land sales, outer continental
shelf oil and gas leases, a federal motorboat fuels tax, and recreational user fees, which may
be used to acquire national park, conservation, and recreation areas. The fund also provides grants to states for the purpose of acquiring recreational and conservation lands. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SETTING PRIORITIES FOR LAND CONSERVATION 52-55 (1993)
[hereinafter PRIORITIES FOR CONSERVATION]; Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Cog-

gins, FederalRecreationalLand Policy: The Rise and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation
Fund, 9 COLuM.J. ENvTL. L. 125, 138-47 (1984).
82 See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 585 n.77 (noting that over a 26-year period from 1967
through 1993, the FWS spent a total of $238 million to acquire 349,405 acres of land under
§ 5(a) and predecessor statutes). The Land and Water Conservation Fund nominally re-

ceives some $900 million annually in revenues, but those funds can be spent for conservation purposes only to the extent appropriated by Congress, and far smaller amounts have
usually been appropriated, with the rest made available to the Treasury for other uses. See
PRIORriES FOR CONSERVATION, supranote 81, at 52. If all revenues nominally credited to
the Fund are counted, its accumulated unexpended (because unappropriated) surplus
now exceeds $10 billion. See Congressional Research Serv., Land and Water Conservation
Fund: Current Funding (visited Sept. 12, 1997) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/nrgen-l.html>.
83
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
84
Or, in the case of marine or anadromous species, the agency must consult the
National Marine Fisheries Service.
85
By regulation, the FWS must issue a "jeopardy" opinion if the proposed federal
action either jeopardizes the survival of the species or destroys or adversely modifies critical
habitat, essentially collapsing the two requirements into one. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h) (3)
(1996); see also Katherine Simmons Yagerman, ProtectingCritical Habitat Under the Federal
Endangered Specie4 Act 20 ENvrL. L. 811, 838-45 (1990) (detailing problems with the singlepronged approach).
86 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-95 (1978). Congress later exempted the project
from the ESA.
87
See Northern Spotted Ow v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
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As show-stopping as the Act has sometimes been, however, its limitations as a biodiversity conservation measure are equally well understood. First, the ESA employs a species-by-species approach that does
little to protect ecosystem diversity, genetic diversity within species, or
nonlisted species. 88 At first glance, it might seem obvious that saving
any species from extinction would benefit biodiversity.8 9 However, efforts to protect a single species may sometimes have adverse effects on
other species or on ecosystems, and the conservation measures
adopted under the ESA's species-specific approach may not always
produce a net biodiversity benefit. For example, to provide prey for
the timber wolf-a listed species-the Forest Service sought to increase white-tailed deer populations by encouraging logging in Wisconsin's national forests, reasoning that the logging would increase
the new-growth vegetation available to the deer.90 Greater logging,
however, fragments the forest and alters its vegetational composition,
consequences adverse to many other species and to the forest ecosystem itself.9 1 Of course, nothing in the ESA requires federal land managers to adopt such narrow, single-species management strategies, and
indeed, one of the stated purposes of the Act is to "provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved." 92 Yet, a single-species
management approach is also not prohibited, and, consequently, federal land managers may comply with the operational provisions of the
Act without taking into consideration adverse effects on ecosystems
and nonlisted species.

88 See Smith, supranote 38, at 386-88; Christopher A. Cole, Note, Species Conservationin
the United States: The Ultimate Failureof the EndangeredSpecies Act and OtherLand Use Laws, 72
B.U. L. REv. 343, 346-47, 358 (1992); Doremus, supra note 5, at 284-85, 304-09.
89 Cf BAL, supra note 4, at 6-9 (advancing arguments for protection of biodiversity
and endangered species as if the two were inseparably linked); idat 7 (stating that because
each species occupies a unique ecological niche, the "loss of one species may have longterm 'cascading' effects, setting off an ecological chain reaction"); TOBIN, supranote 79, at
5 (implicitly equating "protection of biological diversity" with "protection of... species").
90

See Walter Kuhlmann, Wildlfe's Burden, in BIODIVERSIrY AND THE LAW, supra note 1,

at 189, 190-91. Not coincidentally, measures to increase the size of the deer herd are also
politically popular with Wisconsin's recreational hunters.
91 See id. Old growth forests are characterized by low light levels, large standing and
fallen dead trees, multiple layers of vegetation, and gradations of thermal environment, all
factors conducive to roosting, nesting, and hiding by bird and animal species that may not
thrive in openings or newly emergent forested areas. See Thomas A. Spies &Jerry F. Franklin, The Diversity and Maintenance of Old-Growth Forests, in MANAGED LANDSCAPES, supra note

53, at 296, 303.
92 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Oliver Houck argues that the principal reason we should care about endangered species at all is that they are a proxy for,
and indirectly a means of protecting, endangered ecosystems. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We
ProtectEndangered Species, and What Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on PrivateProperty
to Protect Them Constitute "Takings", 80 IowA L. REv. 297, 301 (1995).
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Second, the ESA intervenes, if at all, only after a species has been
pushed to the brink of extinction; it does nothing to prevent a species
from becoming threatened or endangered in the first place.9 3 Such
"emergency room care" 94 is highly inefficient because, by the time action is taken, available remedies are limited and populations of the
listed species may be so diminished, and habitats so degraded, that
recovery is either impossible or extremely costly.95 In addition, with
populations in deep decline, genetic diversity within the species may
drastically and irretrievably decline before any protective action is
96
taken.
A third, well-understood limitation of the ESA is that it has generally afforded greater protection to high-profile "charismatic" species,
especially large vertebrates, at the expense of lesser-known or less popular species,9 7 even though proportionally more plant and noncharismatic animal species are in peril. 98 The Act allows listing of
geographically distinct subpopulations of vertebrates that become endangered or threatened, even if the species as a whole is not in danger, whereas geographically distinct populations of plants and
invertebrates are not afforded similar protection. 99 Similarly, the Act
93 See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 255; Craig R. Groves, Candidate and Sensitive Species
Programs: Lessons for Cost-Effective Conservation, in ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY. FINDING
THE LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PRoCESs 227, 228 (Tim W. Clark et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter
ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY]; Doremus, supra note 5, at 316-17.
94 William K. Stevens, Battle Looms Over U.S. Policy on Species, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993,
at Cl.
95 See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 255-56; Groves, supra note 93, at 228; Doremus, supra
note 5, at 316-17. For example, in highly urbanized Riverside County, California, the last
remaining habitat for the endangered Stephens' kangaroo rat sold for $400,000 per acre.
See BEATLm', supra note 4, at 206.

See Doremus, supra note 5, at 284-85; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE
ACT 142 (1995) ("Small population sizes usually lead to the
loss of genetic variation, especially if the populations remain small for long periods.").
97
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES: MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS COULD ENHANCE RECOVERY PROGRAM 4-5 (GAO/RCED-89-5, 1988); Douglas 0. Linder, "Are All Species CreatedEqual?" and OtherQuestionsShaping Wildlife Law, 12 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 157, 174-75 (1988);James Drozdowski, Note, Savingan EndangeredAct: The Casefora
Biodiversity Approach to ESA ConservationEfforts, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 553, 565, 571-72
(1995). This bias in favor of charismatic species is characteristic of conservation policy
generally. See McNaughton, supra note 38, at 115 ("Conservation policy is generally blind
to the two classes of organisms most important to human welfare: plants and microbes...
[which] are the crucial, indispensable components of every ecosystem .. ").
98 See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, PRIORITIES FOR CONSERVATION: 1996 ANNUAL REPORT
CARD FOR U.S. PLANT AND ANIMAL SPECIES 8-9 (1996) (noting that birds and mammals are
proportionally the leastjeopardized groups, with two-thirds of freshwater mussels and crayfish, approximately 40% of amphibians and freshwater fish, and one-third of flowering
plants categorized as "vulnerable" or "imperiled," in contrast to 16% of mammals and 15%
of birds).
99 The ESA defines "species" to include "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants,
and any distinctpopulationsegment of any vertebratefish or wildlife which interbreedswhen mature"
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994) (emphasis added). By negative implication, then, a subpopulation of a plant or invertebrate species is not a "species" entitled to protection if endan96

AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
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prohibits the "taking" of any listed animal species on private lands, 10 0
but provides little protection to plants found in similarocales. 1 1 Historically, the FWS's lists of endangered and threatened species have
been heavily weighted in favor of vertebrates. 10 2 Even among listed
species, a handful of charismatic species such as the bald eagle, the
peregrine falcon, and the spotted owl receive a disproportionately
103
large share of agency resources.
Fourth, although the ESA is often perceived as stringent in its
requirements, there is in fact a great deal of flexibility in its application.10 4 The FWS routinely approves thousands of proposed agency
gered or threatened. Thus, for example, although the gray wolf as a species is not
endangered because there are numerous gray wolves in Canada and Alaska, geographically
distinct subpopulations in the lower forty-eight states are classified as "endangered" or
"threatened" and protected by the ESA. Similar protection would not be available to a
plant or invertebrate species that is abundant in Canada or Alaska but nearing extinction
in the lower forty-eight states. Cf NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 96, at 92
("There is no biological or physical reason that standards relating to habitat protection,
survival, and recovery should differ for plants and animals and for public and private
lands.").
100 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (B) (making it unlawful to "take any such species within the
United States or the territorial sea of the United States").
101 See George Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American
Law : The Recent Evolution of FederalLaw for PreservingFloralDiversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J.
247, 295-98 (1987). The ESA makes it unlawful to "remove and reduce to possession" any
listed plant species from federal lands, and to "remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy
any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any
State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1538(a) (2) (B). Consequently, under the ESA, it is entirely lawful to take or destroy endangered or threatened plant species on one's own land, or on any private land with permission of the owner, so long as state law does not prohibit that act. See Farrier, supranote
2, at 372-73.
102 See Murphy, supra note 47, at 182-87 (suggesting the imbalance is due in part to an
agency culture at FWS emphasizing traditional fish and wildlife species, and in part to the
perception that listing of invertebrates might undermine public support for the ESA itself);
see also STEVEN LEwIs YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY- IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED

SPECIES ACT 72-75 (1982) (discussing the effects of available information and of the personal and professional values and goals of FWS staff members on listing decisions);J. Alan
Clark, The EndangeredSpecies Act: Its History, Provisions, and Effectiveness, in ENDANGERED SPECIEs RECOVERY, supra note 93, at 19, 31-32. Currently, of the 449 listed animal species, only
140 are invertebrates, see Box Score; supra note 75, even though invertebrate species vastly
outnumber vertebrates. Recently, however, the FWS has made dramatic progress in listing
threatened and endangered plants. Before 1985, only 79 plant species had been listed. See
Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Listed FloweringPlantSpecies
Index by Lead Region and Status (as of Nov. 30, 1997) (visited Dec. 9, 1997) <http://
wv.fs.gov/-r9endspp/pltldata.html>; Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Widlife Serv., U.S. Listed Non-FloweringPlantSpecies Index by LeadRegion and Status (as of Nov. 30,
1997) (visited Dec. 9, 1997) <http://www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/plt2data.html>. Today, 625
plant species are listed, constituting a majority of all listed species. See Box Score; supra note
75.
103

See MichaelJ. Bean, CreatingPolicyon Species Diversity, in MANAGED LANDSCAPEs, supra

note 53, at 689, 692.
104 See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce; 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 358 (1993) (describing how
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actions after informal consultation. Even upon formal consultation,
the FWS issues "no jeopardy" opinions in the vast majority of cases,
because it finds that the action, however detrimental to the listed species, falls short of creating an imminent danger of extinction across
the species' range.10 5 In the rare cases where the FWS initially issues a
'Jeopardy" opinion, the agency is often allowed to proceed with the
action by incorporating mitigation measures. 10 6 Finally, if all else
falls, the agency proposing the action may appeal to a cabinet-level
Endangered Species Committee, 10 7 popularly known as the "God
squad," which may grant exemptions to the "no jeopardy" rule if it
finds that there is no reasonable and prudent alternative to the proposed action, that its benefits outweigh its costs, and that the agency is
taking reasonable steps to mitigate and minimize the adverse consequences.' 0 8 Only rarely have the ESA requirements significantly
delayed or canceled federal projects. 10 9
Responding to these criticisms, the FWS and the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS") have recently undertaken some significant
initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of the ESA as a biodiversity
discretion-enhancing interpretations have allowed "federal agencies to avoid conflict
under the Act to an extraordinary degree").
105
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr: TYPEs AND NUMBER OF
IMPLEMENTING AcrIONS (GAO/RCED 92-131BR, 1992) (finding more than 16,000 informal
consultations allowing proposed project to go forward over a 5-year period, compared to
2,000 formal consultations, resulting in 181 jeopardy opinions); TOBIN, supra note 79, at
188 (summarizing formal and informal consultations and jeopardy opinions over a 10-year
period); id,at 262-63 (contending that the most plausible explanation for the paucity of
formal consultations and jeopardy opinions is the FWS's desire to avoid conflict with other
federal agencies); Michael J. Bean, Taking Stock- The Endangered Species Act in the Eye of a
Growing Storm, 13 PUB. LAND L. REv. 77, 80-81 (1992) (noting that, annually, more than
95% of the ten thousand to twenty thousand proposed federal actions potentially affecting
listed species are approved after informal consultation; of those proceeding to formal consultation, 85% result in a determination of "no jeopardy").
106
See Bean, supra note 105, at 80-81; Clark, supra note 102, at 24; Houck, supra note
104, at 318-21. Between 1987 and 1995, the FWS issued only 600 "jeopardy" opinions out
of 186,000 endangered species consultations; and of these 600, the FWS ultimately approved "reasonable and prudent alternatives" in all but 100 cases, resulting in an overall
approval rate of 99.9% of actions it reviewed. See Endangered Species Statistics,supranote 78.
107
See Houck, supra note 104, at 330-33. The Committee is composed of the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army, and the Interior, the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors, the Administrators of the EPA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and designated representatives of each affected state. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(e) (3) (1994).
108
See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (1). This hierarchy of opportunities for compromise produces, unsurprisingly, a great deal of compromise, as "[tihe higher in the hierarchy the
dispute goes, the greater the likelihood that compromise will be achieved." YAFFEE, supra
note 102, at 99.
109
See Steven L. Yaffee, Avoiding Endangered Specieks/Development Conflicts Through Interagency Consultation, in BALANCING ON THE BIUNK, supra note 47, at 86, 86-89. Yaffee suggests,
however, that a low rate of project cancellations could as easily indicate the ESA's success
as its failure, if agencies are incorporating endangered species protection into project planning. Id. at 90-91.
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conservation tool. 10 These include: conducting group listings on an
1 2 and keystone" 3
ecosystem basis; identifying umbrella,"' indicator,
species as priority candidates for listing, thereby importing a broader
focus on ecosystem protection; emphasizing the listing of plants and
nonvertebrate animal species;" 4 renewing the emphasis on critical
habitat designation and recovery plans and explicitly incorporating
ecosystem management and biodiversity considerations into these
documents;" 5 and using the leverage created by the ESA's prohibitory
provisions to induce government agencies and private landowners to
cooperate in regional ecosystem-wide, multi-species habitat conserva6
tion planning."
Overall, the ESA plays an important role in forcing federal land
management agencies to address the needs of listed species on public
lands." 7 However, because its benefits are limited to listed species, it
falls far short of a comprehensive biodiversity conservation measure,
even with respect to the federal lands where its benefits are greatest.
110 See Notice of Interagency Cooperative Policy for the Ecosystem Approach to the
Endangered Species Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 34,273 (1994); Ruhl, supra note 2, at 587-600.
Ill An umbrella species is one with such large area requirements that protecting its
habitat will simultaneously protect the lesser included habitats of numerous other species.
See Noss, supra note 50, at 234-35.
112 An indicator species is one whose population serves as a proxy for the health of the
broader ecosystem of which it is a part. An example is the northern spotted owl, whose
habitat is old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest upon which as many as 1,000 other
species of birds, mammals, amphibians, reptiles, invertebrates, and plants depend. See
Doremus, supranote 5, at 306-08. But cf GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 106 (questioning the
assumption of "an overlap in different species' living requirements," upon which the concept of indicator species rests).
113 A keystone species is one that performs such essential ecological functions within
an ecosystem that its disappearance would jeopardize the entire ecosystem. See Doremus,
supra note 5, at 306. Examples include coral, which forms the coral reefs that provide
critical habitat for scores of marine species, and the beaver, which creates and maintains
wetland habitat for dozens of plant and animal species. See Noss, supra note 50, at 233-34.
114 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife Plants; Review of Plant and Animal Taxa
That Are Candidates or Proposed for Listing as Endangered or Threatened, Annual Notice
of Findings on Recycled Petitions, and Annual Description of Progress on Listing Actions,
62 Fed. Reg. 49,398 (1997) (proposed Sept. 19, 1997).
115 See Keiter, supra note 11, at 308-09 (describing how new recovery plans for the
northern spotted owl and grizzly bear incorporate ecosystem-level protection, including
provision for corridors linking habitat areas to minimize adverse effects of fragmentation).
116 Perhaps the most significant example on public lands is the Clinton Administration's attempt to resolve the spotted owl controversy through an ambitious ecosystem-wide,
multispecies habitat planning process delineating future uses of the old growth forests of
the Pacific Northwest. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DRAFT SupPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON MANAGEMENT OF HABITAT FOR LATE-SuC-

CESSIONAL AND OLD-GROwTH FORSr RELATED SPECIES WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN
SPOTTED OWiL (1993).
117 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 96, at 15 (despite shortcomings, "the

ESA has successfully prevented some species from becoming extinct" and its retention will
help to prevent species extinction).
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The Federal Land Managers

2.
a.

The Bureau of Land Management

The BLM manages more land than any other agency or organization in the nation, public or private, controlling over 264 million acres
or 11.4% of our national land area." 8 The BLM is the residual manager of original public domain lands neither disposed of nor withdrawn for other purposes such as national forests, national parks, or
wildlife refuges. 119 Of the BLM's nationwide total, 165 million acres
are rangeland, and another 90 million acres are forested, the latter
principally in Alaska. 120 BLM lands also include grasslands, brush12 1
lands, tundra, wetlands, and various kinds of bodies of water.
BLM manages its lands under the broad multiple-use mandate of
22
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"),1
which includes ecological and environmental considerations within a
broader framework of multiple-use management objectives. Thus, the
BLM is instructed to manage the public lands "in a manner that will
protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values;
that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands
in their natural condition; [and] that will provide food and habitat for
fish and wildlife."1 23 At the same time, the BLM is obligated to "provide food and habitat for ... domestic animals" and to "provide for
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use."1 24 The BLM is

also required to manage its lands "in a manner which recognizes the
Nation's need for domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from the public lands."'1 5 Under this "have your cake and eat it
too" approach, the BLM holds broad discretionary authority to balance competing land uses, but historically, its land management poliSee BUREAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 6 tbl.4.
119 In addition, the BLM manages some 2.6 million acres of lands in western Oregon
that were previously conveyed for railroad construction, but were later reconveyed to the
federal government. Id. at 6 tbl.4, 9 tbl.5.
120 BLM holdings include 88 million acres in Alaska. Id. at 6 tbl.4.
121
See KEYSroNE CENTER, FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE KEYSTONE PouCY DIALOGUE
ON BIOLOGICAL DnvEsrr ON FEDERAL LANDs 49 (1991) [hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT].
122 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994). FLPMA directs the BLM to "manage the public
118

lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield" except where a tract of land has
been "dedicated to specific uses according to any other provisions of law." Id § 1732(a);

see also id. § 1712(c) (1) (directing BLM to "use and observe the principles of multiple use
and sustained yield" in drawing up and revising land use plans). FLPMA defines multiple
use as "management of the public lands and their various resource values so that they are
utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of the American people" for "recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values." Id- § 1702(c).

123

Id. § 1701 (a) (8).

124
125

Id,

Id § 1701(a)(12).
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cies have given primacy to commodity production, especially grazing
and mining. 126 Indeed, BLM is often cited as the prototypical example of the "agency capture" phenomenon, in which concentrated economic interests having the greatest and most immediate stake in the
outcome, and, therefore, the greatest incentive to mobilize resources
to influence the process, come to dominate the agency's
27
decisionmaking.
Only 1.6 million acres are currently under wilderness designation, but another 26.5 million acres of roadless areas are currently
designated as wilderness study areas. 12 8 Additional BLM lands are
use-restricted under a variety of designations. These include Areas
of Critical Environmental Concern, 29 National Conservation
Areas,' 30 Research Natural Areas ("RNAs"), 13 1 and Wild and Scenic
126

See George Cameron Coggins, Snail Darters and Pork BarrelsRevisited: Reflections on

EndangeredSpecies and Land Use in America, in BALANCING ON THE BIUNK, supra note 47, at 62,

65; Keiter, supra note 11, at 312, 318. But cf CAwLzY, supra note 33, at 42 (contending that
since the enactment of FLPMA, BLM policy has emphasized environmental concerns at
the expense of commodity production, to the consternation of Western ranchers and
other commodity-producing users of federal lands).
127 See, e.g., TOBIN, supra note 79, at 40; George Cameron Coggins, Some Directionsfor
Reform of PublicNaturalResources Law, 3 ENVrL. L. 67, 72-73 (1988) (describing the BLM as
"the very model of the agency capture phenomenon, the Rodney Dangerfield of
agencies").
128
See BuREAu OF LA- MANAGEMENT, supra note 57, at 58 tbl.38, 60-62 tbl.40; see also
infra Part IIA2.e (explaining the significance of wilderness and wilderness study
designation).
129 These are "areas within the public lands where special management attention is
required.., to protect and prevent irreparable damage to important historic, cultural, or
scenic values, fish and wildlife resources or other natural systems or processes." 43 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a). In drawing up land use plans, the BLM is instructed to "give priority to the
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern." Id, § 1712(c) (3).
Areas of Critical Environmental Concern include sites set aside for a variety of nonbiological values and recreational hunting, as well as ecological reserves, and the BLM has been
criticized for its reluctance to use this authority to protect representative ecosystems. See
Keiter, supra note 11, at 312 & n.106. Currently, some 10 million acres are designated
Areas of Critical Environmental Concern. See BuRFAu OF LAND MANAGEMENT, supra note
57, at 139 tbl.5-7.
130 These may be established either by act of Congress, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 460y (1994)
(designating King Range National Conservation Area), or by administrative withdrawals,
see, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1714.
131 BLM regulations require the Bureau to set aside RNAs "for the management and
protection of public lands having natural characteristics that are unusual or... of scientific
or other special interest." 43 C.F.R. § 8223.0-1 (1996). RNAs must be "sufficient [in]
number and size to adequately provide for scientific study, research, and demonstration
purposes." H § 8223.0-6. They are to be established on land having "one or more of the
following characteristics: (1) A typical representation of a common plant or animal association; (2) an unusual plant or animal association; (3) a threatened or endangered plant or
animal species; (4) a typical representation of common geologic, soil, or water features; or
(5) outstanding or unusual geologic, soil, or water features." Id. § 8223.0-5. By thus providing for the BLM to protect both representative and unique biological communities, the
regulations appear to contemplate and authorize a system of biological reserves on BLM
lands, but thus far only a few small areas have been designated as RNAs. See GAO, LAND
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Rivers,' 3 2 as well as one major National Monument, 33 and National
Recreation Areas. 134 Altogether some 58 million acres, or 22% of the
BLM's total, are thus managed "primarily for conservation" according
to the General Accounting Office, 3 5 although much of this acreage is
reserved primarily for recreational use or selected for scenic rather
than biological values.
A common view is that BLM lands are the nation's left-over
lands-too harsh, arid, and inaccessible for any purpose other than
livestock grazing or mineral production. The common perception is
that the lands are, in many cases, left in poor condition as a result of
decades of overgrazing and mismanagement and are thus not particularly interesting from a biodiversity conservation perspective.' 3 6 However, more recent research suggests that these lands encompass a
broad range of ecosystem types providing habitat to species and communities of native flora and fauna not found elsewhere,1 3 7 and that
OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 26 (providing that 326,000 acres of BLM land have been
designated as RNAs).
132
SeeWild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1994). In total, 829,000
acres of BLM lands have been designated as Wild and Scenic Rivers. See GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 26. Although these designations are primarily based upon recreational and scenic values, ravine and riparian ecosystems are often biodiversity rich and
provide habitat for many species not found elsewhere. Thus, the protection afforded
under this statute may make a significant contribution to biodiversity conservation.
133
National Monuments may be created by acts of Congress or by presidential proclamation pursuant to the Antiquities Act of 1906, which authorizes the President to withdraw
public lands to preserve "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest." 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). Under this authority,
President Clinton designated 1.7 million acres of BLM lands in southwestern Utah as the
Grand Staircase-Escalate National Monument, the first and only National Monument to
remain under BLM management. Proclamation No. 6920, 3 C.F.R., 1996 Comp. 64
(1997).
134
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 460mm-2 to -4 (1994) (designated the White Mountains National Recreation Area in Alaska, to be managed by the BLM under authority of the
FLPMA).
135 GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 6.

136 See, e.g., VICTORIA EDWARDS, DEA-ING IN DVERsrT 3 (1995) (stating that BLM lands
are "relatively sparse as a pool of biological and genetic diversity"); George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management V Prescriptionsfor Reform, 14 ENvrL. L. 497,
500-02 (1984). In part, this perception may result from the common error of conflating
biodiversity with lush vegetation or, more generally, with biological productivity, i.e., the
total biomass supported by a given land area. Some biologically productive ecosystems
support relatively little species richness and low levels of endemism, while some harsh, arid,
low-productivity Western landscapes provide unique microclimates, rare ecological niches,
and high levels of endemism. See, e.g., Robert Costanza et al., Scale and Biodiversity in Coastal
and Estuarine Ecosystems, in BIODIVERSrrY Loss, supra note 24, at 84, 90-91 (noting that
coastal and marine ecosystems generally rank low in species richness and endemism but
high in biological productivity).
137

See COMMITTEE ON RANGELAND

COUNCIL, RANGELAND

CLASSIFICATION, BD. ON AGRic., NAT'L RESEARCH

HEALTH: NEW METHODS TO CLASSIFY, INVENTORY AND MONITOR

RANGELANDS 18-19 (1994) (stating that the federal government owns 43% of U.S. rangelands, which constitute a diverse array of ecosystems supporting an equally diverse array of
plant and animal life); REED F. Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE'S LEGACY.
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the BLM lands are, collectively, relatively rich in biodiversity.' 38 In the
final analysis, although some BLM lands may be of little value for
either commercial or biodiversity conservation purposes, and others
may be of greater commercial than biological value, some BLM lands
include habitats and ecosystems that are deserving of protection.
b.

The Forest Service

The U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service is the nation's
second-largest land management agency, responsible for 191 million
acres of land. 139 Although most Forest Service lands are in the West,
the Forest Service also has a major presence in several important eastern ecoregions, including the upper Great Lakes, north140
ern New England, the southern Appalachians, and the Ozarks.
Some 34.5 million acres of Forest Service land, or about 18%
of the total, are under wilderness designation, with another 6.6
million acres designated as wilderness study areas. 14 1 Additional
areas are protected as Research Natural Areas, 142 Wild and Scenic
220-21 (1996) (stating that rangelands make up
roughly 70% of the terrestrial surface, and include a wide variety of natural communities
and ecosystem types); Neil E. West, Strategiesfor Maintenance and Repair of Biotic Community
Diversity on Rangelands, in MANAGED LANDSCIAPES, supra note 53, at 326, 326 ("rangelands
constitute the largest category of generally non-tilled, but extensively used land across the
world" and include a "wide variety of ecosystem types" such as shrublands, grasslands,
deserts, tundra, heaths, salt marshes, and post-clearcut forests).
138 See KEYSToNE REPORT, supra note 121, at 49 (stating that partial study of BLM lands
in 10 Western states found at least 114 of 261 Bailey-Kfichler natural vegetation types);
Crumpacker et al., supra note 38, at 114 (finding BLM lands include slightly more than
half of all major terrestrial and wetland ecosystem types, a "surprisingly large number... in
view of the fact that most of these lands occur only in the western half of the United
States").
139 See National Park Serv., The National Park System Acreage (last modified Apr. 24,
1997) <http://www.nps.gov/legacy/acreage.html> [hereinafter National Park System Acreage]. Of all the major land management agencies, the Forest Service has the least land and
the lowest percentage of its overall holdings in Alaska, where it manages 22 million acres.
See GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 16-17. Its holdings there, however, include
the magnificent Tongass National Forest in the Alaskan panhandle, the largest and, many
would argue, the most ecologically important unit in the entire National Forest system. See,
e.g., Joby Warrick, Dispute in Alaskan Logging Helps Stall Pena Nomination,WASH. POST, Mar.
1, 1997, atA2 (noting that 17 million acre Tongass is "home to the North America's largest
remaining temperate rain forest, a rare expanse of old growth trees and rare wildlife that
environmentalists consider the crown jewel of this country's national forests").
140 Great Lakes: Mich.-2.8 million acres, Minn.-2.8 million, Wis.-1.5 million; New
England: N.H.-721,000, Vt.-341,000; southern Appalachians: Ga.-860,000, Ky.673,000, Tenn-628,000, Va.-1.6 million, W. Va.-1.0 million; Ozarks: Ark.-2.5 million,
Mo.-1.5 million. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1996).
141
See GAO, LAND OWNERSIP, supra note 58, at 26.
142 See id. (approximately 300,000 acres). Forest Service regulations require each forest plan to identify "examples of important forest, shrubland, grassland, alpine, aquatic,
and geologic types that have special or unique charateristics of scientific interest and importance." 36 C.F.R. § 219.25 (1996). The Chief of the Forest Service is to "establish a
PROTECTING AND RESrORING BIODIVERsrIY
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National Recreation Areas, 145 and
National Game Refuges.'
In total, the GAO lists 49.9 million acres,
or 26% of the Forest Service total, as "managed primarily for conservation," although this figure includes recreational and scenic areas as
1 47
well as areas reserved for their biological resources.
46

Forest Service lands not subject to such special designations are
managed under a "multiple use-sustained yield" mandate. 148 In principle, this mandate gives the Forest Service broad discretionary authority to determine appropriate land uses and levels of commodity
outputs. 14 9 In practice, however, this mandate has historically re50
sulted in an emphasis on commodity (especially timber) production
series of research natural areas, sufficient in number and size to illustrate adequately or
typify for research or educational purposes, the important forest and range types in each
forest region, as well as other plant communities that have special or unique characteristics
of scientific interest and importance." Id. § 251.23. These are to be "retained in a virgin or
unmodified condition except where measures are required to maintain a plant community
which the area is intended to represent." Id. Like the BLM Research Natural Areas regulations, see supra note 131, the Forest Service regulations appear to contemplate identification and setting aside of representative and scientifically valuable communities-in effect,
a system of biological reserves. But like the BLM, the Forest Service has thus far committed
only isolated small tracts, comprising a modest fraction of the land under its management,
to Research Natural Area designation. SeeWLIAM S. ALVERSON ET AL., WILD FOaRsS: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND PuBLic POLICY 143-44 & fig.9-2, 160 (1994).
143 See GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 26 (approximately 618,000 acres).
144 See id. (3.4 million acres). Most national monuments are under management of
the National Park Service, although a few located in national forests are managed by the
Forest Service.
145 See id. (2.7 million acres).
146 See id. (1.2 million acres). These are established by acts of Congress.
147 Id. at 24-26.
148 The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994), provides that national forests "shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes," id. § 528, and "utilized in the combination that
will best meet the needs of the American people," including a "high-level annual or regular
periodic output of the various renewable resources." Id- § 531 (a)-(b).
149 See George Cameron Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes: The
Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield"for Public Land Management, 53 U. COLO. L. REV.
229, 240-43 (1982); Keiter, supra note 11, at 309; see also Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803,
807 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that the court should review the agency's factual findings
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard).
150
See ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 142-43; GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 109;
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 135"41 (1992); Oliver A. Houck, On
the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Managemen 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 884 (1997); Keiter,
supra note 11, at 318. This phenomenon is usually attributed to agency capture by timber
interests. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why
"Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARv. ENvrTL. L. REV. 405, 406-07 (1994). An equally plausible
explanation is that a strong internal agency culture has, since the founding of the Forest
Service under Gifford Pinchot in the Progressive era, emphasized the superiority of
scientific/rational/bureaucratic silviculture to maximize sustained commodity output. See
ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILuRE OF SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 48-51 (1995); RANDAL O'TooLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 20-24
(1988). Moreover, congressional appropriations historically have been tied to timber
production, creating a bureaucratic incentive to maximize output at the expense of
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and, secondarily, on recreational use. 15 '
In recent years, however, timber producti6n from the national
forests has declined dramatically under the constraints of the ESA and
other environmental laws. As Congress and administrative agencies
152
have set aside increasingly large areas for conservation purposes,
this decline has prompted congressional response in the form of the
so-called "Salvage Logging" rider to the 1995 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill. 15 3 This bill suspended environmental con-

straints, administrative appeals, and judicial review of timber sales on
thousands of acres of national forest lands. 154 These developments

have left the agency reeling, whipsawed between conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable legal and political demands for both increased
conservation and increased timber output.155
environmental services for which the agency is not similarly rewarded. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREST SERVICE DECISION-MAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING

PERFORMANCE 63-64 (GAO/RCED-97-71 1997) [hereinafter GAO, FOREST SERVICE
DECISION-MAKING]; O'TooLE, supra, at 14; Keiter, supra note 11, at 318.
151 See GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 140-41 (stating that the Forest Service has embraced
recreational use as a secondary goal in a defensive maneuver to prevent additional lands
from being transferred to the rival National Park Service). Recreational use of the national
forests has grown enormously, and this trend is expected to continue. See GAO, FOREST
SERVICE DECISION-MAKING, supranote 150, at 60-61.

152 In western Washington, western Oregon, and northern California, some 47% of
forest service lands previously available for timber production have been set aside for conservation purposes. See GAO, FoREsr SERVICE DECISION-MAKING, supranote 150, at 58. National forest timber production fell from its peak level of 11.3 billion board feet in 1988 to
3.1 billion board feet in 1994. See id at 59. The decline was partially attributable to staff
reductions, government furloughs, and a severe fire season in 1994, which all contributed
to delays in re-establishing a timber sale program held up by injunctions stemming from
the spotted owl controversy. See COUNCIL ON ENVrL. QUALrIY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIY
1994-95 307 [hereinafter CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrYm].
'53
Emergency Salvage Timber Sale Program, Pub. L. No. 104-19 § 2001, 109 Stat. 194,
240 (1995). The statute, adopted as a rider to a budget reconciliation bill, is labeled the
"Logging Without Laws Bill" by some environmental groups because it provides that timber sales on qualifying lands will be deemed to be in compliance with environmental
laws-whether they are or not. See Patti Goldman, 1995 Logging Without Laws: Legislatingby
Budget Rider, ENV'T, Apr. 1, 1996, at 41.
154 See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL QUALT=, supranote 152, at 309-12; GAO, FORST SERVICE
DECISIoN-MAKING, supra note 150, at 64.
155 See GAO, FOREST SERVICE DECISION-MAKING, supra note 150, at 63-66 (describing
how this conflict is played out internally among Forest Service professionals, externally
among competing pressure groups, politically among contending factions in Congress and
in the Administration, and legally through apparently conflicting statutory mandates);
GAO, FORES-T SERVICE: ISSUES RELATED TO MANAGING NATIONAL FORESTS FOR MULTIPLE USES

9 (GAO/T/RCED-96-111 1996) (stating that because demands for both commodity and
noncommodity uses of national forests are expected to intensify, Congress must set clear
priorities if noncommodity uses, especially biodiversity, are to be protected). Many observers attributed the abrupt resignation of Forest Service Chief Jack Ward Thomas, a career
Forest Service wildlife biologist who played a central role in resolving the spotted owl controversy and later became the first nonforester to head the agency, to Thomas's inability to
resolve this fundamental role confusion. See, e.g., Scott Sonner, Forest Sewice Head to Quit;
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The National Forest Management Act of 1976 ("NFMA") ' 56 establishes an elaborate land-use and commodity production planning process. This process produces legally binding, long-term forest plans for
each national forest, thus limiting the agency's management discre157
tion once the forest plan has been adopted.
The Forest Service is the only federal land management agency
with an explicit biodiversity conservation mandate in its organic statute. The NFMA directs the agency to "provide for diversity of plant
and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the
specific land area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives." 158
Implementing regulations require forests to be managed, "where appropriate and to the extent practicable," to "preserve and enhance the
diversity of plant and animal communities .. .so that it is at least as

great as that which would be expected in a natural forest"'159 and to
provide sufficient habitat to "maintain viable populations of existing
native and desired non-native vertebrate species.' 160 The Forest Service carries out these directives primarily by identifying and monitoring "management indicator species"' 61 for each national forest,
"selected because their population changes are believed to indicate
the effects of management activities," 162 and by incorporating goals
for the "maintenance and improvement of habitat for [these] species" 163 in each forest management plan "to the degree consistent
64
with overall multiple use objectives.'
Some of the northern spotted owl's most significant legal victories came from judicial rulings based on the threat of timber harvesting to the species, which had been identified as a management
indicator species for forests in the Pacific Northwest even prior to its
He Urges Truce Over Logging-Wants Politics Put Aside and 'Clear Mission' Defined, SEAirLE
TIMFS, Oct. 11, 1996, atA6.
156
157

16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1617 (1994).
Under the NFMA, each national forest must produce an inventory of forest re-

sources and undergo a broad, interdisciplinary planning process, subject to public input,
before producing a legally binding ten-year to fifty-year forest plan. See generally Charles F.
Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planningin the NationalForests,64 OR.
L. REv. 1, 43-45 (1985) (describing the NFMA planning process); see also GAO, FORST
SERVICE DECISION-MAING, supranote 150, at 28 (stating that forest plans generally take 3 to
10 years to complete and cost up to $8 million per forest).
158 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (3) (B).
159 36 C.FR. § 219.2 7 (g) (1996).
160 Id. § 219.19.
161
Id. § 219.19(a).
162
Id. § 219.19(a) (1). Management indicator species may include listed endangered
and threatened species, other species with special habitat needs, game species, nongame
species of "special interest," or species whose population changes are believed to indicate
the status and health of other species within the community. See id.
165
Id. § 219.19.
164 Id. § 219.19(a).
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listing under the ESA.165 However, the Forest Service's biodiversity
mandate is ultimately a weak one. The statutory language itself suggests that the goal of "providing for diversity" is subsidiary to the
agency's broader mission of "meet[ing] overall multiple use objectives.' 66 The implementing regulations underscore this important
qualification, instructing the Forest Service to manage forests to protect indicator species "to the degree consistent with overall multipleuse objectives," 167 and pursue diversity objectives "where appropriate
and to the extent practicable,"' 168 with reductions in diversity allowable
"where needed to meet overall multiple-use objectives.' 69 By thus
subordinating biodiversity conservation to multiple-use management,
the statute places less emphasis on biodiversity considerations, and appears to leave the Forest Service a free hand to continue its traditional
emphasis on timber output. In practice, the Forest Service has often
interpreted its biodiversity requirements in ways that many environmentalists and conservation biologists have found to be antithetical to
biodiversity conservation goals. 170 For example, the Forest Service has
made questionable selections of indicator species,' 7 ' failed to adequately monitor populations of indicator species, 17 2 and relied on single-species and site-specific mitigation rather than broader, ecosystemprotective conservation measures. 73 Despite the dramatic results in
the spotted owl cases, courts have generally deferred to the Forest Service's "expert" determinations, holding the statutory and regulatory
diversity mandates to be broadly discretionary. 174 Finally, the Forest
165 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1096 (W.D. Wash.
1991), affd,952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991) (enjoining logging in spotted owl habitat because
Forest Service had failed to protect adequate habitat to ensure spotted owl's viability as
required by NFMA and implementing regulations).
166 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) (3) (B) (1994); see also GRUMBINE, supranote 44, at 104 (discussing the vague language of the NFMA).
167 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (a).
168
Id. § 21 9 .27 (g).
169 Id.;
see also GRUMBNE, supranote 44, at 106 (discussing the indicator species selection process).
170 See ALVERSON Er AL., supra note 142, at 218-21; GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 107-08.
171

SeeALvERSON ET Al., supra note 142, at 218-19 (recounting that national forest man-

agers in Wisconsin selected "ubiquitous" species and "habitat generalists" like white-tailed
deer, ground squirrels, and ruffed grouse as indicator species, despite their abundance
and, in some cases, preferences for cut-over areas); Houck, supra note 150, at 920-21
(describing similar selections of ubiquitous species like deer, quail, turkey, squirrel, and
mouse as "indicators" in Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma national forests).
172 See ALvERSON ET AL, supra note 142, at 220; GRUMBINE, supra note 44, at 113
(describing how one national forest plan simply assumes a relationship between acreage of
available habitat and population of indicator species, rather than actually monitoring species population).
173
See ALvEvRSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 217.
174 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995); Krichbaum v. Kelley, 844 F. Supp. 1107, 1111-12 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd, 61 F.3d 900 (4th Cir. 1995); Oregon
Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727, 732 (D. Or. 1993), affd, 109 F.3d
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Service, while continuing to insist that its biodiversity provisions are
procedural only and do not require any particular level of biodiversity
protection, 175 is now considering abandoning its diversity regulations
entirely, in favor of an even more broadly discretionary "ecosystem
17 6
management" approach.
In sum, although the Forest Service manages lands rich in biodiversity under a mandate that explicitly embraces biodiversity conservation, that mandate is a limited one. It is easily overwhelmed by
the agency's primary objective of meeting timber production targets,
toward which it is impelled not only by statutory mandate but also by
interest-group pressure, traditional agency culture, and the bureaucratic imperatives of the budget process.
c.

The National Wildlife Refuge System

The FWS, the federal government's third-largest land management agency with holdings of 92 million acres in 511 national wildlife
refuges in all fifty states, administers the National Wildlife Refuge System. 177 Four-fifths of the system's land holdings-76 million acres in
sixteen wildlife refuges-are found in Alaska. 178 Some 19 million
521, 526 (9th Cir. 1997); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 878 F. Supp. 1295, 130607 (D.S.D. 1993), afjd,46 F.3d 835, 838-39 (8th Cir. 1995); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810
F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (W.D. Ark. 1992), affd in part, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994); see also
Houck, supra note 150, at 919-22.
175
See Robertson, 810 F. Supp. at 1027-28; Keiter, supranote 70, at 56.
176
Under the proposed rule, the "principal goal" of national forest management
would be "to maintain or restore the sustainability of ecosystems," and "diversity of plant
and animal communities" would be recognized as "an inherent feature of sustainable ecosystems," but forest managers would "retain the discretion to determine for each plan area
which conditions are indicative of sustainable ecosystems and how the plan area could be
managed to promote achievement of those conditions," and "nothing in the proposed rule
... establishes a concrete standard regarding ecosystem sustainability or diversity." National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning: Proposed Rule, 60 Fed.
Reg. 18,886, 18,892 (1995). One version of the proposed rule would replace current diversity and indicator species viability requirements with a generalized directive to forest managers to "provide for the protection of habitat capability for sensitive species," id., so as to
.prevent the need for listing the species as threatened or endangered under ESA," id. at
18,894, but management decisions under this provision are "inherently dependent on professionaljudgment," id. at 18,922, that is to say, discretionary. An alternative version would
restate the current requirement that habitat be managed to "maintain viable populations"
of management indicator species, id. at 18,922-23, but in place of the current requirement
that each forest plan include "objectives for the maintenance and improvement of habitat,"
36 C.F.R § 219.19(a) (1996) (emphasis added), the proposed rule would require only
"guidelines," 60 Fed. Reg. at 18,923, adding yet more flexibility to an already highly discretionary regulation. Both versions of the proposed rule would drop the current requirement that forests be managed to produce diversity "at least as great as that which would be
expected in a natural forest." 36 C.F.R. § 219 .27 (g).
177 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Dept. of the Interior, Three New Refuges Added to
National Wildlife Refuge System (Oct. 31, 1996) (press release, on file with author).
178
See GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 17. The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge alone is larger than the combined acreage of all the wildlife refuges outside Alaska. See
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acres, just over one-fifth of the total, are under wilderness designation. 179 Refuges are created by acts of Congress,' 8 0 executive withdrawals of public lands, 18 1 and acquisition through donation or
18 2
purchase under a variety of statutes.
The stated purpose of the system is to develop "a national program of wildlife and ecological conservation and rehabilitation"
through "restoration, preservation, development and management of
wildlife and wildlands habitat."'8 3 Although this might suggest a
broadly conceived goal of biodiversity conservation, historically, most
wildlife refuges have served the narrower purpose of protecting
84
habitat for waterfowl, other migratory birds, and game species.'
Moreover, the FWS has been traditionally identified as the federal
counterpart of state sport fishing and game management agencies.' 8 5
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (visited Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.r7.flvs.gov/nwr/arctic/
descrip.html>.
179
See KESONE REPORT, supranote 121 at 58; Fink, supranote 27, at 35. Some 90% of
the acreage so designated is in Alaska, leaving relatively little wilderness on the FWS' generally smaller holdings in the lower forty-eight states. See id.
180 See Fink, supra note 27, at 10-12.
181 See id. at 10-11. President Theodore Roosevelt used an executive order to create
the first national wildlife refuge, Pelican Island, off the Florida coast, in 1903, and by 1909
had established 53 refuges. See id. at 10-11 & nn.52, 56. The federal government already
owned some 97% of the acreage of today's system at the time it was set aside for conservation purposes. See id. at 11.
182 These include the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715r (1994);
the Migratory Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamp Act, 16 U.S.C. § 718d; the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 661; the North American Wetlands Conservation
Act of 1989, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4413; the Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, 16
U.S.C. §§ 3901-3932; and the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1534. See Fink, supra
note 27, at 13-19. Money from the Land and Water Conservation Fund may be used to
acquire land for refuges, see id. at 17-18, and to acquire habitat of endangered or
threatened species, see iti at 18-19. See also supra notes 81-82 (discussing the funding
sources and objectives of the Fund).
183 50 C.F.R. § 25.11(b) (1996).
184

See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, PUTING WILDLIFE FIRST: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RE-

(1992) ("Today's national wildlife refuges are a
collection of landscape fragments."); NATHANIEL P. REED & DENNIS DRABELLE, TNE UNITED
STATES FISH AND WILDuFE SERVICE 19 (1984); Keiter, supra note 11, at 306 ("[M]ost of the
nation's refuges were not designed as ecologically sustainable entities, even though they
provide critical habitats for particular species."); Murphy, supra note 47, at 183 (describing
the FWS' "historical mission" as protecting "traditional fish and wildlife values" rather than
biodiversity broadly conceived). The FWS now includes "biological diversity" among the
five priority goals in its Land Acquisition Priority System (LAPS), along with endangered
species, migratory birds, nationally significant wetlands, and fishery resources. See PRIORITIES FOR CONSERVATION, supra note 81, at 71-74; Fink, supra note 27, at 84-85. However,
because the LAPS analysis produces only two land acquisition lists-one for migratory
birds and one for endangered species-biodiversity must be considered at best a secondary
criterion. See id. at 85.
185 See TomN, supra note 79, at 52; YAFFEE, supra note 102, at 110-13 (stating that
hunters and sport fishers form the FWS's core constituency, and its staffing, programs, and
policy priorities traditionally reflect these interests). Prior to 1974, the FWS was named the
"Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife." See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 36. In addition to
FORMING Oua TROUBLED REFUGE SYSTEM 5
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Apart from Alaska, where the system's vast acreages protect habitats
for multiple species and whole ecosystems, 18 6 most units in the system
are small, often just a few acres in area, and many are managed under
narrow statutory mandates tailored to their narrow, species-specific
8 7
purpose.
The refuge program has principally emphasized setting aside
small wetland acreages as seasonal habitat for waterfowl and other mix88
gratory birds, especially along the principal north-south "flyways."
Wetlands, comprising some 37% of the system's acreage, represent
the largest category of landholdings.18 9 Since 1934, revenues from
Duck Stamps, federal waterfowl hunting permits that every adult
hunter of migratory waterfowl must purchase and carry affixed to his
state hunting license, have largely funded the acquisition of lands for
waterfowl refuges. 90 As a quid pro quo, portions of these refuges are
open to duck and goose hunting.' 91
Other refuges have been established to provide habitats for large
mammals.' 9 2 More recently, the ESA has influenced FWS land acquisition priorities through the establishment of refuges specifically providing habitats for listed endangered or threatened species. 19 3
managing wildlife refuges and the endangered species program, the FWS manages 70 fish
hatcheries, and until 1986, was responsible for eradicating "predators such as bears, bobcats, coyotes, [and] mountain lions," some of which are now protected under the Endangered Species Act. See id. at 42-43.
186 The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 ("ANILCA"), which
nearly tripled the size of the wildlife refuge system, expressly provides that the purpose of
the Alaskan refuges is to conserve fish and wildlife populations and habitats "in their natural diversity." Pub. L. No. 96-487, §§ 302-303, 94 Stat. 2371, 2385-93 (1980). Congress
thereby intended to "conserve the entire spectrum of plant and animal life" in the Alaskan
wilds. S. Rep. No. 96-413, at 174 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAjN. 5070, 5118.
187

See U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM: CONTRIBU-

4 (GAO/RCED-95-7 1994) [hereinafter GAO, ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY]; REED & DRABELLE, supra note 184, at 19.
188
See REED & DRABELLE, supra note 184, at 19; Fink, supra note 27, at 23.

TIONS BEING MADE TO ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY

189

See KEYSTONE REPORT, supranote 121, at 57. Other major landscape types include

grasslands (4.6%), forests (19.1%), brush (9.3%), desert (6.5%), tundra (19.6%), and
others (4.3%). See id
190
See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 52. Sales of Duck Stamps, officially known as Migratory
Bird Hunting and Conservation Stamps, have generated some $500 million for the
purchase of more than 4.5 million acres of waterfowl habitat. See U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, Dep't of the Interior, Deadline Is September 15 for Federal Duck Stamp Art Contest, July 21, 1997 (press release, on file with author).
191 See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 52. The Act provides that 40% of the area of refuges
established with Duck Stamp funds shall be open for hunting. 16 U.S.C. §§ 718-718h
(1994).
192 These include the National Bison Range in Montana, the Key Deer National Wildlife Refuge in the Florida Keys, the National Elk Refuge in Wyoming, and the Charles
Sheldon Antelope Range in Nevada. See REED & DRABELLE, supra note 184, at 20-21.
193

See GAO,

ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY,

supra note 187, at 6 (as of 1994, fifty-five

refuges totalling 310,000 acres had been established to provide habitat for listed species).
Many other wildlife refuges also provide habitat to listed species, and it is estimated that
about one-quarter of listed species occur somewhere within the refuge system. See id. at 1.
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However, consistent with longstanding ESA priorities, 194 less charismatic members of the animal kingdom rarely receive such special protection, and refuges typically are not set aside especially for the
benefit of plant species or threatened ecosystems. 195 Nonetheless, the
refuge system is estimated to represent nearly half of the major ecosys196
tem types in the United States.
Although even unprotected species might derivatively benefit
from the protection of land as wildlife refuges, active management for
the benefit of the chosen species is not always consonant with biodiversity protection. Refuge managers have occasionally altered naturally occurring ecosystems to benefit target species, for example, by
replacing forests with artificial wetlands to serve as waterfowl
habitat, 197 or producing grains or other species-specific food crops at
the expense of naturally occurring flora and the diverse communities
they support. 198 In some cases, managers have aggressively suppressed predators through hunting, trapping, and poisoning as well as
nonlethal means. 19 9 Many refuges allow recreational fishing, hunting,
and trapping. 20 0 Even though recreational exploitation of game species is not always inconsistent with species or ecosystem conservation, 20 1 frequently wildlife conservation must compete with hunting,
fishing, and other recreational uses, and, in some cases, commercial
or governmental uses incompatible with conservation objectives.2 0 2 In
See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
See GAO, ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY, supranote 187, app. III (identifying only
six refuges established for protection of listed plant species and invertebrates).
196 See Crumpacker et al., supranote 38, at 113; Fink, supra note 27, at 23-24 & n.147.
See OTA, supra note 3, at 230.
197
198 See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 52-53 (describing efforts by refuge managers to "transform their refuges into 'artificial duck and goose farms,'" disrupting normal migratory
patterns through such means as grain crops and placement of decoys); Fink, supranote 27,
at 87-88.
199 See Fink, supra note 27, at 88-89 & n.650.
200 See REED & DRABELLE, supra note 184, at 48. Under the National Wildlife Refuge
System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(d) (1) (A) (1994), hunting may be
authorized by the manager of the refuge, provided appropriate formal rulemaking procedures are followed, no endangered or threatened species is adversely affected, and the
state in which the refuge is located assents. See id.; see also Humane Society of the United
States v. Lujan, 768 F. Supp. 360 (1991) (upholding decision to allow deer hunting in a
refuge that was established as a bald eagle sanctuary).
See, e.g., Humane Society, 768 F. Supp. at 363-64 (noting that the FWS determined
201
that deer population far exceeding the carrying capacity of Mason Neck National Wildlife
Refuge was causing extensive damage to vegetation, justifying thinning through a "wellcontrolled public hunt"). The FWS and other wildlife management agencies have long
maintained that hunting is an effective and appropriate means of controlling populations
of ungulates, like deer, which may damage vegetation, especially in the absence of large
predators, which have all but vanished due to eradication and habitat loss. See Fink, supra
note 27, at 68-69.
202 See Fink, supra note 27, at 27 (describing wildlife refuges as "dominant use" lands,
falling somewhere between more restrictive "single use" designations like wilderness areas,
and less restrictive "multiple use" lands like national forests and BLM lands). In addition
194
195
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1996, President Clinton issued an executive order defining the system's mission as "preserv[ing] a national network of lands and waters
for the conservation and management of fish, wildlife, and plant resources of the United States for the benefit of present and future generations," but simultaneously identified recreational hunting and
fishing among the "priority public uses" of the system. 20 3 In 1997,
20 4
Congress enacted legislation intended to have a similar effect.

Perhaps the National Wildlife Refuge System is best understood
as two systems operating under a single title. Its vast Alaskan holdings
may come closer than any other category of federal lands to constituting genuine biodiversity reserves-large enough to provide broad
ecosystem-level protection and managed principally to provide prophylactic protection of their diverse biological resources-whether or
not the protected species and ecosystems are presently "threatened"
or "endangered." By contrast, refuges in the lower forty-eight states
are generally small habitat fragments, set aside to provide species-specific protection, often imperiled by adverse spillovers from neighboring land uses or harmful conflicting uses of the refuge itself and
historically not managed under broad ecosystem-level biodiversity
conservation management principles. However, because these small
refuges include some of the last remaining habitat fragments for some
species and communities, they are of considerable conservation value
and could provide core holdings around which larger biological
reserves could be assembled. Consolidation and adjustment of
boundaries, assertion of regulatory authority to prevent adverse spillovers from adjacent land uses, and explicit emphasis on biodiversity
conservation as the central goal in refuge land acquisition and management could capitalize on their biodiversity conservation potential.
to hunting and fishing, recreational uses include motorized and nonmotorized boating,
waterskiing, off-road vehicles, swimming, horseback riding, hiking, and wildlife observation. See TOBIN, supra note 79, at 44; Fink, supra note 27, at 67 & n.480. More than onethird of all refuges accommodate grazing or farming. See id. at 65. A few refuges have
been used as gunnery or bombing ranges or for other military exercises, see id at 70, or
have been subject to physical alterations for flood control or navigation purposes, see U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGEs: CONTINUING PROBLEMS WIH INCOMPATIBLE USES CALL FOR BOLD ACTION 31-32 (GAO/RCED-89-196, 1989) [hereinafter
GAO, INCOMPATIBLE USES]; Fink, supranote 27, at 20, 29, 66 n.475. Finally, where the FWS

does not hold the subsurface mineral rights, refuges may be entered for mining and oil
and gas exploration and production. See GAO, INCOMPATIBLE USES, supra, at 29; Fink, supra
note 27, at 29, 39 & n.188, 65-66.
203
Exec. Order No. 12,996, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,647 (1996).
204
See National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-57
(1997) (defining the mission of the system to "administer a national network of lands and
waters for the conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish,
wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats... for the benefit of present and future
generations" and identifying "wildlife-dependent recreational uses" as "priority general
public uses").
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d.

The NationalPark System

The National Park Service, a division of the Department of the
Interior, manages 80.7 million acres in 376 national parks, monuments, seashores, recreation areas, and other units, with about 60% of
this total in Alaska. 20 5 Although these lands include many important
minimally disturbed natural areas protected from conversion and
commodity production, for several reasons, they contribute less to biological diversity than might be expected. 20 6 First, the system's acreage
includes not only national parks, but other, typically smaller units
such as national monuments and national recreation areas, often established and managed primarily for their recreational, historical, cultural, or scenic value. 20 7 Second, with some notable exceptions, such
as Florida's Everglades, 208 our national parks themselves were in most
cases reserved for their scenic and recreational importance, not for
their biological riches. 20 9 Consequently, many habitats and ecosystem
types are not represented at all in the national parks. 210 Even in the
See National Park System Acreage, supra note 139.
206 But see Jim Fowler, Making a Difference, NAT'L PARKS, July/Aug. 1996, at 28-29
(describing importance of national parks as habitat for such rare, endangered, or
threatened species as grizzly bear, Florida panther, North American crocodile, piping
plover, gray wolf, black-footed ferret, and California condor).
207 A few nonpark units have been established primarily to preserve unique ecosystems. These include Florida's Big Cypress Preserve and the new Tallgrass Prairie National
Preserve in Kansas and Mojave National Preserve in California. SeeS. Rep. 93-1128 (1974),
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5568 (stating that Congress established the Big Cypress National Preserve to safeguard the ecological values of Big Cypress swamp); S. Rep. 104-376 (1996)
(stating that Congress established the Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve to protect "one of
the few unaltered expanses of the once vast tallgrass prairie" ecosystem).
208
See Ted Levin, Immersed in the Everglades,SIERRA, May/June 1996, at 56, 56. Among
205

the other national parks arguably falling into this category are the large national parks in
Alaska, Olympia National Park in Washington's temperate rainforest, as well as the Redwoods, Sequoia, Death Valley, and Joshua Tree National Parks in California.
209

See FREDERIC W. WAGNER ET AL., WILDLIFE PoLICmS IN THE U.S, NATIONAL PARKS 1,

19-21 (1995); David Hales, Changing Concepts of National Parks, in CONSERVATION FOR THE
TWENTY-Frisr CENTURY, supra note 25, at 139, 139-40; Noss, supra note 41, at 234. Our first
national park, Yellowstone, was established not to protect wilderness but as a tourist mecca,
offering such natural "curiosities" as geysers and hot springs; conservation of wildlife and
wilderness was later added to the park's mission as an afterthought. See NASH, supranote 2,
at 108-13. U.S. national parks thus differ from the great national parks of Africa, which
were established primarily to protect wildlife. See WAGNER ET AL., supra, at 1. More recently, parks and reserves have been set aside in Latin America specifically to conserve
biodiversity. See Francisco Dallmeier, Biodiversity Inventories and Monitoring: Essential Elements for Integrating Conservation Principles with Resource Development Projects, in MANAGED
LANDSCAPES, supra note 53, at 221, 228-30.

210 See Linder, supra note 97, at 191 (stating that most national park lands are coniferous forests; other biodiversity-rich ecosystem types such as grasslands and Mediterraneantype zones are "substantially underrepresented"). This is not to suggest, of course, that our
national parks do not include important reserves of biological riches. Some, like the Haleakala and Hawaii Volcanoes National Parks in Hawaii, are critical reserves of unique and
highly endangered endemic species and ecosystems. See Falth Campbell, The Appropriations
Histoy, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK, supra note 47, at 134, 139. Others, such as California's
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case of the largest parks, there is often a mismatch between park
boundaries and the ecosystems of which they are a part, so that parks
alone may not provide adequate habitats for some species and communities. 2 1' Third, although the stated policy of the Park Service is to
"provid[e] the American people with the opportunity to enjoy and
benefit from natural environments evolving through natural processes
minimally influenced by human actions," 21 2 the demands of visitor access and recreational use often take precedence over resource protection. As a result, visitor-caused disturbances alter natural ecological
processes. The steadily growing popularity of national parks as vacation destinations requires more roads, parking lots, campgrounds,
and concessions, 21 3 and stretches park operating budgets to cover the
costs of trash removal, general maintenance, utilities, and employee
overtime. 21 4 Finally, the parks' own natural resource management
policies and priorities have contributed to declining levels of biodiversity. Consistent with its statutory mandate to ensure that parks are left
"unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations," 215 the Park
Service now emphasizes the primacy of long-term resource preservation and has recently adopted a hands-off attitude toward natural
Sequoia and Redwoods National Parks, represent important surviving fragments of formerly more prevalent ecosystem types. Taken as a whole, however, they are not nearly as
representative as they might be had they been selected according to biological, rather than

scenic and recreational, criteria.
211 See Robert B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and
Ecology in the GreaterYellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 931-32 (1989) [hereinafter
Keiter, Yellowstone]; rflliam D. Newmark, Legal and Biotic Boundaries of Western North American National Parks: A Problem of Congruence, 33 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 197, 198-200
(1985); Noss, supra note 41, at 234. Precise delineation of ecosystems is difficult because
species, habitats, communities, and ecosystems occur not in tidy bundles but in overlapping gradients over larger landscapes. See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 576-77. Nonetheless, few
would dispute that, in many cases, the fit between park boundaries and ecosystems is a
poor one. For example, the Everglades National Park has been severely degraded by draining, diversion, and pollution of the larger wetlands ecosystem of which the park is but a
part. See Noss & COOPERRIDER, supra note 137, at 133-34. Even Yellowstone, one of the
largest national parks at 2.2 million acres, is only a fraction of the 18 million acre Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem which spans two national parks, parts of six national forests, three
national wildlife refuges, and BLM lands, together with state, local, and private lands in
three states. See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem ManagementDebate, in THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE EcOsYSEM: REDEFINING AMERICA'S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 3, 4 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds., 1991) [hereinafter Keiter, Ecosystem Management Debate].
212
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT POLicIES 4:1
(1988).
213 See EDWARDS, supra note 136, at 99-100, 112-13; WAGNER ET AL., supra note 209, at
84, 87-90; Keiter, supra note 11, at 304, 318.
214

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL PARES: DIFFICULT CHOICES NEED TO BE

MADE ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PARKS 34-35
GAO, NATIONAL PARKS:. DIFFICULT CHOICES].

(GAO/RCED-95-238 1995) [hereinafter

215 National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See Robin Winks, Dispelling the Myth, NAT'L PARKS,July/Aug. 1996, at 52-53 (arguing that the legislative history and
the textual mandate to keep parks "unimpaired" indicate congressional intent that resource preservation be given primacy over visitor access and recreational use).
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processes.2 1 6 However, alteration of vegetation by large protected
populations of ungulates such as deer and elk,2 17 invasions by exotic

species, fire suppression, negative spillovers and edge effects from development on adjacent lands, and the relatively small size of parks
poorly matched to the larger ecosystems of which they are a part, combine to put stresses on the species, habitats, and ecosystems found on
2 18
park lands.
The pressures of recreational use have grown rapidly and are only
likely to increase in coming years.21 9 If valuable biological resources
in our national parks are to be protected, reserve areas must be identified and sequestered, with visitor access to these areas strictly limited.
In addition, boundary adjustments, consolidations with adjacent federal landholdings, 22 0 assertion of regulatory authority to prevent adverse spillovers from adjacent lands,22 1 and explicit statutory directives
See Keiter, Yellowstone, supra note 211, at 1007.
Generally national parks are off-limits to hunting, see 43 C.F.R. § 24.4(f) (1996)
(hunting prohibited in national parks by regulation, except when specifically authorized
by Congress), and the ungulates' natural predators, including wolves, coyotes, and mountain lions, are themselves threatened or endangered due to habitat loss and decades of
suppression by humans. See George Cameron Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of
216

217

National Parksfrom External Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. Rxv. 1, 4 (1987).
218
See WAGNER Er AL., supranote 209, at 62-68, 71-76; Noss, supranote 41, at 234. The

problem of small reserve size is especially acute for large carnivores like the wolf, grizzly
bear, mountain lion, and wolverine, which have large home ranges, low population densities, and low growth rates. See GRUMBiNE, supra note 44, at 41-44. In addition, smaller
reserves are subject to potentially "catastrophic" disturbances by fire, windstorm, or flood;
in larger reserves, such natural disturbances would affect only a portion of the total area,
allowing for recolonization from undisturbed portions of the reserve. See id. at 53-56.
219
220

See GAO, NATIONAL PARKs: DIFFICULT CHOIcES, supra note 214, at 33.

While Yellowstone is often cited as an example of the insufficiency of even our
largest national parks to protect biological resources, see, e.g., Newmark, supranote 211, at
199, the federal government owns much of the land surrounding Yellowstone National
Park and comprising the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem. In theory at least, a much larger
biological reserve, better matched to ecosystem boundaries, could be carved out of the
Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks and the national forests and BLM lands in
northwestern Wyoming, southwestern Montana, and eastern Idaho. Yellowstone is not
unique in this regard. Federal lands surround many of the larger Western national parks,
including Yosemite, King's Canyon, Sequoia, Rocky Mountain, North Cascades, Mt. Rainier, Olympic, Grand Teton, and Glacier. SeeJoseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, GlacierNationalPark and Its Neighbors: A Study of FederalInteragencyRelations,14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208
(1987).
221
Current statutes provide ambiguous regulatory authority to ensure that adverse
spillovers from adjacent land uses do not threaten resources on federal lands, and federal
agencies have been reluctant to assert such authority. See William J. Lockhart, External
Threats to ourNationalParks:An Argumentfor SubstantiveProtection, 16 STAN. EN TL. L.J. 3, 4551 (1997). However, federal courts have held that the federal government has constitutionalpower to regulate activities on private lands adjacent to, within, or near federal lands.
Under the Property Clause, Congress is empowered to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States," U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, on the theory that "'Congress' power must extend to regulation of
conduct on or off of the public land that would threaten the designated purpose of federal
lands.'" Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983) (hold-
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to acquire and manage these lands for biodiversity conservation purposes could elevate the potential of the national parks to serve as important biodiversity reserves.
e.

Wilderness Areas

The Wilderness Act of 1964 established a process by which federal land managers were to identify and assess the suitability of
roadless and "underdeveloped [f]ederal land retaining its primeval
character and influence" and "of sufficient size as to make practicable
its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition"2 22 for congressional designation as wilderness areas. Once these areas are designated, the Act directs federal agencies to manage wilderness areas "for
the use and enjoyment of the American people in such manner as will
leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness"
and "for preservation ... in their natural condition." 223 Congress has
designated some 96 million acres of national parks, national forests,
wildlife refuges, and BLM lands as wilderness areas. An additional 33
million acres are currently in "wilderness study" status, affording them
interim protection until a decision is made on wilderness designation. 224 The statute generally prohibits commercial enterprises, the

construction of roads and buildings, and the use of motor vehicles,
motorized boats, and aircraft in wilderness areas, 225 but permits "recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical"
uses consistent with preservation of the area's "wilderness characing that federal regulation of out-of-park private canoe rentals to protect Ozark National
Scenic Riverways from excessive recreational use is a valid exercise of Property Clause
power) (quoting Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981)); see also Lockhart,
supra, at 57-58 (discussing cases that recognize Congress's power under the Property
Clause to regulate private land use that threatens the designated purpose of federal lands).
222 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
223 Id. § 1131 (a). See generally Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning,45 OR. L. REV. 288 (1966) (providing general discussion of Wilderness
Act's history and meaning); Daniel Rohlf & Douglas L. Honnold, Managingthe Balances of
Nature: The Legal Framework of Wilderness Management, 15 EcoLoGY L.Q. 249 (1988) (discussing how the Wilderness Act circumscribes and mandates wilderness management).
224 See GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 26; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b), (c); 43
U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1994) (mandating study of roadless and primitive areas for possible wilderness designation).
225 See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). There are important exceptions. Water resource development, mining, and such construction and motorized transport as may be necessary to carry
out these activities are permitted under some circumstances, as are commercial activities
"proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes." Id. § 1133(d). In
addition, grazing, aircraft, and motorboat use are permitted if these uses were established
prior to wilderness designation. See id.; Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 223, at 260. In addition, the statutes designating particular wilderness areas may contain exceptions to the
general use restrictions. See, e.g., Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d
1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1976) (reconciling Wilderness Act's general provisions with special
provision allowing commercial logging in Boundary Waters Canoe Area to the extent consistent with "maintaining its primitive character").
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ter."226 These uses typically include low-impact activities like hiking,
camping, canoeing, rafting, hunting, and fishing.2 27 Although the Act
makes no special provision for wildlife management or biodiversity
conservation, 2 28 it arguably addresses these concerns by the mandate
to preserve "natural conditions." 229 Like national parks, wilderness areas are often selected for scenic and recreational rather than biological values, 230 and, like other protected areas, their boundaries often
do not coincide with ecosystems. 23 ' Furthermore, like other protected public lands, wilderness areas are regionally concentrated in
the West, particularly in Alaska. Nonetheless, wilderness areas unquestionably provide important, minimally disturbed habitats for
many species and communities, and include many large blocks of relatively undisturbed land. 23 2 The wilderness system thus remains an important conservation asset. Current wilderness units could, if properly
managed and protected, provide important core holdings for a national system of biodiversity reserves. However, because of the shortcomings identified here, wilderness areas, as presently conceived, are
not an adequate substitute for a system of biological reserves identified, acquired, and managed explicitly for biodiversity conservation
purposes.
3.

Biodiversity Conservation on FederalLands: Assessment and New
Directions

iFederal lands form a vast and elaborate patchwork of landholdings and management authorities, in which biodiversity conservation
is at best a secondary goal. 233 Nonetheless, the federal lands include
an impressive array of species, habitats, and ecosystems. The biodiversity conservation potential of these lands is substantial. However, without a fundamental revamping of our public lands management
226
227
228
229

16 U.S.C. § 1133(b).
See idL § 1133(c), (d).
See Fink, supra note 27, at 36.
Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 223, at 275-77. But cf Keiter, supranote 11, at 305-06

("[D]espite strong preservationist language, the Wilderness Act does not fully ensure the
integrity of wilderness ecosystems.").
230 See Noss, supranote 50, at 238 (stating that because wilderness areas are selected for
scenic and recreational values, they are disproportionately low-diversity alpine zones);
Noss, supra note 41, at 234 ("[H]igh-elevation sites (rock and ice), wetlands, and other
scenic but not particularly diverse lands dominate our system of protected areas; many
ecosystem types are not represented, at least not in sizable areas.").
231 See Rohlf & Honnold, supra note 223, at 272.
See id. at 275.
232
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 311-12 (describing land conservation decisions as "ad
233
hoc" and "dominated" by "factors other than wildlife conservation"); Keiter, supra note 11,
at 314 ("The fact is that few, if any, of the principal laws governing public land management are modeled upon contemporary ecological principles.").
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strategy, we can expect only limited progress in conserving biodiversity on federal lands.
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, federal law currently
does not require sequestration of federal lands for biodiversity conservation purposes or prioritization of biodiversity conservation considerations in federal land management agencies'

land use plans.23

4

Indeed, far from mandating biodiversity conservation, the current
statutes fragment responsibility for ecosystem management and impose conflicting requirements on many categories of federal land, limiting the ability of even the best-intentioned administrators to
implement far-reaching biodiversity conservation plans.2

35

Conse-

quently, biodiversity conservation on the federal lands is discretionary,
interstitial, meager, and impermanent, operating on a "catch-as-catchcan" basis at the margins of federal lands management, easily
trumped by conflicting statutory requirements or passed over in favor
of competing discretionary policy objectives. Only a statutory mandate can make biodiversity conservation on federal lands an explicit
23 6
and binding national policy objective.
Specifically, biodiversity conservation requires that a federal statute establish a new category of biological reserves, set aside large areas
for special protection explicitly on the basis of their importance in
conserving biodiversity, and strictly limit activities in these areas to
uses consistent with the conservation mandate. These areas could in234 See OTA, supra note 3, at 12-13.
235 See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 152, at 135-36 (ecosystem management is hindered by "specific [agency] missions, rigidly stratified and specialized agency
structures, and the subdivision of problems into narrowly defined tasks," as well as program-specific budgeting "sometimes linked primarily to the production of tangible outputs
such as commodities"); GAO, FOREST SERVICE DECISION-MAKING, supra note 150, at 84-85,
90, 96 (stating that conflicting statutory mandates hinder interagency cooperation in
ecosystem management, producing disparate planning processes, agency missions, responsibilities, substantive objectives, and procedures, often including a lack of shared definitions and comparable data); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IssuEs RELATED TO MANAGING

NATIONAL FoRESTs FOR MULTIPLE UsES 6 (GAO/T-RCED-96-111 1996) (describing agencies' failure to agree on plans or projects crossing jurisdictional boundaries, due to differing evaluations of likely environmental impacts and reflecting "disparate missions and
responsibilities"); Keiter, supra note 11, at 295 (stating that by fragmenting land management authority within larger ecosystems among various agencies, and by imposing separate
management regimes emphasizing production of individual commodities like timber and
minerals, "federal public land law runs directly counter to ecosystem management principles"); Office of the Vice President, National Performance Review, Monograph on Environmental Management (1994), available in 1994 WL 170853, at *10 (many factors
including "inconsistent statutory missions, demands of special interests, incompatible data,
distinct agency cultures, inconsistent planning and budgeting cycles, and differing agency
organizational structures" have hindered coordinated interagency ecosystem
management).
236 See OTA, supranote 3, at 8-19 (recommending legislation establishing biodiversity
conservation as a national policy goal and explicitly mandating biodiversity conservation by
federal land management agencies).

1997]

BIODIVERSITY AND LAND

clude all or portions of existing national parks, national forests, wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges, but should also include areas
newly acquired or withdrawn specifically for biodiversity conservation
purposes. 23 7 The congressionally mandated process by which federal
land management agencies identified, studied, and recommended
proposed wilderness areas, which were then formally designated by
acts of Congress, provides a model for how the designation process
might commence. However, to evaluate the biological value of various lands, the Department of the Interior's national biological service
should also play a central role.
Once Congress designates such biodiversity reserves, an important subsidiary question is whether these reserves should be unified
under a single management agency, or, like wilderness areas, remain
under the management of the various agencies out of whose territory
they are carved. 23 8 Given longstanding interagency rivalries and the
imperatives of internal bureaucratic politics, agencies might cooperate more fully in the designation process if they could expect to retain
2 39
management authority over areas designated as biological reserves.
However, a unified management regime is more likely to provide a
clear mission, policy coordination, and efficiency gains by eliminating
redundancy in agency functions and consolidating information and
in-house expertise.2 40 In addition, biodiversity concerns are less likely
237 This has already begun on a limited and ad hoc basis with the creation of some
ecosystem-preserving national parks and similar conservation areas. For example, in 1994,
Congress enacted the California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108
Stat. 4471-4508 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of titles 16 & 43 U.S.C.), which transferred three million acres from the BLM to the National Park Service, established a 1.4
million acre Mojave National Preserve, redesignated the Death Valley and Joshua Tree
National Monuments as national parks, and designated 3.6 million acres of adjacent BLM
lands as wilderness areas. See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supranote 152, at 146; see also
Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-333, 110 Stat.
4093 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 31, 36, 40, & 43 U.S.C.) (establishing
Tallgrass Prairie National Preserve in Kansas).
238 See supraPart II.A.2.e.
239 See Craig W. Allin, Wilderness Protection as a BureaucraticToo4 in FEDERAL LANDS POicy 127, 127 (Phillip 0. Foss ed., 1987) (attributing Forest Service's support of wilderness
designations to its desire to keep lands from being transferred to the National Park Service); GRUMBINE, supranote 44, at 141 (same); cf DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 184,
at 22 (recommending creation of a National Wildlife Habitat System consisting of present
National Widlife Refuges and additional designated federal lands, which would "remain as
holdings of, and managed by, the pre-designating agency" but would be "managed
predominantly for wildlife values").
240 Some have suggested that the current division of land management responsibilities
among four agencies whose missions are increasingly similar is fundamentally flawed, and
that the agencies should be combined into one or, at a minimum, their responsibilities
should be reorganized and integrated to reduce unnecessary duplication and improve policy coordination. See e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFicE, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENTSTREAMLINING AND REORGANIZATION ISSUES (GAO/T-RCED-96-209 1996). While that view
has considerable merit, and the proposal to create a unified system of biodiversity reserves
underscores its importance, creation of biodiversity reserves need not necessarily await res-
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to be submerged, subordinated, or simply lost in the shuffle if consolidated in a single-mission agency (or a single-mission unit within an
existing agency) than if parceled out among traditionally commodityoriented, multiple-use agencies like the BLM and the Forest Service,
as well as recreation-oriented agencies like the National Park Service
and the FWS. Finally, because there may be opportunities to create
large ecosystem-wide reserves crossing current agency jurisdictional
boundaries in areas like the Greater Yellowstone region, consolidating
reserves under a unified management regime might actually lead to
less interagency rivalry in the operation and management of the
reserves.

24 1

More than twenty years ago, the Nature Conservancy recognized
that the existing patchwork of federal laws and land management programs then in place did not add up to a coordinated policy of ecological protection, and proposed that the federal government establish a
National Ecological Reserve System consisting of "protected natural
areas representing the full spectrum of biological communities, ecosystems, features, habitat, and forms."2 42 That prescient advice remains good today. Although federal laws and land management
policies have changed in the two decades since the Nature Conservancy issued that recommendation, and although biodiversity conservation is now on policymakers' radar screens, there is still no
coherent, coordinated federal policy to achieve it.
Even with a clear statutory mandate and a unified management
regime for biological reserves, an important limitation on federal land
management as a biodiversity conservation strategy will arise from the
fact that federal lands are heavily concentrated in eleven contiguous
Western states and Alaska, which together account for more than 93%
of the lands the four leading federal land agencies manage. 243 The
fact that the federal government .owns less than 4% of the land
outside the region 244 leads some commentators to conclude that we
should focus our principal biodiversity conservation efforts on private
olution of these broader questions. A system of biodiversity reserves could be placed somewhere within the current agency structure (e.g., under management of the Fish and
Wildlife Service), in a new structure alongside existing agencies, or within a unified or
streamlined federal land management agency.
241
See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
242
THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, THE PRESERVATION OF NATURAL DivERsrry. A SURVEY
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 40-41 (1975).
243 See GAO, LAND OWNERSHIP, supra note 58, at 20-22 tbl.I.2 (illustrating that of 623
million acres the four agencies manage, 580 million, or 93%, are located in Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming). Alaska alone accounts for 39% of all the land these four agencies
manage, 56% of the federal land currently designated for conservation purposes, 60% of
designated wilderness areas, and 80% of National Wildlife Refuge acreage. See id. at 20-22
tbl.I.2, 24-25 tbl.I.3.
244
See EDWARDS, supra note 136, at 3.
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lands.245

This gross figure may be misleading, however, if it causes us
to overlook the federal government's substantial land ownership role
in such disparate and critical ecoregions as Hawaii, south Florida, the
upper Great Lakes, the NewJersey pinelands, northern New England,
the southern Appalachians, and the Ozarks. 246 Gross acreage also belies the importance of federal holdings in fragile coastal wetlands and
barrier lands along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts which, although small
in acreage, represent unique, priceless, and endangered biological assets.2 47 Even where the federal role is smaller, it is hardly trivial. The

federal government owns one million acres or more in nineteen states
outside the Western-Alaska region. 248 In almost every state, the federal government is either the largest landowner or second only to the
state government, 24 9 and the federal holdings often include many of
the best preserved remaining fragments of critical ecosystems-the
lands with the most potential for serving as biological reserves. Fi245
See, e.g., GRUMBINE, supranote 44, at 211-17 (arguing for conservation efforts aimed
at federal, state, and private lands); Michael A. O'Connell, ManagingBiodiversity on Private
Lands, in MANAGED LANDSCAPES, supranote 53, at 665; Farrier, supra note 2, at 317 (describing biodiversity conservation efforts aimed solely at federal lands as a "ghetto approach").
246 The relevant percentages of federal land ownership are Haw.-16.8%; Fla.-7.8%;
Minn.-14.3%; Mich.-12.9%; Wis.-8.4%; N.H.-13.2%; Vt.-7.3%; N.J.-13.3%; Va.11.8%; W. Va.-7.1%; N.C.-7.8%; Tenn.-5.9%; Ark.-8.7%. See BUREAU OF LAND
McNr., supranote 57, at 6. Even these state-level figures may be misleading, since in many
cases federal holdings are regionally concentrated within these states; a glance at a map
suggests that the federal government is a major landowner in the upper Great Lakes
(northern portions of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan), along the southern Appalachian spine (western Virginia and North Carolina; eastern West Virginia, Kentucky, and
Tennessee; and north Georgia), and in the Ozarks (northern Arkansas and southern
Missouri).
247 Various federal agencies manage an impressive string of National Seashores, National Recreation Areas, and National Wildlife Refuges, together with assorted National
Forests and military bases, extending from Cape Cod through ,the Florida Keys, and back
around the Gulf coast to the Mexican border. See National Geographic Society, Federal
Lands in the Fifty States, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1996, Map Supp.; see also RuTHERFORD H.
PLATr,
LAND USE AND SOCIETY: GEOGRAPHY, LAw, AND PUBLIC POLICY 411-12 (1996)
(describing the ecological significance of coastal wetlands and barrier beaches); id. at 433
fig.12-7 (showing 53% of Atlantic and Gulf coast barrier lands are under protected status).
248 By way of comparison, the largest private conservation organization, The Nature
Conservancy, owns about one million acres nationwide. The Nature Conservancy's efforts
are not insignificant: it selects its acquisitions carefully, it owns many priceless and irreplaceable reserves, and its conservation efforts are widely andjustly applauded. SeeJohn G.
Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. Rv. 816, 855
nn.183-84 (1994).
249
See PRIoRITES FOR CONSERVATION, supra note 81, at 42. State and local governments
hold an estimated 8% of the nation's land, but holdings vary widely, ranging from 2% in
the South to 11% in the West. See id. In the aggregate, they include 11 million acres of state
parks, 14 million acres of state wildiife refuges, and 27 million acres of state forests. See
John A. Georges, Our CriticalForestResources, in LAND USE IN AMERICA 223, 226 fig.I (Henry
L. Diamond & Patrick F. Noonan eds., 1996). While these figures pale in comparison to
their federal counterparts, state governments are still among the largest landowners, and
states with large holdings play an important role in managing ecosystems, whether for
good or ill.
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nally, although private landowners own roughly twice as much land as
the federal government, 25 0 much of the privately held land is in biodiversity-poor categories such as cropland and pasturage, 251 industrial forests, 25 2 urbanized areas, 2 53 or small-scale rural developments
contributing to the fragmentation of habitats and ecosystems.2 5 4 This
250 The federal government owns roughly 30%, private landowners 59%, state and local governments 8%, and Indian tribes about 3% of the land in the United States. See
PRIORITIES FOR CONSERVATION, supra note 81, at 42, 45, 94.
251 As of 1992, about 382 million acres, roughly a fifth of the nation's land outside
Alaska and nearly 30% of the privately owned land, was cropland. See U.S. CENSUS BuREAu,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 229 [hereinafter STATISTICAL AB-

sTRAcr]. Another 125 million acres are pastureland and 396 million acres are rangeland,
see id., with more than half of the grazing land privately owned. CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL
QuAL'rr, supranote 152, at 284. More than 80% of the cropland is used to produce corn,
wheat, hay, and soybeans, see id. at 283 fig.16.4, resulting in a remarkable paucity of floral
diversity and consequently providing habitat to a limited diversity of wildlife species. In
some Midwestern states, more than two-thirds of the privately owned land is cropland. See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra, at 229 (Iowa 70.8%; Illinois 69.4%).
252 Privately owned forests cover 394 million acres, or just over half of the forested land
in the United States. See STATISTICAL ABsTRAur, supra note 251, at 229, 685. Some 90% of
the privately owned forests are classified as "timberland," capable of producing twenty cubic feet of industrial timber per acre annually and not reserved from timber harvest, accounting for almost three-quarters of the nation's total inventory of timberland. See id. at
685. This acreage includes seventy million acres owned directly by firms in the forest industry. See CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUITY, supra note 152, at 300. Authorities expect this
figure to grow in the future. See id. at 303 (stating that pine plantations in the South are
expected to double from the current level of 23 million acres). Intensive even-aged silviculture has reduced species and habitat diversity in many of these industrial timberlands so
as to produce commercially valuable and easily harvested single-species, uniform-aged
crops. See ALVERSON ET AL., supra note 142, at 59; William A. Atkinson, Managingthe Urban/
ForestInterface: A View From Forest Industry, in LAND USE AND FOREST RESOURCES IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: THE URBAN/FoREST INTERFACE 189, 191-93 (Gordon A. Bradley ed.,
1984) [hereinafter URBAN/FoREsT INTERFACE] (discussing the forest industry's techniques
to maximize returns on timber as a slow-growing crop, achieving efficiencies through mass
production by monocropping and large scale clearcutting).
253 "Developed" areas, including cities, towns, highways, and individual developed parcels exceeding ten acres in size, account for 92 million acres, or nearly 5% of the U.S. land
area. This figure is growing rapidly, increasing by 14 million acres from 1982 to 1992
alone. See Natural Resources Conservation Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., 1992 National Resources Inventory Highlights (visited Oct. 17, 1997) <http://wwv.nhg.nrcs.usda.gov/
nrihigh.html> [hereinafter 1992 Inventory Highlights). In most urbanized areas, urban expansion is outpacing population growth as population shifts to low-density suburbs. See
Christopher B. Leinberger, MetropolitanDevelopment Trends of the Late 1990s: Social and Environmental Implications, in LAND USE IN AMERICA, supra note 249, at 203, 209 (stating that
between 1970 and 1990, metropolitan Chicago grew 4% in population but 46% in land
area, and metropolitan Los Angeles grew 45% in population but tripled in size to an area
equal to the state of Connecticut). Most authorities accept the view that "urban sprawl"
leads directly to habitat destruction or to fragmentation and biodiversity loss. See, e.g., Reid
Ewing, IsLosAngeles-Style SprawlDesirable?63J. Am. PLAN. ASS'WN 107 (1997). A contrary view
holds that where low-density residential development displaces cropland, it may actually
prove beneficial to wildlife, which is often a high-value residential amenity but a nuisance
to farmers. See Richard D. Taber, Wildlife Conservation at the Urban/ForestInterface, in URBAN/FoR=T INTERFACE, supra note 252, at 109, 109-10.
254
Rural developments under 10 acres are excluded from the government's definition
of "developed" areas. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Percent Change in Developed Land Area, 1982-
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is not to suggest that privately held lands are of no conservation value
or that the federal holdings are without important gaps. Indeed, the
greatest loss of biodiversity almost certainly occurs at the frontiers of
expansion of these categories of privately owned land, as natural areas
are fragmented and partially or fully converted to human-engineered
floral monocultures, built upon, or simply paved over. But merely totaling acreage and observing that more land is privately owned than
federally owned should not mislead us to undervalue the role and potential of federal lands in conserving biodiversity, even in regions
where federal holdings are relatively modest.
Moreover, the fact that the federal lands are concentrated in
the West and Alaska has some beneficial aspects. First, with lower
population densities, less developed land, 255 and less land under agricultural cultivation, 25 6 these regions include many of the nation's largest remaining areas of unf-agmented, relatively undisturbed natural
areas, 257 and thus present unique opportunities to set aside large
reserves. Equally important, the public already owns many of the largest contiguous blocks of undeveloped land. Thus, the public's claim
to make biodiversity conservation a binding requirement in the management of the lands best-suited to that purpose is at its strongest in
258
these areas.
In addition, the Western states, where federal ownership is most
heavily concentrated, are among the most biodiversity-rich in the na1992 (visited Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.nhg.nrcs.usda.gov/land/meta/m2311.htnl>.
Nonetheless, many observers believe the rapid growth of rural residences, vacation homes,
recreational developments, and industry contributes significantly to the fragmentation of
rural landscapes, especially in high-growth regions such as the Pacific Northwest. See, e.g.,
EdwardJ. Blakely, The New People in the Woods, in URBAN/FoRsT INTERFACE, supranote 252,
at 141, 142-43 (describing rapid growth in conversion of rural lands to residential, commercial, industrial, and recreational uses such as second homes and hobby farms); Keith
Dearborn, A New Zoning Strategy for Forest Lands, in URBAN/FoR=Sr INTERFACE, supra note
252, at 180, 180-81 (stating that Pacific Northwest forests provide scenic, recreational, and
'quality of life" amenities that, ironically, attract rural population growth, leading to fragmentation and degradation of forest ecosystems and conversion of land from forest to
nonforest uses).
255
Except for California (4.9%) and Washington (4.1%), every state in the Western
region falls well below the national figure of about 5% of "developed" land. See STATISTICAL ABSTRaCr, supra note 251, at 229.
256
Every state in the Western region

fals significantly below the national figure of
20% of land in cropland as a percentage of total land area. See id. at 229; see also id. at 676
(showing Western states lagging behind Eastern states in total planted acreage per state).
257
See LANGNER & FLATHER, supra note 7, at 13-16 (stating that conversion and fragmentation of forest, grassland, and wetland ecosystems is generally least advanced in the
West and most advanced in the eastern two-thirds of the nation; and loss of natural vegetation types ranges from a low of 4% in Nevada, to a high of 92% in Iowa).
258
See Keiter, Ecosystem ManagementDebate, supranote 211, at 4-5 (stating that various
federal agencies already control 12 million acres in the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem,
sometimes described as the least-disturbed major regional ecosystem left in the lower 48
states, and perhaps in the entire United States).
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tion, ranking high in both species richness and endemism, 2 59 and including many rare and unique ecosystems. A recent study found that
56% of identified "rare" ecological communities occur in a thirteenstate Western region, due to a "high level of natural diversity" in the
region. 2 60 Other studies suggest that the federal lands are more
broadly representative of the nation's ecosystem types than one might
expect, given their regional concentration. David Crumpacker, for
example, found that three-quarters of all major U.S. ecosystem types
are relatively well represented on federal lands, with only nine of the
135 types in the Kfichler typology wholly unrepresented and another
twenty-four "underrepresented." 261 Although they fall short of fully
representing all of the nation's ecosystem types, the lands the federal
government currently holds present enormous conservation opportu259

See BErATLEY, supra note 4, at 4 fig.1.1 (showing that, of the 13 states having the

largest numbers of endemic plant species, 10 are in the Western region: California leads
with 1517, followed by Hawaii with 883, Florida 385, Texas 379, Utah 169, Arizona 164,
Oregon 109, Nevada 90, New Mexico 81, Alaska 80, Colorado 54, Washington 49, and
Idaho 37. Wyoming ranks sixteenth, with nineteen endemic species, and Montana ties for
twentieth with six species).
260 Dennis H. Grossman & Kathleen Lemon Goodin, Rare TerrestrialEcological Communities of the United States, in OUR LrVING RESOURCES 218, 219-20 (Edward T. LaRoe et al. eds.,

1995). The western states offer great variability in altitude, hydrology, geology, and climate, producing numerous "microclimates" and unique ecosystem niches and consequently large numbers of endemic species. See Rodger Doyle, Plants at Risk in the US., Sci.
Am., Aug. 1997, at 26, 26 (stating that "patchwork mountain and desert" landscapes, such
as those in the West, provide diverse habitats and "ample opportunities for geographical
isolation;" in contrast, Midwestern and Central states feature uniform climate, topography,
and geology, generally favoring ubiquitous species); Peter Warshall, Southwestern Sky Island
Ecosystems, in OUR LrVING REsouRcEs, supra, at 318, 318 (stating that mountaintop "sky islands" in Southwestern deserts provide pronounced microclimates, diverse habitats, and
numerous rare species). The thirteen-state region in the Grossman and Goodin study also
includes Hawaii, home to many unique and endangered species and ecosystems. See J.
Michael Scott, Hawaii: Overoiew, in OUR LIVNG RESOURCES, supra, at 361, 361 (stating that
Hawaii has "degrees of endemism... unmatched anywhere else in the world" but that "loss
of species in the islands has been staggering" due to habitat loss, introduction of exotics,
and pressure from human population and tourism).
261 Crumpacker et al., supra note 38, at 111; see also LANONER & FLATHER, supra note 7,
at 17 (stating that similar studies of National Forest land and wilderness areas support
Crumpacker's conclusions). Crumpacker bases his analysis on a mapping of Kfichler potential natural vegetation ("PNV") types, the vegetation that would exist in the absence of
human disturbances and "if the plant succession ... were telescoped into a single moment." Crumpacker et al., supra note 38, at 104. Examples are Spruce-Cedar-Hemlock
Forest, Palo Verde-Cactus Shrub, Bluestem Prairie, and Conifer Bog. See id. Crumpacker
acknowledges that the Kfichler typology is crude: it measures potential rather than actual
vegetation, it does not account for variations in the plant and animal species that comprise
a broad type over its geographic range or at different successional stages, and it is not
sufficiently fine-grained to account for some especially rare, small-scale or unique ecosystems. Id, at 104-05. In particular, the Kfichler typology has received criticism for failing to
distinguish among wetland types. See LANGNER & FLATHER, supra note 7, at 13. But
Crumpacker argues that despite their shortcomings, the Kfichler types "provide the only
assessment of major, above-ground, terrestrial and wetland ecosystem diversity that describes the entire United States in reasonable detail." Crumpacker et al., supra note 38, at
104.
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nities and are the logical starting point for a national biodiversity conservation strategy.
Management of federal lands is undoubtedly critical to biodiversity conservation in the eleven-state Western region, where 45% of all
land is under federal control, and in Alaska, where the federal government owns 61% of the land.2

62

Because the federal government is the

dominant landowner in a twelve-state area comprising some 40% of
the nation, federal land management must be a central component of
263
the national biodiversity conservation strategy.

Even in the West, it is not enough simply to rely on the federal
government's dominant role as landowner. To optimize the conservation value of federal lands, adjustments in boundaries, agency jurisdiction, and management authority are necessary. Many federal lands
that are important for biodiversity conservation purposes are not currently protected, 26 4 and protected areas do not represent the full array of ecosystem types within the region. 26 5 In California, according
to one estimate, 95% of alpine habitat is included in protected
reserves of some sort, 2 6 6 while only 1% of riparian ecosystems-often
rich in biodiversity, but subject to intense development pressure and
degradation from pollution and anthropogenic alteration-receives
protection. 267 Moreover, as noted, the boundaries of current federal
landholdings often do not coincide with the geography of ecosystems. 268 The federal government should identify its lands of high bio-

logical value in the West and sequester them in a separate, protected
category of biological reserves. The government should supplement
those lands with the acquisition of additional lands containing habitat
supra note 58, at 20-22 tbl.1.2.

262

See GAO, LAN

263

See id.

264

See, e.g., Thomas C. Edwards, Jr., ProtectionStatus of Vegetation Cover Tpes in Utah, in

OWNERSHIP,

OUR LIVING RESOURCES, supra note 260, at 463, 464 tbls.2, 3 (stating that although federal

lands comprise 64% of Utah's territory and include all vegetation cover types occurring in
the state, most vegetation types are represented inadequately in "protected" conservation
areas, which "are more of a random product than a systematic approach to protecting the
diversity of vegetation"); David M. Stoms, Biodiversity in the Southwestern CaliforniaRegion, in
OuR LMING RESOURCES, supra note 260, at 465, 465 (stating that although publicly owned

lands comprise nearly 40% of southern California's coastal sage scrub region, protected
areas are confined largely to higher elevations; 88% of areas below five hundred meters
elevation, where development pressure is greatest and ecosystems are most endangered,
are either unprotected public lands or privately held).
265 See OTA, supra note 3, at 227; Farrier, supra note 2, at 310.
266 See Doremus, supra note 5, at 322 n.356. Alpine ecosystems receive protection not
only because of their scenic value, but also because they do not lend themselves readily to
competing land uses. See id. at 322.
267 See OTA, supra note 3, at 67. Riparian lands generally are more developed and
largely privately held because access to water has made these lands the most valuable to
settlers in the region.
268 See supra notes 186-87, 211, 231 and accompanying text.
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and ecosystem types currently unrepresented or only partially repre269
sented within current federal landholdings.
However, the identification, acquisition, and sequestration of additional representative and uniquely valuable habitats and ecosystems
should not be limited to the West. Many of the nation's most critically
endangered ecosystems are located in Hawaii and in the eastern twothirds of the continental United States, 270 where population densities
are generally higher, land conversion and ecosystem fragmentation
are more advanced, 27 1 and the federal presence is generally much
smaller. Not coincidentally, many of these states also rank among the
leaders in listed endangered and threatened species. 272 Federal land
acquisitions in these regions are unlikely ever to occur on a scale that
would bring them into parity with federal landholdings in the West
and Alaska, because land costs in these regions are generally
higher, 273 widely dispersed ownership makes large-scale acquisitions
difficult, 274 and, in any case, there are relatively few large blocks of
269
Cf Crumpacker et al., supra note 38, at 111 (arguing that ecosystem types currently
unrepresented or underrepresented on federal lands "should be given special consideration in federal programs concerned with the maintenance of biological diversity").
270 A 1993 study by Defenders of Wildlife ranked Florida, California, and Hawaii with
the most endangered ecosystems, followed by Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, South Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, and Tennessee. REED F. Ross & ROBERT L. PETRS, DEFENDERS OF
WILDLIFE, ENDANGERED EcOsYSTEMs: A STATUS REPORT ON AMERICA'S VANISHING HABITAT
AND WILDLIFE (1993); see also CEQ ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrry, supra note 152, at 131-32

tbl.7.1 (citing 1995 study listing 21 "most endangered ecosystems," of which 14 occur
predominantly or exclusively outside the twelve-state Western region, led by South Florida
Landscape, Southern Appalachian Spruce-Fir Forest, and Longleaf Pine Forest and
Savanna).
271
272

See supra note 257.
See BEATLEY, supra note 4, at 5 fig.1.2; Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., Listed Species by State/Teritoy (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <http://www.fws.gov/
-r9endspp/listmap.html> (noting that states with most listed species are Hawaii, California, Florida, Alabama, Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia); David S.
Wilcove et al., Envtl. Def. Fund, Rebuildingthe Ark: Toward a More Effective EndangeredSpecies

Act for PrivateLand (visited June 16, 1997) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/Reports/help-esa/
index.html> (stating that endangered species are concentrated on private lands, especially
in states with relatively little federal land, and those listed species with habitat primarily on
federal land are far more likely to be in improving or stable condition, while those on
private land are more often in decline); A.P. Dobson et al., GeographicDistributionof Endangered Species in the United States, 275 Sci. 550, 551-53 (1997) (finding greatest numbers of
endangered species in Hawaii, southern California, southeastern coastal states, and southern Appalachia, areas characterized by high species endemism and intensive urban and
agricultural development).
273
See STATISnCAL ABsTRAcr, supra note 251, at 665 (indicating that, of 28 states with
average value of farm land and buildings exceeding $1,000 per acre, only Oregon and
Washington are in the Western region; other Western states all rank in the bottom third).
274
Some 85% of the nation's privately owned timberlands exists outside the Western
region, see id. at 685, and, apart from lands owned directly by forest industry firms, ownership of the timberlands is dispersed widely, see CEQ ENWRONMENTAL QuALmr, supra note
152, at 300-01 (stating that six million people own 287 million acres of private nonindustrial timberlands). Farmland ownership is also dispersed widely, see National Agric. Statistics Serv., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Farms and Land in Farms (1996) (news release, on file with
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undisturbed habitat. 275 Nevertheless, if carefully selected and prop-

erly managed, even much smaller scale acquisitions can play an important, positive role in biodiversity conservation.2 76 Indeed, in some
areas-Hawaii, Florida, Texas, parts of the Southeast, and high-population coastal areas generally-where concentrations of rare, unique,
or especially fragile ecosystems combine with intense development
pressure to create a heightened threat of species and ecosystem
extinction, targeted federal acquisitions of the last remaining habitat
2 77
fragments may be the last best hope for conserving biodiversity.
author) (stating that 2.06 million farms, with an average farm size of 469 acres, consist of
968 million acres), especially in the Eastern regions where farms are more numerous and
smaller in size. See STATISTICAL ABsrAcr, supranote 251, at 663 (detailing the number of
farms and average size of farm by state and by region). Forest lands and farmlands account
for the bulk of privately owned acreage, see supranotes 251-52, but adding owners of developed land-generally held in even smaller, more numerous, and more costly parcelsbrings the total to 34 million private landowners. See PRIRIIrES FOR CONSERVATION, supra
note 81, at 45 (citing 1980 figures).
275
See supratext accompanying notes 46-47. Pursuant to its authority under the Weeks
Law, 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1994), the Forest Service has over the years acquired large tracts of
relatively undeveloped, primarily second-growth forests in parts of the East and Southeast,
especially in the upper Great Lakes, northern New England, the southern Appalachians,
and the Ozarks. A number of other important and largely undeveloped tracts are national
parks (e.g., the Everglades in south Florida, Great Smoky Mountains in the southern Appalachians, and Voyageurs and Isle Royale National Parks in the upper Great Lakes), other
units of the National Park Service (e.g., Cape Cod National Seashore, Big Cypress Preserve), or National Wildlife Refuges (e.g., Okefenokee). Virtually all federal lands east of
the 100th meridian have been acquired in this century. See PRIOITrrIES FOR CONSERVATION,
supranote 81, at 41. In a few cases, very large state parks have been set aside to fill a similar
niche, most notably the nation's largest park, Adirondack Park, in upstate New York.
276
See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Donald H. Miller, Strategies to
Achieve Public and Private Land Use and Forest Resource Goals, in URBAN/FoREST INTERFACE,
supra note 252, at 163, 172-73 (stating that although public acquisition of land may be
costly in areas under development pressure, "purchases of land or rights in land in the
open market may be the most direct, simplest, least controversial, and even least expensive
way of preserving key parcels") (citation omitted).
277 See CURTIS H. FLATHER ET AL., SPECIES ENDANGERMENT PATTERNS IN THE UNITED
STATES 26-27 (U.S. Dept. of Ag., Gen. Tech. Rpt. RM-241 1994) (stating that the greatest
multispecies conservation benefit would come from land acquisition or other conservation
measures targeted to regions of high species endangerment, generally characterized by
high species richness, high endemism, and intense development pressure); see also Lloyd L.
Loope & Charles P. Stone, Strategiesto Reduce Erosion of Biodiversity by Exotic TerrestrialSpecies,
in MANAGED LANDSCAPES, supra note 53, at 261, 264-67 (describing the critical role of Haleakala and Hawaii Volcanoes National Parks in protecting Hawaii's critically endangered
ecosystems and numerous endemic plant and bird species, despite the parks' small sizes);
Marla Cone, San Diego OKs Broadest ConservationPlan in U.S., LA TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at
Al (noting that San Diego County has an extraordinary concentration of endangered species, due to a combination of endemic species and real estate development pressure).

These regions have been among the fastest-growing in the country, and those trends will

likely continue. See U.S. Census Bureau, Projectionsof the Total Population of States: 1995 to
2025 (visited Oct. 17, 1997) <http://www.census.gov/population/projections/state/
stpjpop.txt> [hereinafter PopulationProjections] (indicating that California, Hawaii, Florida,

Texas, the southeastern states generally, and several southeastern states including Georgia,
North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee, will likely rank among the fastest-growing over a
thirty-year period).
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Ultimately, the problem is neither that the federal government
owns too little,land, nor that it owns too much. Rather, the problem is
that the federal government must diversify and better manage its rich
278
portfolio of land in order to achieve biodiversity conservation goals.
Critics of a biodiversity conservation strategy premised on federal land
ownership frequently overlook that neither the present portfolio of
federal lands nor the authorities under which those lands are managed are immutable facts of nature; they are political and legal artifacts from an earlier era in which biodiversity conservation had yet to
appear on the national policy agenda. The federal government can
make adjustments where important ecosystem types and habitats are
not represented or where the boundaries of federal landholdings are
not well matched to the ecosystems of which they are a part.
Some federal lands have moderate to high commercial value for
commodity production (e.g., grazing, 279 timber, 280 oil and gas, coal,
28 2
or mineral development), 28 ' for private recreational development,
or for urban development in some of the fastest-growing regions of
278 As the chief conservation officer of The Nature Conservancy has noted: "The challenge for the federal government is not the amount of land it manages, but rather the
biological or ecological value of the land it owns. Not all land is biologically equal." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interiorand Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations,
104th Cong. (Mar. 14, 1996) (testimony of Bruce Runnels, The Nature Conservancy)
[hereinafter Testimony of Bruce Runnels].
279 Grazing has some market value, but perhaps not as much as ranchers and critics of
"below market" grazing fees commonly believe. Many economists have concluded that livestock grazing is a low-value activity in much of the West, and likely could not sustain significantly higher fees. See NELSON, supra note 150, at 264-65 (indicating that the direct and
indirect costs of administering grazing programs exceed not only grazing fee revenues, but
also the full market value of current livestock grazing); id. at 266 (stating that the value of
recreational outputs of BLM lands exceeds the market value of livestock grazing by a factor
of five, and the gap is likely to grow wider); see alsoWilliam E. Riebsame, Ending the Range
Wars 2, ENV'T, May 1996, at 4, 9 (stating that the costs of federal range programs exceed
profits that the ranchers make from grazing livestock on public lands).
280 The federal government owns half of the nation's softwood timber inventory, but
current federal timber management policies have received criticism for subsidizing timber
production in areas where it is uneconomic and discouraging production in high-quality,
accessible stands that are capable of producing more and better timber at a lower cost. See
NELSON, supra note 150, at 76-77, 221. One solution may be to reform these policies so as
to concentrate timber production in prime timber-producing areas. See id. at 77 (citing
Sierra Club proposals to that effect). But once policymakers reach that decision, there is
little reason to retain federal ownership of the prime commodity-producing lands. See infra
note 291 and accompanying text.
281
See NELSON, supra note 150, at 315 (estimating that the value of unleased federally
owned coal reserves in the Powder River Basin of Wyoming and Montana, which lie primarily under privately owned surfaces and are therefore of little biological conservation value,
is $6 billion); see also HearingBefore the Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, 104th Cong.
(June 27, 1996) (testimony of Robert H. Nelson) [hereinafter Nelson Testimony] (stating
that federal lands include one-third of all U.S. coal reserves, major oil and gas reserves, as
well as hardrock mineral deposits such as gold, copper, and nickel).
282 See Nelson Testimony, supra note 281.
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the country.28 3 Some of these lands also contain important biological
resources, and the federal government will need to make hard choices
about which values to promote and protect, and on which lands to do
so. But the federal holdings also include lands that are relatively less
important, or, in some cases, simply redundant from a biodiversity
conservation perspective, 28 4 but are nonetheless commercially valuable. Through an aggressive program of in-kind land swaps or cash
sales of these lands, the federal government could substantially rectify
this imbalance in the federal land portfolio without significantly increasing (or decreasing) its overall role as landowner and land manager. The federal government could then use the proceeds from
these programs to acquire and protect fee interests or lesser property
interests (like conservation easements) in valuable ecosystems and
28 5
habitats.
Land-swapping agreements may offer the opportunity to enhance
the biodiversity conservation value of the federal land portfolio. The
Interior Department has already undertaken a number of strategic
land swaps to secure endangered species habitats, and unique and
threatened ecosystems. 286 In addition, the BLM regularly engages in
283
See NELSON, supra note 150, at 311 (estimating that the value of BLM holdings in
the rapidly growing Las Vegas metropolitan area is "several hundred million dollars"); see
also PopulationProjections, supranote 277 (indicating that Alaska and eleven Western states
are expected to be among the fastest-growing over a thirty-year period); Mike Dombeck,
Acting Director, Bureau of Land Management, State of the Public Lands: Remarks before
Conservation Roundtable at the National Press Club 3 (Oct. 9, 1996) (transcript on file
with author) (noting that BLM lands are concentrated in the Rocky Mountain region,
which is projected to be the fastest-growing region of the country over a ten-year period,
with Nevada, Utah, and Arizona projected to be the three fastest growing states).
284 Conservation biologists generally recommend that reserves include some redundancy of ecosystem types and habitats, as insurance against localized disturbances. Nonetheless, some ecosystem types are probably overrepresented in current federal
landholdings, and diversifying the portfolio of federal lands could achieve greater overall
biodiversity protection.
285
See UNi. CONSERVATION EASEMENT Acr § 1(1), 12 U.LA. 170 (1996).
"Conservation easement" means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real
property imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of
which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values
of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational,
or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing
air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
Id.
286 See Bruce Babbitt, The Endangered Species Act and "Takings: A Callfor Innovation
Within the Terms of the Act 24 ENVrL. L. 355, 365 (1994) (describing a land swap in which
the Department of the Interior acquired 100,000 acres in Florida's Big Cypress Swamp in
exchange for one hundred acres in downtown Phoenix, Arizona); John H. Cushman Jr.,
U.S. UsingSwaps to Protect Land,N.Y. TiMes, Sept. 29, 1996, atAl (describing land swaps as a
"decades-old practice [that] has achieved new prominence" as the Clinton Administration
seeks to protect environmentally-sensitive lands by exchanging lands of high development
value).
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land exchanges with other federal and state agencies 287 and wholesale

exchanges between the BLM and the Forest Service have been recommended periodically to allow each agency to rationalize its holdings. 288 Others have suggested, for reasons of management efficiency,

that land swaps should consolidate federal lands, which are currently
divided into isolated parcels or "checkerboard" patterns, interspersed
with state, local, and private lands. Under these ownership patterns,
land is often more difficult and costly to manage, and less valuable for
either conservation purposes or for some private uses, than it might
be if held in larger consolidated blocks. 289 By packaging conservation
lands in fewer, but larger, units, consolidation of holdings could significantly increase the conservation value of some federal lands. At
the same time, it could benefit state and local governments and private landowners by freeing larger contiguous parcels for development
or other purposes. Furthermore, the principle that the federal government should seek to optimize the conservation value of its landholdings through land exchanges should extend beyond
consolidations with adjacent parcels. The government should seek to
assemble the portfolio that represents the greatest conservation value,
wherever the lands are located.
Land swaps, of course, raise notoriously difficult questions of valuation, and, for that reason, often generate considerable controversy. 290 Alternatively, or additionally, Congress could authorize a
287 See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW REPORT, supra note 19, at *2 (stating that the
BLM typically exchanges about 250,000 acres annually with other federal and state agencies). The BLM is authorized to engage in land swaps under section 206 of the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to dispose
of public lands by exchange when the Secretary "determines that the public interest will be
well served," 43 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (1994), provided that the lands exchanged must be of

equal value or, if not equal, equalized by a supplemental cash payment, see id § 1716(b).
288

See id.; NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REViEW REPORT, supra note 19, at *2-3 (citing pro-

posals made in the 1980s, and recommending renewed efforts at BLM-Forest Service
exchanges).
289

See FRANK GREGG, FEDERAL LAND TRANSFERS: THE CASE FOR A WESTWIDE PROGRAM

BASED ON THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT 5-8 (1982); Coggins, supra note

136, at 520-26.
290 See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, FinalAudit Report on Nevada
Land Exchange Activities, Bureau of Land Management (visited July 20, 1997) <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?Paddress=wais.access.gpo.gov&filename=nevada.wais&directory=/diskb/wais/data/interior> [hereinafter Final Audit Report]
(concluding that the Nevada BLM office based its exchanges on overappraisals of private
lands and underapprasals of public lands) (may only be indirectly accessed through
<su__docs/aces/aaces0O2.html>); Cushman, supranote 286 (stating that public lands economist Robert H. Nelson describes land swaps as a "second-best solution" because barter
exchange is less efficient than cash exchange). See generallyJon Margolis, Let's Make aDeak
FederalLand Swaps Are Now a Valuable Tool of Resource Conservation, But Is the Public GettingAll
It Should?, AUDUBON, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 71 (questioning the valuations of exchanged lands

and challenging the legitimacy of secret bargaining between federal agents and private
landowners). A partial solution is to require competitive exchanges, in which, rather than
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systematic program of market sales of potentially valuable commodityproducing lands, or lands with high development value, with the proceeds designated for the acquisition of lands for biodiversity conservation purposes. 29 ' In some cases, it may be possible to stretch these
conservation dollars by acquiring less than a full fee interest because
the purchase of a conservation easement is typically less costly and
may be perfectly adequate to achieve the government's conservation
objectives. 29 2 This approach would require federal land managers to
weigh the market value of lands currently in the government's portfolio against their biological value, and to compare the biological value
of lands currently under government ownership with lands that might
be acquired in their stead. Thus, in each case, the federal land managers would weigh, in concrete fashion, the costs and benefits of conservation against the costs and benefits of development. The federal
land managers would seek to get the most conservation available for a
limited conservation budget-a healthy fiscal discipline found neither
under current approaches to federal land management 29 3 nor under
29 4
a broad-based regulatory approach.

relying on appraisers' estimates to establish the terms in a negotiated two-party transaction,
the public agency solicits bids by private landowners, who offer competing packages of
land and cash in exchange for an identified parcel of federal land. See FinalAudit Repor4
supra, at 11 (describing prototype program of competitive land exchanges by Forest Service
and recommending its adoption by BLM). This approach will not work, however, when
the federal government wants to acquire a particular ecologically valuable parcel.
291 See NELSON, supra note 150, at 311-14. The broad outlines of such a mechanism
already exist under the Land and Water Conservation Fund, which uses proceeds from,
inter aia, sales of "surplus" public lands for acquisition of park, recreation, and conservation land. But the government is not currently in the business of actively seeking to market
its most commercially valuable lands, see id., nor is biodiversity conservation per se a high
priority consideration in land acquisition, see PiROmnEs FOR CONSERVATION, supra note 81,
at 6-9 (stating that of the four major land agencies, only the FWS explicitly includes biodiversity in its land acquisition criteria, but that the OMB sets the overall acquisition priorities under criteria that largely ignore biodiversity and ecosystem considerations).
Because Land and Water Conservation Fund moneys are available for land acquisition only
as provided in annual appropriations by Congress (which have been limited in recent
years), most of the Fund's money has been diverted to deficit reduction. See supra note 82.
Nonetheless, the Land and Water Conservation Fund has funded federal acquisition of
between four and five million acres over a twenty-five-year period. See PRIoR=TEs FOR CONSERVATION, supra note 81, at 103.
292 See PRIORITIES FOR CONSERVATION, supra note 81, at 23; RobertJ. Smith, TheEndan-

gered Species Act: Saving Species or Stopping Growth, REG., Winter 1992, at 83, 87.
293 Currently, the federal government generally retains ownership of any particular
parcel regardless of the opportunity costs, the only question being what weight the government will give conservation in the land's management as the agency seeks to juggle conflicting mandates, missions, and political pressures. See Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and
Loathing on the FederalLands, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 647, 650-51 (1997) (describing historical
shift in federal policy from disposal to retention and accompanying ascendancy of environmental and resource conservation objectives).
294 See infra notes 522-25 and accompanying text.
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Some economists and many environmentalists have argued that
the federal government should get out of the commodity production
business entirely and concentrate its efforts on providing benefits
(such as biodiversity) that markets will fail to produce in adequate
quantities. Although some environmentalists are suspicious of any
suggestion that the federal government divest land,2 95 their emphasis

on the primacy of environmental values should logically support the
conclusion that the federal portfolio should include those lands capable of producing the greatest environmental benefits. Exchanging environmentally less-valuable lands for other lands capable of producing
greater environmental benefits can achieve this end.2 96 Many econo-

mists contend that there is no economic justification for continued
federal ownership of valuable commodity-producing lands because
markets are quite capable of producing those commodities more efficiently. 2 97 This argument is supported, in many cases, by the fact that

the public lands are managed under policies that ensure an annual
taxpayer subsidy to the private parties licensed to exploit the commodities, a situation not only economists, but many environmentalists,
find intolerable. 29 8 The cost to taxpayers is thus two-fold. First, the
295 See NELSON, supra note 150, at 312 (stating that proposals to sell public lands are
often equated with "privatization" proposals by former Reagan Administration Interior Secretary James Watt, anathema to environmentalists).
296
See Testimony of Bruce Runnels, supra note 278 ("The Nature Conservancy has
little disagreement with the notion that the federal government should divest itself... of
federal lands having little or no important biological value.").
297 See, e.g., Barney Dowdle, The Casefor PrivatizingGovernment Owned Timberlands, in
PRIVATE RIcrTS AND PUBLIC LANDS 71, 76 (Phillip N. Trulock ed., 1983) (identifying spe-

cific government timber management policies as inefficient because they are unresponsive
to market demand and price signals); B. Delworth Gardner, The Casefor Divestiture, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 156, 157, 169-78 (Sterling Brubaker ed., 1984) (stating that
private markets produce more efficient allocations of commodities than does government
ownership); Gary D. Libecap, The Efficiency Casefor the Assignment of PrivateProperty Rights to
Federal Lands, in PRIVATE RIGHTs AND PUBLIC LANDS, supra, at 29, 34 ("In neither timber
land nor rangeland [aire there significant public good reasons or other externalities to
justify land retention by the government."); Robert H. Nelson, The Future of FederalForest
Management: Optionsfor Use of Market Methods, in FEDERAL LANDS POLICY, supra note 239, at
159, 172 (arguing that the private sector has a comparative advantage "in producing outputs for which most of the benefits can be captured in market prices," while the federal
government has an advantage "in managing forestiand that provides recreational or other
nonmarket benefits of importance to the whole nation"); Roger A. Sedjo, Market and
Nonmarket Influences in Urban/ForestInterface Conflicts, in URBAN/Foamr INTERFACE, supra
note 252, at 93, 93 (stating that "It]here is no reason to believe that the unregulated private market could not adequately provide socially desirable levels of timber production," by
shifting more land to forestry, increasing output from industrial timberlands through new
technologies, and increasing reliance on nonindustrial private timberlands).
298
See B.J. Bergman, Logger's Free Lunch: Wien Will Big Timber Get Off the Dole, SIERRA,
July/Aug. 1997, at 22 (criticizing below-cost timber production on federal lands); Coggins,
supra note 136, at 526-28 (stating that the BLM sets grazing fees below market price); Brad
Knickerbocker, Butting Heads with the Environmental Status Quo, CHISrTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 24, 1997, at 4 (stating that the Mining Law of 1872 allows mining companies to claim
federal land for a token fee and extract valuable minerals without payment of royalties).
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taxpayers pay through annual appropriations to support large federal
bureaucracies like the Forest Service and BLM, whose work consists
largely of subsidizing private, profitable production of commodities
that the private sector would produce, even in the absence of any subsidy. Second, the taxpayers pay in the form of opportunity costs when
the federal government dedicates federal lands to commodity production. These opportunity costs arise because those lands (or substituted lands of equal market value but greater conservation value)
could be used instead to produce other, potentially more valuable,
public goods such as biodiversity, the production of which we forego
under current federal land ownership patterns and management policies. 299 A more sensible approach to federal land management would
place biodiversity conservation above commodity subsidization in the
hierarchy of public values; selective divestiture of commercially valuable federal lands in favor of acquisition of lands of higher conservation value is consistent with that approach.
However, even a major program of federal land acquisition, trading, and sequestration to achieve biodiversity conservation objectives
would almost certainly leave gaps in biodiversity protection. In large
parts of the nation, most land is-and is likely to remain-in private
ownership. Federal biodiversity reserves are unlikely ever to cover the
full range of habitats and ecosystems that merit protection. Even
where reserves are set aside, biodiversity policy must concern itself
with ecosystems that may not be well matched with reserve bounda30 0
ries, and with potentially adverse spillovers from adjacent land uses.
For these reasons, federal biodiversity law and policy must also address
the use of adjacent privately owned lands.
III
FEDERAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE LAND USE

Regulation of private land use has traditionally been the province
of state common-law courts and, more recently, state and municipal
legislative and administrative bodies. 30 ' Although Congress flirted
briefly with proposals to establish a National Land Use Act in the
1970s, the federal government has, for the most part, avoided direct
intervention in land use regulation, viewing it as properly a state and
local affair.30 2 However, several federal statutes enacted in the "environmental decade" of the 1970s profoundly affect private land-use decisions. The most important of these, from a biodiversity conservation
See NELSON, supra note 150, at 76 (identifying "social loss" that occurs when uneco299
nomic, subsidized commodity production displaces nonmarket uses of public lands).
300 See supra notes 186-87, 211, 231 and accompanying text.
301
See Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, supra note 2, at 1318.
302
See Doremus, supra note 5, at 288-89, 302.
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perspective, are the ESA, which restricts landowners' ability to alter
their land in ways that adversely affect the habitats of plant or animal
species listed as "threatened" or "endangered,"30 3 and the federal wetlands protection programs, especially section 404 of the Clean Water

305
Act 30 4 and the "Swampbuster" provision of the Farm Bill.

A.

Endangered Species Act and Private Lands

Part II.A.L.b above discussed the duties which the ESA imposed
on federal land managers. But the ESA also affects private landowners. Under the ESA, it is unlawful for "any person"-private parties
and government agencies alike 3 0 6-to "take" any fish or wildlife species listed as "endangered."3 0 7 By statutory definition, "take" includes
"harm."3 0 8 By regulation, "harm" is defined as any "act which actually
kills or injures wildlife," including "significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavior patterns, including breeding, feeding, or
sheltering."3 0 9 The Secretary of the Interior has, by regulation, extended the same protection to species listed as "threatened," 310 but
may modify this protection by special rule where appropriate.3 1 ' The
upshot is that private landowners generally may not develop their land
if it would "harm" a listed endangered or threatened wildlife species
303
304
305
306

See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).

307 Id. § 1538(a) (1). Violators are subject to civil and criminal penalties. See id.
§ 1540. The prohibition on "taking" does not apply to endangered plant species. Instead,
it is unlawful to "remove and reduce to possession" endangered plants from areas under
federal jurisdiction, or to "remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy" such plants "in knowing violation" of state law or in the course of criminal trespass. M § 1538(a) (2) (B). Consequently, endangered plants may be "taken" from private land if state law does not forbid
it.

308 1d. § 1532(19) ("The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.").
309 50 C.F.R_ § 17.3 (1996). This regulation-the principal basis for federal regulation
of private land use under the ESA-has been upheld by the Supreme Court as a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
310 The statute authorizes the Secretary to "issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of [threatened] species." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(d). On this authority, the Secretary of Interior has issued a regulation generically
extending the taking ban to all threatened species, except as otherwise provided by special
rule. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.31 (a), 17.71. The Secretary of Commerce has not taken parallel
measures for threatened marine and andromodous species, but instead issues protective
regulations for such species on a case-by-case basis. See Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things
Are: The Endangered Species Act and PrivateProperty, 24 ENrL L. 369, 375 n.35 (1994).
311
See 50 C.F.R §§ 17.40-17.48.
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by adversely modifying its habitat so as to disrupt breeding, food sup3 12
plies, or nesting.
Nevertheless, a landowner seeking to modify the habitat of a
listed species may apply for an "incidental take permit" 3 13 that allows

the taking of a listed species if the taking is incidental to otherwise
lawful activity and will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the
species' survival and recovery.3 14 The applicant must also win federal
approval of a habitat conservation plan designed to "minimize ind
mitigate such [adverse] impacts... [and including] such other measures that the Secretary may require as being necessary or appropriate
for purposes of the plan."3 15
For some years, the permit process was viewed as a narrow and
rarely used exception to the general prohibition on taking listed species. 3 16 The current administration, however, views the process as an
opportunity to encourage (or perhaps to compel) landowners, developers, local officials, and conservation groups in areas containing the
habitats of listed species to collaborate in comprehensive, ecosystemwide, multispecies habitat conservation planning. 317 Secretary Babbitt's biggest success to date involved the coastal scrub sage ecosystems
of southern California's Orange and San Diego Counties.3 1 8 There,
comprehensive federal habitat conservation plans embrace ecosystemwide land use plans developed under California's Natural Community
Conservation Planning Act ("NCCP"), which provides for ecosystem312 This can create perverse incentives. In some instances, landowners have intentionally destroyed populations of candidate species on their land, so as not to fall under the
ESA's "taking" prohibition in the event the species were eventually listed as threatened or
endangered. See Holmes Rolston, III, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 283, 283-84 (1990).
313 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1) (B).
314 See id. § 1539(a) (2) (B); 50 C.F.R. § 17.22(b) (2) (i), (iv).
315
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2) (A) (ii), (iv).
316 See Farrier, supra note 2, at 376; Robert D. Thornton, Searchingfor Consensus and
Predictability:Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973, 21 ENrrL.
L. 605, 650-52 (1991) (citing the cost and delay involved in the planning process, together
with difficulty in reaching consensus among many groups with disparate interests, as barriers to successful implementation). The most prominent early habitat conservation plans
were developed in California, for the mission blue butterfly on San Bruno Mountain, just
south of San Francisco, and for the fringe-toed lizard in Riverside County's Coachella Valley. See Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 606-08.
317 See Babbitt, supranote 286, at 361-64; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Dep't of the Interior, Habitat Conservation Planning Is Streamlined Under New Guidelines Announced by
Two Agencies (Press Release, Dec. 3, 1996), availablein 1996 WL 694915, at *2 (noting that
from 1982 to 1992, FWS issued only 14 HCPs, but by September 1996, 197 HCPs had been
approved with another two hundred under development). The first such regional multispecies plan, the Balcones Canyonlands Conservation Plan in the Texas Hill Country
around Austin, predates the present administration. See BEATL=, supra note 4, at 173-93;
Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supranote 2, at 608.
318 See Cone, supra note 277.
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wide planning on a purely voluntary basis.3 19 Although the NCCP
planning process was already underway by the time the California
gnatcatcher was listed under the ESA, the federal listing lent gravity
and urgency to the planning process. It triggered land use plans to
protect a threatened ecosystem upon which dozens of rare plants and
animals depend, in a region under tremendous developmental
0
pressure.32
Clearly, the ESA's ban on adverse habitat modification gives the
government a powerful club to hold over the heads of would-be developers and local officials, in order to induce their participation in "voluntary" biodiversity conservation planning efforts. 32 1 Not surprisingly,
the process is not always a smooth or amicable one.3

22

Secretary Bab-

bitt has made a bid to sweeten the pot for landowners with a "no surprises" policy, promising that once a multispecies habitat conservation
plan is approved, the federal government will not later introduce additional demands for protection of species or habitat, absent "extraordinary circumstances." 323 The habitat conservation planning
approach, although not without its critics, 324 is now widely touted as
319

1991 Cal. Stat. 765 (codified at CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800-2840 (West Supp.

1997)).

320 See Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 610; Welner, supra note 74, at 338-46;
Cone, supra note 277.
321 See Federico Cheever, An Introduction to the ProhibitionAgainst Takings in Section 9 of
the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973: Learningto Live with a Powerful Species PreservationLaw, 62
U. COLO. L. REv. 109, 198 (1991).

322 See Ruhl, supranote 2, at 623, 639-40 (describing habitat planning process as "coercive" in nature, if not outright "extortion"); Cone, supra note 277 (stating that some San
Diego landowners and politicians bitterly oppose what one calls the "multiple stolen and
confiscated property" plan); Ralph KM. Haurwitz, Urban Habitat:Eight Years in the Making,
a Plan to Preserve30,000 Austin-Area Acres Will Soon GainFederalApproval-But Not Everyone Is
Cheering, AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 21, 1996, at Al (stating that despite broad public
approval, some landowners regard Austin's habitat conservation plan as a "high-handed
land grab"). But cf BEA=, supra note 4, at 196, 211-13 (stating that, despite acrimony,
factions usually find common ground because developers come to see the habitat planning
process as more efficient than site-by-site battles over the ESA, and may reap market benefits from open space and related environmental amenities).
323 See Notice of Availability of Final Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and
Incidental Take Permitting Process, 61 Fed. Reg. 63,854 (1996); see also Tarlock, Biodiversity
Federalism, supra note 2, at 1352 (discussing the "no surprises" policy); Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat ConservationPlanningUnder the EndangeredSpecies Act: No Surprises & the Quest
for Certainty, 67 U. COLO. L. Ruv. 371, 387-90 (1996) (discussing the requirements and
difficulties of the "no surprises" policy). The "extraordinary circumstances" exception, of
course, is sufficiently open-ended to make many would-be developers skeptical of the value
of the "no surprises" commitment, and is also opposed by some environmentalists who
argue that the policy handcuffs the government, leaving it without sufficient flexibility to
respond to new information or changed factual circumstances. See Christine L. Younger,
EnvironmentalGroups Say "No Surprises" Policy Is No Good, WEST's LEGAL NEws, Nov. 7, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 638734.
324 See Marianne Lavelle, Endangered Species Act: Feds Settle to Save Act and Species, But
Critics Say Deals May Hurt Not Help Endangered, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 16, 1996, at Al.
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the wave of the future. 32 5 Thus, the incidental take provision threatens to become the exception that swallows the rule against adverse
modification of habitat for listed species, and deeply implicates the
federal government in the heretofore largely local matter of land-use
planning.
Secretary Babbitt also appears to be receptive to listing species as
"threatened" rather than "endangered,"3 2 6 allowing greater flexibility
in applying the ESA.3 27 For threatened (but not for endangered)

wildlife species, the Secretary may issue special rules modifying the
ESA's strictures against taking that species. 328 For example, because
the coastal California gnatcatcher was listed as threatened rather than
endangered, the Secretary was able to issue a special rule prospectively
permitting incidental takes of the species, provided they were consis3 29
tent with California's NCCP for the coastal sage scrub region.
The ESA may also affect private landowners if their land development projects require federal permits or funding. The ESA can affect
private landowners in this way because the relevant federal agency is
subject to the ESA's consultation requirements, as well as its proscriptions against taking any action (including issuing a permit or funding
a project) that would 'Jeopardize" or adversely affect the designated
critical habitat of a listed species. 330 For example, a proposed development on a privately owned wetland normally requires a permit from
the Army Corps of Engineers. 3 31 If the proposed wetland development adversely affects a listed species, however, the ESA requires that
the Corps consult with the FWS prior to issuing the permit, and prohibits the Corps from issuing the permit if doing so would jeopardize
or adversely affect the designated critical habitat of the listed spe325 See, e.g., BATLm', supra note 4, at 192 (stating that the plan "is impressive in its
efforts to take a regional multi-species approach and may well represent the best model for
habitat conservation in the future"); see also Lavelle, supra note 324, at A17 (stating that
Michael Bean, who is widely considered the "father" of the ESA for his early and ongoing
work on endangered species protection, endorses the HCP process as a "creative new solution" to conflicts that have undermined species protection).
326 Although the statutory definitions of these terms differ, see supratext accompanying
notes 72-73, the distinction is at best imprecise, leaving the agency with considerable discretion to determine whether a species is "in danger of extinction" and therefore "endangered," or merely "likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future"
and therefore "threatened." Although the statute directs the Secretary to make listing determinations solely on the basis of the best scientific information, see supra text accompanying note 74, the uncertain line separating the categories invites manipulation.
827
See Meltz, supra note 310, at 382-83; Welner, supra note 74, at 343; see also Tom
Kenworthy, Babbitt ClearsCompromise to Protect CaliforniaBird, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1993, at
A2 (describing flexibility of this approach with respect to the gnatcatcher).
328 See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
329
See Meltz, supra note 310, at 383 n.81; Welner, supra note 74, at 343-44.
330 See Meltz, supra note 310, at 384; Farrier, supra note 2, at 377.
331 See infra Part III.B.1.
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cies.3 32 As noted previously, however, the vast majority of such consultations are either approved outright or approved subject to mitigation
33
requirements.
B.

Wetlands

'Wetlands" is an umbrella term for a diverse array of semi-aquatic
ecosystems, encompassing marine, estuarine, riverine, lacustrine (lake
and pond), and palustrine (inland basin) systems such as tidal flats,
salt and freshwater marshes, fens, bogs, swamps, bottomlands,
and prairie potholes. 334 Wetlands processes and functions vary
widely, 335 but in general, wetlands provide habitats for many species of
birds, amphibians, reptiles, mammals, arthropods, fish, shellfish, insects, hydrophytic plants, and micro-organisms, 33 6 and serve as "nurseries" for the reproductive and early developmental stages of many
species, including many commercially valuable fish and shellfish species. 337 By some estimates, approximately half the animals and onethird of the plants currently listed as endangered or threatened under
the ESA are wetland-dependent. 33 8 In addition, wetlands often perform crucial flood control, erosion control, freshwater storage,
groundwater recharge, nutrient cycling, and water filtering and
332

See U.S.

GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: INFORMATION ON SPE-

CIES PROTEMCION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 7-8 (GAO/RCED-95-16 1994)
examples).

(giving specific

333 See Meltz, supra note 310, at 384; supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text. Any
project authorized under the consultation process is not considered a "taking," see 16
U.S.C. § 1536(o) (1994), and thus such approval trumps the taking requirements, see
Meltz, supra note 310, at 384. One commentator has suggested that because the consultation process operates on a faster timetable, has no public participation requirements, and
does not place the burden on the landowner to produce a habitat conservation plan, landowners may find it advantageous to proceed under section 7 rather than section 10. See
Farrier, supra note 2, at 378-79.
334 See Mark S. Dennison & James F. Berry, Overview, in WETLANDS: GUIDE TO SCIENCE,
LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1, 3-8 (Mark S. Dennison &James F. Berry eds., 1993) [hereinafter
WETLANDS]. Although there is no consensus definition, scientists and government agencies generally identify wetlands by reference to hydrology (inundated or saturated for at
least part of the year), soil types (hydric, i.e., exhibiting anaerobic characteristics consistent
with inundation or saturation), and vegetation (hydrophytic, i.e., characteristically growing
in wet areas). See id.at 4-6.
335

See, e.g., GLENDA DANIEL &JERRY SULLIVAN, A SIERRA CLUB NATURALIST'S GUIDE TO

THE NORTH WOODS OF MICHIGAN, WISCONSIN, AND MINNESOTA 264-302 (1981) (describing
six distinctive types of northern forest wetland communities, ranging from "lush" marshes
"vibrant with life," to "cold, nutrient-poor" and "stingy" sphagnum bogs that support only a
few specialized plant species).
336 SeeJames F. Berry, EcologicalPinciples of Wetland Ecosystems, in WEmANDS, supra note
334, at 18, 55-60.
337 Id. at 55-56, 130.
338 See Farrier, supra note 2, at 377; see also Berry, supra note 336, at 57 (stating that, as
of 1991, 43% of the species listed as endangered or threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service were wetland dependent).
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cleansing functions, and also provide aesthetic and recreational
33 9
beiefits.
Yet, wetlands are among our most endangered ecosystems.
Nearly half of the naturally occurring wetlands in the United States
have already been lost and others have been seriously degraded, with
the largest losses resulting from agricultural conversion.3 4 0 In coastal
areas, however, the largest threat to wetlands is urbanization and
open-water developments.3 41 An estimated 75% of the wetlands
in the lower forty-eight states are located on privately held
42
land.3
1. Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act 343 generally prohibits discharging pollutants into the "waters of the United States" without a permit.3 44 Section 404 authorizes the Secretary of the Army, as the head of the Army
Corps of Engineers, to issue permits for the "discharge of dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites" under
guidelines developed by the Environmental Protection Administration ("EPA").345 From this unremarkable language springs the nation's principal wetlands protection program.
339 See Dennison & Berry, supra note 334, at 8; R.K. Turner et al., Wetland Valuation:
Three Case Studies, in BIODVERsrry Loss, supra note 24, at 129, 133.
340 See Berry, supranote 336, at 67. An estimated 87% of wetlands losses were due to
agricultural conversion, 8% to urban development, and 5% to other land conversions. See
Turner et al., supra note 339, at 130. From the mid-19th century until the 1980s, the federal government had an explicit policy of transferring what were considered "useless" lands
to agricultural production. In many cases, the government approved and subsidized agricultural conversions of wetlands. See Dalana W. Johnson, Saving the Wetlandsfrom Agriculture: An Examination of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the ConservationProvisions of the
1985 and 1990 FarmBills, 7 J. LAND USE & ENvrL. L. 299, 299-300 (1992).
341 See PLArr, supra note 247, at 437 fig.12-9 (indicating that the greatest losses to
saltwater wetlands come from open water developments such as ports, canals, and marinas,
and secondarily from urban uses, but freshwater wetland losses involve far larger acreage
and are caused primarily by agricultural conversion); DAVID SALVESEN, WMnANDS: MrrGATING AND REGULATING DE ELOPMENT IMPACrS 3, 18-19 (1990). Many of our major cities,
including New York, Boston, Washington, San Francisco, and Seattle, are built at least in
part on converted wetlands. See id. at 1.
342 See Farrier, supra note 2, at 311.
343 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
344 Section 301 prohibits the unlicensed "discharge of any pollutant by any person."
Id § 1311 (a). Section 502 defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source," id. § 1362(12) (A), and further defines
"navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States." Id. § 1362(7).
345 Id. § 1344(a), (b). The EPA may veto a permit if it determines that the discharge
"will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and
fishery areas... wildlife, or recreational areas." Id. § 1344(c). This veto power is rarely
exercised. See Farrier, supranote 2, at 358 (stating that, as of mid-1994, the EPA had exercised its veto power only eleven times).
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The Army Corps of Engineers,3 4 6 the EPA,3 47 and the courts3 48

have interpreted this provision broadly to require a permit for any
dredging or filling of wetlands 349 adjacent to navigable or interstate
waters or their tributaries, as well as for any wetlands that could affect
interstate commerce. The EPA's permit guidelines explicitly provide
for ecosystem-level biodiversity conservation, 35 0 but more importantly,
the guidelines carry a general presumption against wetlands development. The Corps will not issue a permit if a less adverse "practicable
alternative" is available,3 5 1 or, even in the absence of such an alternative, if the development would contribute to "significant degradation"
ofjurisdictional waters.3 52 Section 404 contains an important exemption for "normal farming, silviculture, and ranching activities such as
35 3
plowing, seeding, cultivating, minor drainage, [and] harvesting,"
but the statute expressly forbids bringing an area "into a use to which
See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2), (3), (7) (1996).
The EPA develops the guidelines under which the Army Corps of Engineers issues
section 404 permits. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230 (1996).
348
See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (holding that section 404 applies to wetlands adjacent to rivers). The Court left unanswered the
question of whether the provision applies to so-called "non-adjacent" wetlands, such as
prairie potholes, that are not adjacent to any navigable or interstate body of water. Id. at
131 n.8. In Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh
Circuit held that the use of isolated wetlands as habitat by migratory birds would bring
them under § 404 coverage, but on the facts of the case determined that such a nexus had
not been established. In Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1394-96 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995), the Ninth
Circuit upheld the reasonableness of the Corps' "migratory bird rule," under which even
an isolated, man-made wetland is deemed to fall within the jurisdictional scope of section
404 wetlands regulations if it provides habitat to migratory birds.
349 The Corps defines wetlands as "areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal
circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated
soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b). Under this definition, wetlands delineators examine the hydrology, soil,
and vegetation of a site to determine whether it is a wetland, but even highly qualified
experts using standard definitions often disagree as to whether a particular site qualifies as
a wetland. See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 917-18, 93034 (5th Cir. 1983) (acknowledging that disagreement as to proper classifications of vegetation and soil types leads various government experts to disagree on wetland delineation,
with estimates ranging from 60% to 100% of a 20,000 acre tract); Ralph W. Tiner, Problem
Wetlandsfor Delineation, in WETLANDS, supranote 334, at 199 (describing practical and definitional problems wetlands delineators face).
350 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.10(c), 230.11(e), 230.41(b) (1996); seealsoFarrier,
supranote 2, at
355 (discussing the visibility of the ecosystem conservation perspective in the EPA
Guidelines).
351
40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a). If the proposed development is not water-dependent, there
is a rebuttable presumption that practicable alternatives (such as relocating the development to an alternative site, whether or not the developer owns such a site) are available. See
idL § 230.10(a) (2), (3).
352
Ruhl, supra note 2, at 605.
353
33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1) (A) (1994).
346

347
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it was not previously subject" unless a permit is obtained.3 5 4 Consequently, a new agricultural conversion of a wetland requires a
3 55
permit.
The Corps receives approximately fourteen thousand dredgeand-fill permit applications per year. Of these, only about five hundred are denied, with the remainder either granted, withdrawn, or
35 6
categorically approved under "nationwide" or "general" permits

without individual review because they are part of a class deemed to
have minimal adverse impact. 3 57 Proposed developments affecting
larger areas or otherwise not qualifying for generic treatment undergo a case-by-case permit review process, with the Corps ultimately
basing its decision on a broad, multifactor "public interest" balancing
test.3 5 8 Contrary to popular impression, section 404 does not categori-

cally prohibit wetlands developments; instead, it categorically allows
those developments that fall into classifications deemed to have minimal adverse impact, strongly disfavors larger projects for which "practicable alternatives" exist, and selects among the rest through a highly
discretionary, individualized permit determination. Although there is
some dispute as to how effective section 404 has been in stemming the
tide of wetlands conversions, the weight of the evidence suggests that
Id § 1344(f) (2).
See, e.g, Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 925-26 (5th Cir.
1983) (holding that transformation of forest into soybean field was not a "normal farming
activity" that would quality for exemption under § 1344(f)); see alsoJohnson, supra note
340, at 304-05 and cases cited therein (discussing the application of the agricultural exemption in several cases).
356
The Corps may establish nationwide or regional general permits for categories of
activities that are "similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects
when performed separately, and will have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the
environment." 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). There are currently 37 such Nationwide Permits
("NWP"). The most controversial of these is NWP 26, which until recently gave such generic treatment to all developments affecting up to 10 acres of "isolated" or "headwaters"
wetlands. Critics charged that thousands of acres of wetlands were being lost annually
through NWP 26 permits. See Mark S. Dennison &James F. Berry, The RegulatoryFramework,
in WETLANDS, supra note 334, at 213, 240. In December 1996, the Corps of Engineers
issued a revised rule limiting NWP 26 to developments affecting up to three acres, and
announced plans to phase out NWP 26 within a two-year period. See 61 Fed. Reg. 65,874
(1996).
357
See SALVESEN, supra note 341, at 8.
358 After determining whether there are "practicable alternatives," the Corps broadly
weighs the benefits of a proposed development against its "reasonably foreseeable detriments," considering such factors as:
conservation, economics, aesthetics, general environmental concerns, wetlands, historic properties, fish and wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain
values, land use, navigation, shore erosion and accretion, recreation, water
supply and conservation, water quality, energy needs, safety, food and fiber
production, mineral needs, considerations of property ownership and, in
general, the needs and welfare of the people.
33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1996).
354

355
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the rate of conversions has slowed dramatically in recent decades.35 9
Effective or not, however, this section generates heated opposition
from affected landowners. Even successful developers complain of
the delay, cost, complexity, uncertainty, and arbitrariness of the individualized permit system, which often adds significantly to the devel3 60
opment process.
Mitigation requirements are another source of controversy.
Landowners often complain that the Corps conditions its approval of
permit requests on excessive mitigation requirements, disproportional
to the adverse impact of a proposed development. 3 61 Environmentalists counter that the Corps is too lenient in allowing the loss of complex and irreplaceable naturally occurring wetlands in exchange for
off-site mitigation projects, including restoration and creation of artificial wetlands with unproven ecosystem benefits-an approach they regard as scientifically unfounded.3 62 In an effort to soften the
regulatory burden and lend additional flexibility to the regulatory
scheme, the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations have all endorsed mitigation banking, which permits developers to purchase
"credits" earned by public or private entities for wetland creation, restoration, or enhancement projects, and offset them against wetland
3 63
losses that result from their proposed developments.
2.

Swampbuster

Under the "Swampbuster" provisions of the 1985,364 1990,365 and
1996 farm bills, 366 farmers who convert wetlands to crop production
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 360-61.
See VIRGINIA S. ALBRECiTrr & BERNARD N. GOODE, WETLAND REGULATION IN THE REAL
WORLD 7 (1994); Margaret N. Strand, Current Issues of Wetlands Law: The Searchfor Fairness,
C981 A.L.I.-A.B-. 245 (1995) (citing alleged unfairness as a result of vague, unevenly applied, and shifting standards, as well as the length, cost, and uncertainty of the permit
process, as causes of landowner criticisms of the section 404 program).
361
Mitigation can include "creating, enhancing, preserving, restoring, buffering, and
purchasing wetlands as well as contributing money to conservation groups." ALBREcir &
GOODE, supra note 360, at 22. Albrecht and Goode found that in the 1993 fiscal year,
mitigation projects affecting 1.31 acres were required for every one acre of adversely impacted wetlands. Id.
362
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 368-70 (contending that since substitute wetlands are
often unsuccessful, "[I]ittle is known about the extent to which restored or created wetlands will provide suitable habitat"); William W. Sapp, MitigationBanking: PanaceaorPoison
for Wetlands Protection, 1 ENvrL. LAw. 99, 117-19 (1994) (citing environmentalist
objections).
363
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 365-68; Michael G. Le Desma, A Sound of Thunder.
Problems and Prospectsin Wetland MitigationBanking, 19 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 497, 498 (1994);
Sapp, supra note 362, at 111 n.72.
364 Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1504.
365
Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104
Stat. 3359.
366 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127,
110 Stat. 888.
359
360
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become ineligible for federal farm subsidies for any of their crops.3 67
To convert a wetland, a farmer generally must first receive a section
404 permit from the Army Corps of Engineers.3 68 The Swampbuster
provision does not prohibit such conversions, which may legally proceed if properly permitted.a69 However, Swampbuster does cut off all
federal farm subsidies, including price supports, loans, and other payments, to anyone who converts a wetland "for the purpose, or to have
the effect, of making the production of an agricultural commodity
possible" on the converted land after 1990.370 Thus, not only is the
converted wetland ineligible for federal farm subsidies, but so is all
land cultivated by the person who converted the wetland. This ineligibility is permanent, unless the wetland is restored. 371 Although few
enforcement actions have been taken under Swampbuster,3 7 2 it remains a powerful deterrent to agricultural conversion.
However, the long-term viability of Swampbuster as a deterrent to
wetland conversions is now in doubt, because the 1996 farm bill drastically alters farm subsidies, replacing traditional variable price supports
with flat "market transition payments," which are not tied to commodity prices or production limits.3 73 These "transition payments" are in-

tended to wind down agricultural commodity subsidies over a sevenyear period, after which all agricultural production is expected to be
carried out on a purely free-market, unsubsidized basis. The end of
subsidies would, of course, eliminate the effectiveness of the
Swampbuster provision, because farmers would no longer pay any
367
368

See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3801, 3821-3823 (1994).
See supra notes 353-55 and accompanying text.

369 Previous versions of the farm bill subjected farmers to Swampbuster penalties even
if they had permits to convert wetlands under the Clean Water Act. That is no longer the
case under the 1996 Farm Bill. Now, any wetland conversion that a Clean Water Act permit authorizes is exempt from Swampbuster penalties, provided the loss of wetlands functions and values is adequately mitigated. See 16 U.S.C. § 1322(f) (4) (1994); see also Lisa
Moore, "Flexibility" Over Wetland Protection, 18 NAT'L WETLANDs NEwsLT R, Nov.-Dec.
1996, at 7, 10-11 (discussing the application and implications of the exemption).
370 16 U.S.C. § 3821(b). Note, however, that ineligibility is triggered only by conversion for purposes of agricultural commodity production. A farmer who converts a wetland
for another purpose, such as to build a road or to subdivide for residential development,
remains eligible for farm subsidies. See Farrier, supra note 2, at 339-40;Johnson, supra note

340, at 310. In addition, because "agricultural commodity" is defined as "any agricultural
commodity planted and produced . . . by annual tilling of the soil," 16 U.S.C.
§ 3801 (a) (1) (A), conversion to pasturage, hay, or other perennial crops is not prohibited.
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 339 n.168; Anthony N. Turrini, Swampbuster: A Report from the
Front,24 IND. L. REv. 1507, 1510 (1991).
371
SeeJohnson, supra note 340, at 309-10.
372
See id. at 310; Turrini, supra note 370, at 1509-10. But cf.Farrier, supra note 2, at
340-41, 341 n.172 (questioning Swampbuster's effectiveness due to lax enforcement and
the fact that two-thirds of all farms, representing half of farm acreage, receive no subsidies
and therefore are not affected). Elsewhere, however, Farrier credits Swampbuster with
dramatic reductions in conversions of wetlands to agricultural use. Id. at 361 & n.272.
373 See Stephen Blakely, Seeds of Changefor Farmers,NATioNs Bus., Dec. 1996, at 42.
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penalty for converting wetlands.374 In addition, the 1996 farm bill
eliminated the government-imposed production restraints that previously accompanied many farm subsidy programs. Consequently, farmers can be expected to seek opportunities to expand their production
by, among other things, converting additional lands, including wetlands. During the transition period, however, Swampbuster will likely
retain its effectiveness.
3.

Wetlands Subsidy Programs

The 1996 farm bill extends several important programs designed
to offer financial subsidies (or "incentives") to farmers to retain and
restore wetlands. Under the Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP"),
the Department of Agriculture contracts with farmers to take land out
of production and plant it in vegetative cover. In return, the government provides cost-sharing, technical assistance, and rental payments
over a ten-year period.3 75 The statute and implementing regulations
authorize the Department of Agriculture to enter into CRP agreements to prevent soil erosion, protect water quality, and provide wildlife habitats.3 76 Although the program is not specifically designed to
conserve biodiversity, 377 recent changes to the regulations have expanded eligibility for wetlands, filter strips, and riparian buffers to
prevent soil runoff, and have placed protection of wildlife habitats on
an equal footing with soil erosion and water quality as program
3 78
objectives.
Under the more narrowly targeted Wetlands Reserve Program,
the government subsidizes farmers who restore wetlands converted to
agricultural use prior to 1985. As in the CRP, the government may
provide cost-sharing and technical assistance. In some cases, however,
the government also purchases either permanent or thirty-year con374
Cf Farrier, supra note 2, at 341 & n.172 (noting that Swampbuster has "no hold
over landowners who do not grow [subsidy] program crops"); Turrini, supra note 370, at
1511 (stating that farmers who do not rely on price supports or other federal payments
"can ignore Swampbuster altogether").
375 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3831-44 (1994); 62 Fed. Reg. 7620-22 (1997) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R §§ 1410.40-.42); Johnson, supra note 340, at 314-15.
376 16 U.S.C. § 3831(b); 62 Fed. Reg. 7618-19 (1997) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
§ 1410.31). The program's original purpose was to conserve soil and protect water quality
by taking erodible land out of production and placing it under vegetative cover. As a
result, it raises farmers' incomes by reducing agricultural commodity production, thus raising prices. See Farrier, supra note 2, at 330, 332.
377
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 330. The program does not require that the cover
vegetation consist of native species, and in many cases farmers have planted non-native
species that do not help restore native ecosystems. See id. at 332.
378 See Farm Serv. Agency & Commodity Credit Corp., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Conservation Reserve Program-Long-Term Policy, 62 Fed. Reg. 7602 (1997) (codified at 7 C.F.R.
§§ 1410.6, 1410.31).
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servation easements to preserve the restored wetlands. 379 Restoration
plans must be approved by both the Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service (formerly the Soil Conservation
Service) and the FWS, which evaluate proposals based on their wetland and wildlife benefits and their likelihood of success. 3 0 The 1996
farm bill caps enrollment in the program at 975,000 acres, and directs
the Secretary of Agriculture to maintain an equal balance between
permanent easements, temporary (thirty-year) easements, and restora38 1
tion-only cost-sharing agreements.
4.

Assessment of FederalRegulation of PrivateLand Use as a
Biodiversity Conservation Strategy

Neither the ESA nor the federal wetlands programs-individually
or in the aggregate-amount to a coherent strategy for biodiversity
conservation on private lands. Although these programs have salutary
effects in conserving some valuable biological resources, the results
are spotty: the programs selectively protect only a narrow range of species (those listed as "endangered" or "threatened") and ecosystems
(wetlands, especially larger wetland parcels and wetlands in agricultural districts), without attempting to be comprehensive or to set overall conservation priorities.38 2 Moreover, because both the ESA and
the section 404 wetlands program assign unquantified, but potentially
very large and unequally distributed conservation costs to private parties under regulatory processes and criteria that often appear highly
uncertain and arbitrary, 383 these programs spark enormous controversy.38 4 Finally, because these regulatory programs are inherently
prohibitory in nature, they can proscribe only activitiesthought to be
harmful. They cannot, as a practical matter, compel or induce sound
38 5
stewardship of biological resources.
379
380
381

See 16 U.S.C. § 3837(a)(e); 7 G.F.R. § 1467.4 (1997).
See 16 U.S.C. § 3837(c); 7 C.F.R. §§ 1467.4(d)(2), 1467.6(b).
16 U.S.C.A. § 3837(b) (West Supp. 1997).

382 See Farrier, supranote 2, at 391 (maintaining that although wetlands regulations do
an adequate job of protecting wetlands, this is only one of many types of ecosystems worth
protecting). The programs do set conservation priorities by default, of course. In effect,
they say that wetlands are more deserving of protection than other threatened ecosystem
types, and that species are only worthy of conservation measures when they are identified
as already being at the brink of extinction.
383 See generally supranotes 88-109, 326-28 and accompanying text (discussing programs
protecting endangered species); supra notes 349-60 and accompanying text (discussing
programs protecting wetlands).
384 See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalismin Wetlands Regulation:A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L.
REv. 1242, 1243 (1995) ("Wetlands regulation may be the most controversial issue in environmental law."); Ruhl, supra note 2, at 559-62.
385
See Farrier, supra note 2, at 389.
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The farm bill wetland programs-Swampbuster and the Conservation Reserve and Wetlands Reserve Programs-offer important alternative approaches. These programs tie conservation objectives to
subsidy payments, thus creating economic incentives for conservation.
Swampbuster's incentive is a negative one: farmers must conform to
Swampbuster's prohibition on wetlands conversion or lose farm program payments. Although Swampbuster merely makes federal subsidies conditional on wetland conservation, and is therefore voluntary
because farmers are free to forego the subsidies if they regard the
conditions as too onerous, the program appears to farmers as the
functional equivalent of a prohibitory requirement with stiff financial
penalties attached. Consequently, Swampbuster engenders the same
kind of resistance as the ESA and the section 404 wetlands program.3 8 6 Furthermore, although Swampbuster is credited with help-

ing reduce the rate of wetlands conversion, it is unlikely to serve as a
model for categories of landowners not receiving such valuable federal subsidies as farmers. The scheduled termination of farm subsi38 7
dies within the next few years compounds these shortcomings.
By contrast, the Conservation Reserve and Wetlands Reserve Programs award direct subsidies on a competitive basis for voluntarily un388
dertaken conservation-promoting investments and activities.
Farmers warmly regard these subsidies as a positive incentive to conserve. 389 The principal limitation on these programs is that they impose substantial direct costs on the United States Treasury, even at
their presently modest scale.
IV
BIODIVERSIY CONSERVATION AND FEDERALISM

If habitat destruction through land conversion is the principal
cause of biodiversity loss for terrestrial species, then biodiversity conservation policy will necessarily implicate land-use policy.3 90 However,
in the United States, land use is traditionally a matter of state and
local concern. It is governed in the first instance by the state common-law doctrines of public and private nuisance,3 9 1 and, more re386 See Beth Baker, After a Long Wait, an EnvironmentalFarm Bill Passes Muster, BioscIENCE,JUly 17, 1996, at 486; Keith Pins, FarmersDrowned Out in Policy Debate? Those Surveyed
Are Dissatisfied Saying They Have Little Say in the Formation of Farm Polify, DES MOmES REG.,
Feb. 27, 1994, at 1 (47% of Iowa farmers surveyed say they want Sampbuster rules eased).

See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
See Glickmon Announces Heavy Sign-Upfor Reserve Program,NAT'LJ.'s CONGRESS DAILY,
Mar. 19, 1997.
389 See Pins, supra note 386 (56% of Iowa farmers want CRP retained as is, and another
25% want it expanded).
390 See Houck & Rolland, supra note 384, at 1251; Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, supra
note 2, at 1318, 1341.
391
See DANIEL R_ MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.02, at 100-02 (3d ed. 1993).
387

388
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cently, by municipal zoning and related forms of land-use regulation
authorized by state statute. State-level regulatory controls supplement
these regulations to varying degrees. 3 92 The federal government has
traditionally played only a minor role in regulating land use. The exception to this tradition is land owned by the government itself, under
the Property Clause of the Constitution,3 9 3 the federal government
has all the ordinary proprietary powers of a landowner, as well as ple3 94
nary power as sovereign to regulate the use of its lands.

In an earlier era, it may have been thought that land, being inherently and irrevocably fixed in its location, was not an article of interstate commerce, and was thus beyond the reach of Congress's
Commerce Clause power.3 95 Later, the New Deal's jurisprudential
revolution radically expanded the conception of the reach of the
Commerce Clause.3 96 This culminated in the Supreme Court's adop392
See id. § 1.01, at 1-2. All states authorize local governments to regulate land use
through land-use planning and zoning. See id. at 1, § 4.16, at 113-14. Most also allow local
governments to regulate for such specialized purposes as residential subdivision controls,
see id. §§ 9.01 to .04, at 401-04, and historic preservation, see id. §§ 11.22 to .25, at 479-82.
Many states undertake direct regulation at the state level to achieve specialized purposes
such as protection of wetlands, coastal zone management, or agricultural land protection.
See id § 12.01, at 497-98. A smaller number of states engage in comprehensive state-level
land-use planning, accompanied either by direct state regulation of land use or by state
review of local regulations to ensure their consistency with state planning goals. See DANIEL
R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT

865-82 (4th ed.

1995) (describing programs in Vermont, Florida, Oregon, Hawaii, and New Jersey, and
listing Georgia, Maine, Rhode Island, and Washington as requiring state review of local

land-use planning); see also FRED

BOSSELMAN

&DAVID

CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN

CoNTROLs passim (1972) (describing the growth of state-level land-use regulation
in response to local regulation's inability to address state and regional problems such as
the effects on ecosystems and extraterritorial pollution).
393
U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States .... ").
394
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (holding that under the Property Clause, Congress exercises regulatory power over public lands that is complete, without limits, and "analogous to the police power of the several states") (quoting Camfield v.
United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897)).
395
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that Congress is empowered "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes"). Until the mid-1930s, courts held that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate the sale or transportation of goods across state lines, but not "purely local"
activities occurring in a fixed location, such as mining, manufacturing, and agricultural
production, even if the products of these "local" activities were subsequently sold or
shipped in interstate commerce. SeeCarter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 301-03 (1936);
see also Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 235 (1932) (oil production is not interstate commerce); Oliver Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178 (1923)
("Mining is not interstate commerce but, like manufacturing, is a local business."); Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129, 135 (1921) (owning and operating a cotton gin is not interstate commerce); Browning v. Waycross, 233 U.S. 16, 22 (1914)
(erecting of lightning rods on houses is not interstate commerce).
396
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (holding that the growing
of wheat on private land solely for on-site consumption is subject to Commerce Clause
LAND USE
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tion of highly deferential standards, under which it appeared that virtually any federal regulatory statute could withstand Commerce
Clause challenge.3 97 Nonetheless, because the effects of land-use decisions were considered primarily local in nature, land-use regulation
was left principally in the hands of state and local officials rather than
federal authorities.3 9 8 Indeed, land use is perhaps the most important
single power left to local governments. 399
In the early 1970s, Congress and the Nixon Administration flirted
briefly with the notion of expanding the federal role through a combination of positive and negative financial incentives to induce states to
develop land-use plans. 400 Nixon's proposed National Land Use Policy Act 40 ' would have required states to assume principal responsibility
for land-use planning over "areas of critical environmental concern"
and other lands and developments of regional or statewide significance. 40 2 The federal government would have awarded planning
grants and, under some later versions, imposed stiff sanctions for non40 3
compliance, including cutoffs of federal highway and airport funds.
Thus, Congress would have acted under its spending power, a power
even more expansive than that used to regulate interstate commerce
regulation); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that labor
relations in the steel industry are subject to Commerce Clause regulation).
397 See Ann Althouse, EnforcingFederalismAfter United States v. Lopez, 38 ARiz. L. REv.
793, 798-99 (1996).
398 In the heyday of the New Deal, the National Resources Planning Board and its
predecessors attempted to coordinate land-use planning by federal agencies, and to stimulate land use planning at the state and local levels, but these efforts did not extend to
direct federal regulation of private land use. See Marion Clawson, Land and Water Use Planning in the New Deal, in BEYOND THE URBAN FRINGE: LAND USE ISSUES OF NONMETROPOUTAN
AMEPicA 273, 273-74 (Rutherford H. Platt & George Macinko eds., 1983).
399 Even state-level intervention in land-use regulation is often strongly resisted, both
because municipal governments are fiercely protective of their power in this area, and
because citizens may perceive the state government as too remote and unaccountable to be
entrusted with decisions producing such profoundly local costs and benefits. See
MANDELKER Er AL., supra note 392, at 863-65.
400 SeeJayne E. Daly, A Glimpse of the Past-A Vision for the Future: SenatorHenry M.Jackson and NationalLand-Use Legislation, 28 URB. LAW. 7 passim (1996) (describing competing
proposals for national land-use legislation offered by SenatorJackson, the Nixon Administration, and others). Under the proposed legislation "it is not inaccurate to say that the
land use policy of the federal government [would have been] that the states shall have a
policy." ROBERT G. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES 13 n.1 (1976).
401

S. 992, 92d Cong. (1971).

402 Daly, supra note 400, at 21 & nn.76-79. This would include both crucial public
facilities like airports, highways, and major recreational facilities, as well as large-scale private developments affecting constituencies beyond the local jurisdiction. See id. The
Nixon Administration offered their proposal as an alternative to a bill sponsored by Sen.
Henry M. "Scoop" Jackson (D-Wash.)-a leading Democratic presidential contenderwhich would have required states to engage in comprehensive land-use planning extending to all areas of the state, not just "critical areas." See id. at 18-21, 23.
403 See id. at 21-22.
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(if that is possible).404 In the end, however, Congress rejected this
limited approach to federal intervention in land-use planning, largely
because of concerns about excessive federal intrusion into state and
local affairs. 40 5 Congress considered land-use regulation to be no
business of the federal government, whether or not the contemplated
federal role was constitutionally permissible.
The dawning of the age of biodiversity conservation fundamentally challenges that notion. Biodiversity depends upon land use, and
many important benefits of biodiversity conservation-or conversely,
the costs of failing to conserve biodiversity-are not local, but are national, 4°6 or even global, 40 7 in scope. These costs and benefits include
404 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987). The Dole court noted that,
although not unlimited, Congress's power to spend in pursuit of the general welfare is
broad and "is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution." Id. (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)). The Dole court thus concluded that "objectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields'
may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power." Id. (citation
omitted).
405 A compromise bill including elements of the Nixon Administration bill and SenatorJackson's alternative, sans sanctions and with drastically reduced funding for planning
grants, passed the Senate in September, 1972, but the House never acted upon it. SeeDaly,
supra note 400, at 27. A similar bill again passed the Senate early in the next session, but
failed in the House after the White House suddenly reversed course and withdrew its support. See id. at 33-34. Conservative lawmakers apparently persuaded President Nixon that
the bill raised serious federalism concerns, possibly of constitutional dimensions. See id. at
34 n.155.
406 See BRowN ET AL., supra note 5, at 45 ("[T]he net benefits of conservation are lowest
for the local community and highest for the national and global community. Indeed, at the
local level, net benefits may be negative, indicating that there is no local incentive to undertake land conservation."); Michael Wells, Biodiversity Conservation, Affluence and Poverty:
Mismatched Costs and Benefits and Efforts to Remedy Them, AMBIO, May 1992, at 237, 237-41
(claiming that the benefits of biodiversity conservation are modest at the local level, higher
at the national level, and highest at the global level). But cf. BEATmm, supra note 4, at 20608 (contending that biological reserves may incidentally produce many localized benefits,
including preservation of open space and environmental amenities that make local communities more attractive and raise market values of neighboring private lands).
407 Arguably, an effective global biodiversity conservation regime is needed to prevent
free-riding at the international level. See Timothy Swanson, InternationalRegulation, in BiODmVERsryI Loss, supra note 24, at 225, 252 (contending that biodiversity conservation at
the national level will produce inefficiencies, as nations externalize the costs of suboptimal
investment in conservation). But cf. Charles P. Kindileberger, InternationalPublic Goods
Without International Government, in READINGS IN PUBLIC SEcrOR ECONOMICS 222, 232 (Samuel H. Baker & Catherine S. Elliott eds., 1990) (discussing the differences between realists and institutionalist "regime" theorists). Kindleberger contends:
Realists maintain that international public goods are produced, if at all, by
the leading power, a so-called "hegemon," that is willing to bear an undue
part of the short-run costs of these goods, either because it regards itself as
gaining in the long run, because it is paid in a different coin such as pres-

tige ....

or some combination of the two.

Id. Whether the United States undertakes the costs of biodiversity conservation as global
hegemon or as a step toward establishing an effective global conservation regime is of little
import here; if we want to protect biodiversity in the United States, the responsibility rests
with the federal government.
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the following: the benefits of pharmaceutical and agricultural products derived from naturally occurring genetic resources; the aesthetic
benefits; the "option value" in preserving stocks of biological resources for yet-undreamed-of future uses; the "existence value"; 40° and
the insurance value of diverse and healthy ecosystems as a prophylactic against, and reserve resource pool in the event of, catastrophic disturbances or "crashes" that could make human life immeasurably
more difficult.409
While the benefits of biodiversity conservation are national or
global in scope, the costs are locally concentrated. 4 0 This is because
conserving biodiversity usually depends upon deferring, modifying, or
foregoing the conversion of particular parcels of land. 4 1' This does
not require preventing land conversion and economic development
entirely. However, it does require, in some cases, the steering of certain kinds of land uses to alternative locations where the adverse effects on valuable habitats and ecosystems are less severe. In other
cases, it requires the modification of the nature and extent of land
conversion to mitigate the damage to valuable biological resources.
In either case, difficulties arise as development becomes more costly
in some locations (and, in certain cases, prohibitively expensive), and
locally beneficial developments are redirected from some localities to
others.
This formula of global benefits and localized costs argues strongly
against reliance on state or local land-use regulation (or, for that matter, private land use decisions by individual landowners) to conserve
biodiversity. 4 12 Despite biodiversity's global benefits, many biodiversity-rich landowners, communities, and states will calculate that they
will be better off externalizing the costs of biodiversity by letting local
land conversion and development proceed apace, while leaving the
408 The existence value of biodiversity consists in the psychic satisfaction we derive
merely from knowing it exists, apart from any other benefit we might receive from it.
409 See supra note 5 (summarizing putative benefits of biodiversity).
410 See BROWN ET AL., supra note 5, at 45 (noting that the costs of preserving biodiversity are greatest at the local level); Jeffrey A. McNeely, Economic Incentives for ConservingBiodiversity, in MANAGED LANDSCAPES, supra note 53, at 647, 650 ("The opportunity costs of
conserving biodiversity are paid disproportionately by the people who live closest to the
greatest biodiversity."); Wells, supra note 406, at 237-42, 241 tbl.3 (claiming that while national governments typically absorb the direct costs of maintaining biological reserves, the

opportunity costs of foregone development fall locally, and the global beneficiaries of biodiversity conservation bear only de minimis costs).
411

See Wells, supra note 406, at 241 tbls.2, 3.

See Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the ProperScope of the Federal
Commerce Power,31 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 555, 557-74 (1994) (arguing that federal regulation is
justified only where state regulation would be inefficient due to the presence of significant
positive or negative externalities); id. at 568-69 (claiming that rational local governments
will underproduce public goods to the extent the benefits fall outside the jurisdiction).
412
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costs of conservation to others. 413 Indeed, states and communities
with the largest inventories of undisturbed habitat and ecosystems are
probably the least inclined to protect them for two reasons. First,
from a local perspective, these lands may appear to be an overabundant resource. Second, these localities may be reluctant to protect
these resources because they would carry a disproportionate share of
the localized costs of conservation if they must forego development on
4 14
a disproportionate percentage of their lands.
Economists have long argued that one of the principal advantages of our federal system, with its three tiers of federal, state, and
local governments, is that it allows us to match responsibility for producing public goods with the territorial scope of the benefits thereby
provided, on the theory that this division will result in a more efficient
allocation of these goods. 4 15 More localized tiers of governmental authority-states and municipalities-are likely to underprovide public
goods, if the costs will be borne locally, but many (perhaps most) of
the benefits will flow to persons outside the jurisdiction. 4 16 Thus, the
federal government should maintain the Grand Canyon, which provides aesthetic and recreational benefits to a national population,
while the local government should maintain a local park benefiting
primarily local residents. Of course, our three-tiered governmental
structure is not perfect. Given only three levels of government from
which to choose, there will be many mismatches between the scale of
government and the geographical scope of the public good provided. 4 17 Additional mismatches may be created by constitutional lim413 SeeJohn Baden, A Primerfor the Management of Common Pool Resources, in MANAGING
THE COMMONS 137, 140 (Garrett Hardin & John Baden eds., 1977) (discussing free-rider
problems in the context of public goods and management of common pool resources);
Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism,supra note 2, at 1336-37 (suggesting that state and local officials are even less likely to act to protect "intangible values" like biodiversity than more
immediate and localized benefits like public health effects of air and water pollution).
414 See Houck & Rolland, supra note 384, at 1253 (making a similar point in the context of wetlands regulation).
415

See, e.g., DAVID N. KING, FISCAL TIERS: THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNMENT

14-20 (1984); MICHAEL WELLS & KATRINA BRANDON, PEOPLE AND PARMS: LINKING PROTECTED
AREA MANAGEMENT WIrrH LOCAL CoMMUNITIES 60-65 (1992); Wallace E. Oates, An Economic

Approach to Federalism, in READINGS IN PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS, supra note 407, at 554,
561-64; LeBoeuf, supra note 412, at 557-65. Cf Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey,
Externalities and the MatchingPrinciple: The Casefor ReallocatingEnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 14YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. Symposium Issue 23, 53 (1996) (arguing that environmen-

tal regulation is most likely to be efficient when "regulatory authority... go[es] to the
political jurisdiction that comes closest to matching the geographic area affected by a particular externality").
416 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing EnvironmentalFederalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 587
(1996) (describing "structural mismatches" that occur when "the regulator ignores the potential welfare gains of the extrajurisdictional beneficiaries," and consequently "too little of
the public good is provided").
417
See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 445-46 (5th ed. 1989); Gordon Tullock, Federalism:Problems ofScale, 6 PUB. CHOICE
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itations on the distribution of decisionmaking authority, which may
not map perfectly onto the efficient production of public goods. 4 18
Finally, public choice theorists would add that the supply of public
goods may not match demand, due to scarce or distorted information,
the distorting effects of governmental decisionmaking procedures,
and individual and institutional incentives of governmental decisionmakers and bureaucracies. 4 19 Nevertheless, the economists' insight strongly suggests that the federal government should be charged
with the primary responsibility of ensuring biodiversity
420
conservation.
How, then, to do the job? Some have suggested direct federal
regulation of land use, building on the limited prototypes already in
place-the ESA and the federal wetlands programs. Although the
ESA currently falls far short of a comprehensive biodiversity conservation policy, some commentators have suggested that its underlying
regulatory model is sound enough, if broadened to become something like an Endangered Ecosystems Act 4 21 or a Representative Ecosystems Act,42 2 to prohibit adverse modification of protected

ecosystems or ecosystem types.
The section 404 wetlands program offers an alternative prototype. 4 23 In contrast to the ESA, which generally prohibits any action
19, 25 (1969) (stating that perfect fiscal federalism would require "a genuinely Rube
Goldberg arrangement in which the individual citizen would be a member of a vast collection of governmental units, each ... dealing with a separate activity").
418 See Oates, supra note 415, at 563-64 (stating that constitutional constraints may not
match decisionmaking authority with "representatives of the interests of the proper geographical subsets of society"). But cf.William N. Eskridge, Jr. &John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A PoliticalTheory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1395-97

(1994) (stating that the historical pattern of Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause
decisions implicitly embraces "efficiency norms" limiting states' ability to externalize costs).
419 SeeJames M. Buchanan, Public Financeand Public Choice, in READINGS IN PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS, supra note 407, at 38, 45-47.
420 See Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, supra note 2, at 1336-37 (biodiversity protection,

which requires "partial subordination of immediate human demands" to achieve broader,
longer-term, and more abstract ecological objectives, is likely to face intense resistance at
the state and local levels where more immediate and localized concerns predominate); id.
at 1322 (national government must play the central role in articulating biodiversity protection goals, with implementation by all levels of government). In addition, because state
and local political boundaries are often mismatched with ecosystem boundaries, fragmented regulatory authority may impede efficient production of biodiversity protection.
See Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 557-58.
421 See, e.g., Julie B. Bloch, PreservingBiologicalDiversity in the United States: The Casefor
Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENrL. L.

Ray. 175, 217-22 (1992) (proposing an Ecosystems Protection Act modeled on the ESA);
C.E. Hunt, Creating an Endangered Ecosystems Act, ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE, Nos. 3-4,

1992, at 1-5.
422 See Doremus, supra note 5, at 318-24 (proposing Representative Ecosystems Act).
Doremus would protect "representative" examples of ecosystem types, whether or not the
type or the particular ecosystem had already reached endangered status. Id.
423 See supra notes 346-72 and accompanying text.
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adversely affecting a listed species, section 404 imposes a permitting
requirement, with permit decisions made on a case-by-case basis. Conceivably, the federal government could expand this model to include
ecosystems other than wetlands. The federal government could delineate particularecosystems for this kind of protection, or could afford
424
protection to designated types of ecosystems.
There are good reasons to be skeptical of these kinds of direct
federal regulatory approaches, not only for the pragmatic reason that
both the ESA and section 404-the first, limited steps toward federal
425
land-use regulation-have encountered intense local opposition.
In the first place, the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States
v. Lopez4 26 appears to open the door to a fundamental rethinking of
Commerce Clause doctrine 4 27 and arguably calls into question Congress's power to regulate private land use. Lopez struck down a federal
statute prohibiting firearms possession near schools, an activity the
Court said was not "commerce" and did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 428 Although federal environmental regulation is now
part of our basic governmental architecture and has long been assumed to be a valid exercise of the Commerce power,4 29 it might be
argued that neither biodiversity nor land-use is inherently "commercial." Land is, of course, routinely bought and sold in commerce (as
are guns), but just as the Gun-Free School Zones Act sought to regulate the use of guns rather than commerce in them, so land-use regulations are directed at the use of land, not commerce in it. Although some
uses of land are commercial (as are some uses of guns), land-use regulations-such as those prohibiting conversions of wetlands or destruction of valuable habitats-typically apply whether or not the land is
put to commercial use. 43 0 Just as the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
424

Cf Cole, supra note 88, at 378 (proposing Federal Land Use Act under which fed-

eral authorities would engage in comprehensive land-use planning and permitting aimed
at protecting ecosystems and habitat).
425
See supranote 384 and accompanying text.
426 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
427 See, e.g., Althouse, supranote 397. But see Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the
FederalCommerce Powerand Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MicH. L. REv. 554,
563-70 (1995) (concluding that Lopez does not signal a major shift in Commerce Clause
doctrine).
428 Lope; 514 U.S. at 558-62. The Court recognized two other categories of legitimate
exercises of the Commerce Clause power-regulations to protect the "channels of commerce," and regulations to protect "instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce." Id. at 558-59.
429
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981) (upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act and agreeing with

lower federal courts which had "uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce
Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air or water
pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State").
430 Under the Endangered Species Act, for example, I am prohibited from destroying
the habitat of a nesting pair of bald eagles whether I do it for the commercial purpose of
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held to be fatally flawed because it did not distinguish between possession of a handgun in the course of commercial activity and possession
in noncommercial activities, 4 31 so one might also argue that Congress
may not enact land-use regulations applying to noncommercial uses
of land.
Lopez recognizes, of course, that even a noncommercial activity
43 2
may be regulated if it "substantially affects" interstate commerce.
Would federal land-use regulations that protect biodiversity pass that
test? Biodiversity is a valuable public good that produces a variety of
national benefits, some of them of a commercial character. However,
it is not altogether clear that these commercial benefits would provide
a sufficient nexus to appease the Lopez Court.43 3 If the derivative commercial benefits of education are too remotely linked to interstate
commerce to justify federal regulation of the localized, noncommercial activity of possessing a gun near a school, it might be plausibly
argued that the derivative commercial benefits of biodiversity are similarly too remote to justify federal regulation of noncommercial uses of
land.

43 4

building a shopping center, or for the noncommercial use I plan to make of the land for
my own aesthetic enjoyment. Compare Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060 (1996)
(habitat modification by commercial logging is a "taking") with Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of
Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1985) (habitat modification by noncommercial maintaining of feral goats and sheep is a "taking"). ESA makes it unlawful for
"any person" to "take" listed wildlife, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1994), i.e., to "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" it, id. § 1532(19), making no
distinction between commercial and noncommercial versions of those prohibited activities.
Nor does the regulation extending "harm" to include habitat modification draw such a
distinction. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1996); 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748 (1981).
431
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
432
L at 558-69.
433 See id. at 563-65.
434 This line of argument potentially calls into question a great deal of federal environmental law. In general, environmental regulations are aimed not at commerce per se, but
at the externalized social costs and benefits (positive and negative externalities) of polluting activities, whether the activities are commercial or noncommercial. See William
Tucker, MarketingPollution, in READINGS IN PUBLIC SEcTOR ECONOMICS, supra note 407, at
101, 101-02. For example, although much of the worst air pollution comes from industrial
(and therefore "commercial") sources, most provisions of the Clean Air Act apply whether
or not the polluting activity is "commercial." Because there ordinarily are no markets or
"commerce" in these pollution externalities, they cannot provide the requisite commercial
nexus. Nor are the benefits of such regulations themselves primarily "commercial." See
Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in READINGS IN PUBLIC SECTOR EcoNOMICS, supra note 407, at 88, 89-91 ("Pollution control is for lots of things: breathing
comfortably, enjoying mountains, swimming in water, for health, beauty, and the general
delectation.") Regulation of air pollution, for example, is justified primarily on the
grounds that it protects public health, a public good which, like biodiversity and education
may produce derivative commercial benefits, but may itself not count as "commerce."
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Another important dimension to the Lopez case is the notion of
"areas of traditional state concern."4 35 Lopez turns on the following
reductio ad absurdem if the Gun-Free School Zones Act is deemed a
legitimate Commerce Clause regulation by virtue of the derivative
commercial benefits of education or the derivative commercial costs
of crime, then any exercise of federal power affecting crime or education can be similarly justified, along with any federal action affecting
any other area of traditional state concern. 43 6 That would make the
Commerce Clause a power of truly unlimited reach. But this cannot
be so, because it is axiomatic that our national government is one of
limited powers. Consequently, there must be some areas of traditional state concern beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause, and
that clause, to remain a limited power, cannot sweep so broadly as to
include this statute. Lopez thus teaches that courts must be especially
careful to prevent federal intrusion into areas of traditional state concern, except when there is a clearly demonstrated commercial nexus
justifying the federal intervention. By the same logic, courts may be
especially solicitous of state (and, by delegation, local) power over
43 7
land use, traditionally a matter of state and local concern.
It is, of course, too early to tell whether Lopez will be given such
an expansive reading 43 8 and whether even a broad reading of Lopez
would prove an insurmountable barrier to direct federal regulation of
land use to achieve biodiversity conservation. That might depend on
the exact nature of the regulations adopted, as well as the justifica435 Lope, 514 U.S. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The phrase appears in Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, but ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion expresses a similar
idea when it says that the Gun-Free School Zones Act intrudes on "areas such as criminal
law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign." Id. at 564.
Lopez thus revives a concept that many thought the Court had abandoned in Garcia See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549-50 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which had held that a federal statute
intruding on a "traditional area of state concern" was invalid under the 10th Amendment).
436 Lope, 514 U.S. at 564.
437 But cf.Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 275-76
(1981) (rejecting claim by coal producers that Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act was a land-use regulation, thus "within the inherent police powers of the States and
their political subdivisions" and not subject to Commerce Clause regulation). Hodelwas, of
course, a pre-Lopez case, but even under Lopez, courts could easily find the requisite commercial nexus in a statute regulating coal mining-a commercial activity involving the production of "a commodity that moves in interstate commerce." I& at 281. The g-odel Court
did, however, offer an alternative Commerce Clause rationale that might prove more questionable post-Lopez the Court stated that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate pollution and other environmental hazards-apparentiy even in the absence of any other commercial nexus. Id at 282.
438 FourJustices dissented in Lopez, and of the five-member majorityJustice Kennedy,
joined by Justice O'Connor, wrote separately to emphasize that the holding was "limited."
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nonetheless, while Justice Kennedy's
concurrence differs in emphasis, he accepts the core logic of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
argument for the majority, which Justice Kennedy himselfjoined.
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tions offered for them. For example, regulations expressly aimed at
protecting genetic diversity in order to promote interstate commerce
in pharmaceutical, agricultural, and other biotechnology products
might pass muster under even the most expansive reading of Lopez.
Alternatively, under a narrower reading of Lopez, regulations applicable only to commercial uses of land might also survive, even if aimed
at broader ecological goals encompassing noncommercial as well as
commercial benefits.
However, even if direct federal land-use regulation could pass
constitutional muster, there are reasons to be concerned about the
rigidities and inefficiencies of sweeping, uniform federal controls on
land use. The literature is replete with tales of the inherent inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation, which some of these proposals contemplate. 439 But even where command-and-control rigidity is
evaded through case-by-case permitting or market-based regulatory
schemes, vast geographical and metaphorical distances separate Washington bureaucrats from the local contexts in which land-use decisions are typically made, and where their consequences, at least on the
cost side, are most keenly felt. Arguably, such decisions are so inherently context-sensitive that in a nation as vast and diverse as ours, centralized agencies are not well-situated to make them. 440 Also, in most
cases, federal land-use controls would be an "add-on" to an already
tangled web of land-use regulations that state and local authorities are
unlikely to surrender, both because state and local governments
would be disinclined to abdicate so much power and because the regulations serve critical state and local governmental interests that federal biodiversity protection regulations would not address. 44 1 As a
result, developers would face two or even three tiers of land-use regulation. The cumulative, and potentially conflicting or redundant, permitting requirements could dramatically increase development
439
See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334-40 (1985) (describing the inefficiencies of command and control

strategies in the context of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts).
440
Cf LeBoeuf, supra note 412, at 563-65 (pointing out that the advantages of local
government include greater sensitivity to costs of government action, greater accountability on the part of public officials, and heightened levels of political participation at the
local level). For similar reasons, there is resistance in many states even to state-level intrusion into land-use regulation, which is regarded as properly a local matter. See supra note
399.
441
See MANDEI.KER, supra note 391, §§ 1.01 to .10, at 1-9 (providing an overview of
typical state and local land-use control measures and the purposes they putatively serve).
For example, federal biodiversity regulations would not address a local community's interest in controlling local negative land-use externalities by separating "incompatible" land
uses in a zoning scheme, nor would it likely be practical to administer both local zoning
and federal biodiversity regulations in a unified administrative process. Consequently, a
developer would be required to comply with two sets of regulations, through separate administrative processes.
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2

Finally, if biodiversity conservation costs are mostly local,

then direct federal regulation could have potentially enormous redistributive consequences among localities. Even if federal land-use regulation were to have relatively modest implications for the federal
budget," 3 it would place conservation costs squarely on those communities and those landowners who happen to be currently providing
biodiversity benefits to the rest of us, free of charge.
If direct federal regulation is too rigid, costly, and unfair, one
commentator has suggested that we replace it with a revived version of
the old Nixon-era cooperative-federalism approach, in which the federal government would structure incentives to induce states to plan
for biodiversity conservation. 444 Under this proposal, states would inventory and nominate biological zones worthy of special management
protection and submit management plans to the federal government
for approval." 5 States would be responsible for implementing the
plans, with the federal role limited to (noncoercive) coordination,
44 6
oversight, and matching-share financing.
A model of this approach is the Coastal Zone Management Act
("CZMA")

47

under which the federal government approves grants to

the states to develop and implement state-level land-use plans to protect coastal resources, including biological resources as well as, for example, scenic and recreational values. 44 The CZMA has been rightly
criticized as producing dramatically inconsistent results." 9 Most
coastal states participate in coastal zone management planning, and,
442 Developers subject to federal wetlands or endangered species regulations already
face this problem. Under the Clean Water Act section 404 wetlands regulations, for example, federal permitting decisions come only after the developer has secured all necessary
state and local approvals. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 384, at 1253; see also Ronald J.
Rychlak, CoastalZone Management and the Searchfor Integration,40 DEPAUL L. REv. 981, 996
(1991) (recounting that a Connecticut landowner found he needed thirteen separate federal, state, and local permits to build a floating restaurant in a coastal zone, but because
some permits expired before others were granted, the process stretched on for years. The
owner died before successfully assembling all necessary permits.).
443 More likely, however, a large new federal bureaucracy would be needed to identify
appropriate areas for regulation, draw up detailed and context-specific regulations, enforce them, process and adjudicate tens of thousands of applications for development permits, and defend its actions against the inevitable welter of legal challenges.
444
See Ruhl, supra note 2, at 661-71 (proposing a Biological Resources Zone Management Act).
445 See id. at 662-65.
446
See id. at 665-71.
447 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994).
448 See generallyRychlak, supra note 442, at 984-90 (discussing the legislative scheme of
the CZMA and the various considerations that states take into account). Under the CZMA,
states are awarded grants to be applied towards the cost of preparing a Coastal Management Plan, 16 U.S.C. § 1454, and the cost of implementing the plan, id. § 1455.
449 See generally Oliver A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's CoastalZone,
47 MD. L. REv. 358 (1988) (arguing that to preserve coastal environments, "we need to
recognize the limitations of the approaches on which we currently rely," including the
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as a result, coastal resources have probably been afforded greater protection than they might have received in the absence of the federal
Act.450 However, goals, plans, standards, and the effectiveness of implementation vary widely,4 51 depending upon how highly each state

values its coastal environmental resources. This pattern of inconsistency can only be expected to be greater in the case of biodiversity
conservation. Unlike coastal resources, which largely benefit the
coastal state, biodiversity benefits are more likely to be external to the
state hosting critical biological resources. Consequently, there would
be a greater temptation to "free-ride" on others' conservation efforts
while foregoing one's own conservation costs. It may be possible to
improve upon the CZMA model by requiring state participation and
setting mandatory minimum standards. 452 However, the further one
goes down that road, the more closely the program resembles direct
45 3
federal regulation, with all its pathologies.
This Article suggests a radically different approach-federal ownership, not regulation of private land uses, should be the centerpiece
of our national biodiversity conservation strategy. This approach may
sound a bit contrarian in an age in which we are told that the "era of
big government is over"454 and where, in many other areas, state governments are rapidly gaining more power. But by resting biodiversity
protection principally on the management of federally owned land,
this proposal would substantially defer to the traditional prerogatives
of states and local governments to regulate private land uses.
CZMA); Rychlak, supra note 442, at 990 nn.49-50, 991, 994-95 (noting the mixed reviews
that have accompanied the CZMA and certain troublesome areas of the Act).
450 See Rychlak, supra note 442, at 987-88, 988 n.36, 990 nn.49-50, 991.
451
See MANDELKER ET A.., supra note 392, at 836 (state CZMA programs vary widely,
ranging from Rhode Island's "networked" program, which introduces no new legislative or
regulatory authority, to California's comprehensive coastal zone planning and regulatory
program); David W. Owens, National Goals, State Flexibility and Accountability in CoastalZone
Management, 20 Cosra. MGMT.143 (1992) (state programs vary so widely that comparisons
and evaluations of program effectiveness are nearly impossible).
452 Over time, federal dissatisfaction with the states' performance under the CZMA has
led to more intrusive federal standard-setting, much to the condemnation of local and
state governments, which see the expanding federal role as interfering with their power
over land use and betraying the original conception under which the federal role was to be
limited to coordination and funding. See Rychlak, supra note 442, at 1001-05.
453 Most major federal environmental statutes embrace cooperative federalism, at least
formally. See Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism: HistoricalRoots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD.L. REv. 1141, 1174 (1995) (stating that cooperative federalism is the "predominant" model in environmental statutes; federal agencies typically set national standards which states may elect to administer and enforce subject to federal supervision). To
regulated parties and to many states, however, the federal statutes often appear rigid, demanding, and uniformly burdensome, while from the federal perspective, the quality of
state administration is uneven and often inadequate. See id. at 1175.
454 Alison Mitchell, Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, Declaring Era of Big Government Is
Over,' N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 24, 1996, at Al (quoting President Clinton's State of the Union
address).
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Of course, federal land management is hardly uncontroversial,
and raises its own federalism concerns. Many Westerners, and in particular those in communities dependent upon surrounding federal
lands, view the federal government as a gargantuan, insensitive, and
heavy-handed absentee landlord that controls vast resources of great
value to local communities, but manages them for the benefit of some
amorphous and shifting "national interest," which in practice means
the interests of federal bureaucrats and distant, affluent, and principally Eastern environmentalists. 4 55 Federal ownership does not eliminate the problem of balancing global or national benefits against the
local costs of foregoing development and commodity exploitation, but
simply displaces it to another arena. The notion that additional areas
of federal land, including areas now open to commodity exploitation,
should be "locked up" for biodiversity conservation purposes is almost
certain to meet with stiff resistance in some quarters. However, the
proposal outlined here also recommends a shift in both the geographic concentration and core purpose of federal lands management. This would free some of the most commercially valuable
Western lands from federal control. In return, other biologically valuable lands, likely to be located in regions where there is now less federal presence, would be acquired. This approach also lays the
groundwork for more explicit social cost-accounting, requiring federal land managers to balance the costs of biodiversity conservation
against its benefits. To achieve overall biodiversity conservation objectives, federal land managers would need to ask, with respect to each
parcel of federal land, whether it is best kept for biodiversity conservation or, to the contrary, whether it is so commercially valuable that we
are better off disposing of it and using the proceeds to acquire more
environmentally important lands.
Certainly, not all local communities would come out "winners" in
this process. In areas of high biodiversity conservation value, commodity production would be curtailed. In some cases, that loss might
be offset by ancillary economic benefits such as a growth in tourism or
an enhancement in the value of neighboring private lands due to the
455 See CAWLFY, supra note 33, at 89-91; Hungerford, supra note 34, at 458-60 (describing widespread belief among Wise Use movement adherents that federal land managers
are "power and money hungry bureaucrats" whose interests are antithetical to the economic well-being of Western citizens and communities). The West versus East characterization miscasts the conflict, however, as it ignores the important and growing role of
Western environmentalists and recreational users of federal lands. See William E. Riebsame, The Changing West, ENV'T, May 1996, at 8 (stating that "New Westerners," largely
immigrants from other regions employed in the rapidly growing service economy, tend to
favor environmental protection, aesthetic amenities, and recreational uses of public lands,
and disfavor traditional commodity-producing uses such as mining, ranching, and timber
production).
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recreational and aesthetic benefits of nearby conservation areas. 4 56
Nonetheless, the transition will often be painful and there will be
long-term distributional consequences. 457 Overall, however, this
scheme is broadly consistent with federalism concerns-it leaves the
most important land use regulatory power in the hands of states and
localities, and asserts within that framework the federal government's
undeniable right as property owner to choose to forego development
and leave its land intact to provide broad public benefits.
Moreover, this approach is on firm constitutional footing, even if
the Supreme Court radically curtails the federal government's Commerce Clause powers in the next few years, as some have suggested
Lopez portends. 458 First, even if the Constitution prohibits direct federal regulation of land use due to an absence of the requisite interstate commercial nexus, surely the protection of biodiversity-a
public good producing universal benefits-is aimed at "provid[ing]
for the ... general Welfare," 4 59 and Congress may spend to acquire
and manage lands for that purpose. Second, the federal courts have
consistently held that the Article IV "Property Clause" not only gives
the federal government all the proprietary powers of an ordinary landowner, but also gives it the powers of a sovereign over federal lands,
notwithstanding state law to the contrary.4 60 Surely this power includes the ability to manage federally owned lands to produce and
protect biodiversity and the multiple benefits associated with it.
V
BIODVIERSITY AND TAKINGS

Any ambitious governmental effort to protect biodiversity by regulation of private landowners will face challenges under the "Takings
456 See Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental
Quality in Western Public Lands, 65 U. CoLo. L. REv. 369, 378-80 (1994); Riebsame, supra
note 455 (explaining that, in general, Western counties with the greatest proportion of
federal lands have grown faster than others, and those with designated wilderness areas
grew the fastest of all, in part because new immigrants are attracted by aesthetic and recreational benefits of public lands).
457 The federal government could, of course, compensate for these losses by providing
transition assistance in the form ofjob retraining, business loans, and special infrastructure
projects to affected communities. The government could also consider long-term payments, in lieu of taxes, to communities adversely affected by the removal of landsjobs, and
commodity-producing businesses from the local tax base. These forms of assistance would,
of course, add substantially to the costs of the program.
458 See generallyAthouse, supra note 397, at 816-23 (discussing the benefits of a more
scrutinizing Commerce Clause analysis and concluding that Lopez should lead to a renewed
emphasis on federalism concerns).
459 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 1; see supra note 404 and accompanying text (noting that
the spending power, although not unlimited, is broad and not confined by the limitations
of the Commerce Clause).
460
See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535-41 (1976); Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518, 523-28 (1897).
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Clause" of the Fifth Amendment, 4 61 which flatly provides: "[N] or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. ' 4 6 2 This clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 463 As commenta-

tors have pointed out, the Takings Clause was originally thought to
require compensation only when the government physically seized or
occupied such tangible property as land or slaves. 464 Government regulation of the uses of private property, on the other hand, was regarded as beyond the scope of Takings Clause protection.
Nevertheless, in 1922, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes announced for
the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking. ' 465 PennsylvaniaCoal thus led the Court
into the dismal swamp of "regulatory takings" jurisprudence, which
remains one of the most contested and conceptually muddled areas of
46 6
constitutional doctrine.
461
Wetlands regulations have been the subject of numerous takings challenges. See,
e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Oddly, however, ESA regulations have rarely been subject to takings challenges, although the reasons for this are disputed. See Meltz, supra note 310, at 385-87 (explaining that some environmentalists
contend property rights criticisms of the ESA are overstated, but other explanations include narrowness of takings doctrine and high barriers of ripeness requirements).
462
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
463
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (stating that a purpose of the Takings
Clause is to prevent "loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens
of government").
464
See William Michael Treanor, The OriginalUnderstandingof the Takings Clause and the
PoliticalProcess, 95 COLUM. L. Rv. 782, 785-97 (1995). Treanor provides historical evidence that James Madison, who drafted the Takings Clause, thought owners of land and
slaves were especially vulnerable to confiscation of their property by redistributionist
majoritarian politics. Id. at 836-55. Contrast this narrow view of the Takings Clause with
Richard Epstein's expansive, ahistorical reading of the clause as presumptively requiring
compensation whenever governmental regulation diminishes the value of private property,
except when necessary to protect the rights of neighboring property owners or to confer
compensating benefits on an aggrieved property owner. RiCHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAINGS: PRhVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN passim (1985).
465 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that a statute
that requires the owner of subsurface mineral rights to provide support to the surface
estate amounts to a taking).
466
See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.
CAL. L. REv. 561, 561-62 (1984). In a provocative article, Robert Brauneis challenges the
widespread view that Mahon extended the Fifth Amendment prohibition on uncompensated takings to "regulatory takings." Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatoy
Takings'Jurisprudence".The Myth and MeaningofJustice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE LJ. 613, 666-71 (1996). Brauneis contends that Mahon-which
invalidated a Pennsylvania statute requiring coal companies to provide subjacent support
to surface owners-was decided based on substantive due process grounds, and Holmes's
use of the term "taking" should not be taken to have anything to say about the scope or
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The Supreme Court's recent attempts to clean up the mess have
left many questions unresolved. The principal case is Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council4 67 In 1986, David Lucas paid $975,000 to
purchase the last two undeveloped lots in an upscale residential development on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island off Charleston, South
Carolina, intending to build homes there. 468 The lots were zoned for
single-family residential use, and although they were potentially subject to restrictions under South Carolina's Coastal Zone Management
Act, no regulation barred residential development on them at the
time of purchase. 469 In 1988, the South Carolina legislature adopted
the Beachfront Management Act to protect the coastal beach and
sand dune system from further erosion and overdevelopment.4 7 0
Under this Act, the South Carolina Coastal Commission established a
setback line landward from a baseline connecting the landward-most
points of erosion over the previous forty-year period, with the consequence that Lucas was prohibited from building on his lots.4 71 Lucas
claimed that even if the new regulation had been enacted for legitimate police-power purposes, he was entitled to compensation under
the Takings Clause, insofar as he had suffered a one-hundred percent
diminution in the value of his property.47 2 For the Court, Justice
Scalia said that "where regulation denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land,"4 73 it would automatically trigger a compencontours of the Fifth Amendment, which the Court did not understand to apply to the

states. 1d. at 666-70. Whatever the merits of this claim, recent Supreme Court cases indisputably establish that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and includes regulatory takings as well as physical ones. See,
e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994).
467
505 U.S. 1003 (1992). For criticism of Lucas, see David L. Callies, Taking the Taking
Issue into the Twenty-First Century, in ArER Lucas- Land Use Regulation and the Taking of
Property Without Compensation 1, 7-9 (David L. Callies ed., 1993) [hereinafter ArEr Lucas]; Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web ofExpectations, 45 STAN. L. Rxv. 1369 passim (1993); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1393 passim (1993); RichardJ. Lazarus, Putting the Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45
STAN. L. REv. 1411, 1421-25 (1993); Joseph L. Sax, PropertyRights and the Economy of Nature:
UnderstandingLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. Rev. 1433 passim
(1993).
468
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
469 See id. at 1007-08.
470
The stated purposes of the Act were to:
"(a) protect[ ) life and property by serving as a storm barrier which
dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability...;
(b) provide[] the basis for a tourism industry...;
(c) provide[] habitat for numerous species of plants and animals, several of which are threatened or endangered .... ;
(d) provide[ ] a natural healthy environment for the citizens of South
Carolina .... "
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996).
471
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1008-09.
472
See id. at 1009.
473 Id. at 1015.
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sable taking, absent some "pre-existing limitation upon the landowner's title" under the state's background law of nuisance or
474
property.
Some commentators have dismissed Lucas as a unique case not
easily replicated on its facts, because, even under the most stringent
land use regulations, only rarely will land be devoid of all economically beneficial use. 475 Indeed, as the dissenters in Lucas suggest, because Lucas could have continued to use his land for some purposes
(for example, as a campsite), it must have had some residual value,
notwithstanding the uncontested factual finding to the contrary in the
proceedings below, which served as the factual predicate of the
Supreme Court's holding. 476 Nonetheless, it is not difficult to imagine restrictions on land use for biodiversity protection purposes reaching Lucas-type dimensions. 477 Indeed, Lucas itself is a biodiversity
protection case, insofar as one of the stated purposes of South Carolina's development ban under the Beachfront Management Act was
the protection of coastal flora and fauna. 47 8 Suppose the South Carolina legislature had enacted a similar statute solely to protect fragile
coastal ecosystems, prohibiting any land use that would be harmful to
protected classes of plants and animals. Now suppose further that Lucas's land were the last remaining habitat for a protected species of
turtle that laid its eggs in the sand, so that even camping or walking
on the land mightjeopardize the turtles' survival. In that case, Lucas
might have been deprived of all use of his land, and, a fortiori, all
economically beneficial use, giving rise to a compensable taking according to the logic of Lucas.4 79
Undoubtedly, such extreme restrictions on land use would be un48 0
usual under almost any imaginable biodiversity protection regime,
474
475

Id. at 1028-29.
See, e.g., Patrick A. Parenteau, Who's Taking What? PropertyRights, EndangeredSpecies,

and the Constitution, 6 FoRDHAM ENvr.. LJ. 619, 629 (1995) (noting that Lucas was premised on a trial court finding that the property was "valueless" and stating that "[e]ven the
most severe environmental restriction leaves some uses, if only recreational, so that rarely,
if ever, is the post-regulation value literally zero"); Ernest E. Smith, EnvironmentalIssuesfor
the '90s: Golden-Cheeked Warblers and Yellowfin Tuna, 47 ME. L. REv. 346, 355 (1995) (same).
476 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1043-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 1076-77 (statement
of Souter, J.).
477
Cf Houck, supra note 92, at 305-07, 307 n.55 (constructing hypothetical fact pattem that tracks Lucas, but in which the statutory provision that was offended is section 9 of
the ESA or section 404 of the GWA).
478 See supra note 470.
479 Conceivably, the ESA's section 9 prohibition on adverse modification of habitat
could have this same effect.
480 But seeJack H. Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interactionof the Public Trust and the
"Takings" Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and Critical CoastalAreas, 20 VT.L. REv. 81, 106 &
n.139 (1995) (pointing out that owners of wetlands often have plausible claims of total
takings under current wetlands regulations, which may deny all economic use). Archer
and Stone argue that because of privately owned wetlands' intimate connection to the
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and the overall regulatory scheme would likely survive a facial challenge-although individual property owners might still have valid as48
applied claims based on total takings. '
A more serious problem would arise if courts were to reinterpret
the takings doctrine so as to abandon the so-called "entire parcel" rule
in favor of review of regulatory takings based on a loss to any portion
of the owner's land. Traditionally, courts have said that the relevant
unit of property for purposes of determining whether there has been
a taking is the owner's parcel as a whole. 48 2 However, in a footnote in

the Lucas opinion, Justice Scalia seemed to imply that it remained an
open question whether the entire parcel, or some smaller portion of
it, is the appropriate unit of analysis for determining whether there
has been a total taking. 48 3 Subsequently, the Court appeared to
squarely and unanimously reject the suggestion that property could
be subdivided for purposes of takings analysis. 48 4 Nonetheless, later
cases in the Federal Circuit have upheld takings claims based on alleged loss of economic value in areas representing only a portion of
the owner's original parcel. 48 5 Under this approach, any wetlands
waterways, they are held subject to the public trust doctrine, and this is precisely the kind
of limitation inherent in the title that, under Lucas, creates an exception to the per se total
takings rule. Id. at 107-15. Even if this is true of wetlands, however, the public trust doctrine may not apply to other kinds of habitats and ecosystems that might be protected
under a broader biodiversity protection regulatory statute. See Scott B. Yates, Comment, A
Casefor the Extension of the Public Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 27 ENVrL. L. 663, 672-76 (1997)
(stating that the public trust doctrine traditionally protected only public rights to navigation, commerce, and fishing on navigable waters and the lands beneath them, but has been
extended to some other resources in some states).
481
See, e.g United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
(reversing lower court's narrow construction of federal wetlands regulation to avoid potential takings problems; " [a] requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a
certain use of his or her property does not itself 'take' the property" because the permit
may be granted or other economically viable uses may be available, and, in any event, an
aggrieved landowner may seek compensation in the Claims Court for any taking that occurs through operation of a federal statute).
482
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
483
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
484
See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,
643-44 (1993) (affirming and relying on the holding in Penn Central, and ruling that "a
claimant's parcel of property could not first be divided into what was taken and what was
left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete and hence
compensable"). Although Concrete Pipe involves the question of whether purely financial
interests are subdivisible for purposes of takings analysis, its unequivocal language leaves
little doubt that the principle applies to land as well.
485
See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1180-82 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(finding that the denial of a section 404 wetlands permit to develop 12.5 acres constitutes a
taking; the 12.5 acre tract was the "relevant parcel" for takings analysis, even though the
owner had already successfully developed 199 acres of its original 250-acre holding); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562-63, 1567-73 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(applying an innovative "partial takings" analysis to determine that a taking occurred when
the value of a limestone quarry was substantially diminished, but not eliminated, by denial
of a section 404 wetlands permit). In the absence of clarification by the Supreme Court,
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permit or restriction on the alteration of an endangered species'
habitat that prohibited development on only a fraction of the owner's
land could be found to be a per se compensable taking, provided the
owner proves a loss of economic value on that portion of the parcel
where development was prohibited-that is, in almost every case.
As Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas noted, there remains
another category in which a compensable taking may be found "without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support
of the restraint": situations in which a property owner "suffer[s] a
physical 'invasion' of his property. ' 48 6 Although this principle goes
back to the earliest takings cases, 48 7 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp.488 established that even a trivial physical invasion-in that
case, a cable wire and junction box which, by local ordinance, the
landowner was compelled to allow the cable company to affix to his
building-can constitute a compensable taking, "without regard to
the public interests that it may serve," so long as it is governmentally
authorized and permanent. 48 9 It is difficult to imagine a biodiversity
conservation regulation that would authorize or require a permanent
physical invasion of the type contemplated by this branch of takings
law. 490 Although landowners have occasionally argued that the intru-

sive presence of government-protected wildlife on privately owned
land without the landowners' consent must be deemed a physical invasion amounting to a taking, thus far courts have rejected this
49 1

theory.

the Federal Circuit's expansive, pro-plaintiff interpretation of the regulatory takings doc-

trine could have profound implications for federal land-use regulation. See Meltz, supra
note 310, at 416 n.251. That court has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Court of
Federal Claims, which in turn has exclusive jurisdiction over takings claims against the
United States for amounts exceeding $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (2), 1491(a) (1)
(1994).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
See Treanor, supra note 464 and accompanying text.
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
&Lat 426.
490
It is, of course, easy to imagine the need for temporary physical invasions (for inspection and monitoring purposes, for example), but these are unlikely ever to rise to the
level of a taking.
491 See, e.g., Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1334-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
there was no taking by physical invasion when federally protected grizzly bears entered
private land and ate sheep); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423, 142829 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that there was no taking by physical invasion when federally
protected wild horses entered private land and ate forage); Florida Game & Fresh Water
Fish Comm'n v. Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. Dist. C. App., 1994) (rejecting
temporary takings claim on theory of physical invasion when occupancy by nesting pair of
bald eagles required developer to leave undeveloped subdivision acreage undisturbed for
several years). See generally Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supranote 2, at 591 n.183, and cases
cited therein (discussing doubt that Lucas cast on the parcel-as-a-whole test, and the significance of the distinction between partial and total takings requirements).
486
487
488
489
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For the larger number of cases involving neither a "total taking"
nor a physical invasion, Lucas makes clear that partial regulatory takings will continue to be decided under the Penn Central multifactor
balancing test.49 2 The factors that the court considers under the Penn

Central test include the character of the government's interest, the
burden on the property owner, and the degree to which the regulation interferes with the property owner's investment-backed expectations. 493 Although the Penn Central Court acknowledged that these
factors require "ad hoc, factual inquiries," 494 landowners rarely win
these cases because any valid governmental interest is usually regarded as sufficient to outweigh all but the most extreme burdens on
landowners. 495 Because the courts have long recognized that the government has a legitimate interest in protecting wildlife, as well as a
valid interest in conserving dwindling biological resources that markets alone cannot provide, 4 96 this main branch of takings law is not
likely to pose a threat to biodiversity conservation regulation.
Two other important and recent Supreme Court takings cases
merit mention. Nollan v. Calfornia Coastal Commission497 established

that where a permit to develop property is conditioned upon a reduction in the owner's property rights, there must be some rational
"nexus" between the purpose of the regulatory scheme and the condition imposed.4 98 Dolan v. City of Tigard4 99 extended this principle to
include a requirement of "rough proportionality," so that the burden
492
493
494

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8 (citing Penn Centr4, 438 U.S. at 124).
Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124.
1d

See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)
(upholding state statute limiting coal operators' rights to mine coal in order to provide
support to surface); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980) (upholding municipal open-space zoning ordinance). In both cases, the Court inquired whether the regulation substantially advanced a legitimate government interest, and whether the
landowner was deprived of all economically viable use of her property. In both cases, the
answer to the first question was affirmative and the answer to the second question was
negative, and the regulation was upheld against a takings challenge. This outcome suggests that any government interest will be upheld, unless the deprivation to the landowner
is total (or, possibly, near-total, although the Supreme Court has not yet decided such a
case).
496
See, e.g., Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding no taking
where the plaintiff's property was designated as a resource protection area).
497 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
498 Id. at 837. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission required the landowner to
grant a pedestrian right-of-way across his beachfront property to users of neighboring public beaches as a condition for receiving a permit to build a residence that would impair
visual access to the oceanfront from the public road behind the property. The Court said
that the regulatory purpose of protecting visual access from the road would not be advanced by allowing pedestrians to cross the land, and without the requisite nexus, the deprivation of the landowner's right to exclude others from his land amounted to a
compensable taking.
499 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
495

1997]

BIODIVERSTY AND LAND

imposed on the landowner may not be disproportionate to the benefit
provided (or harm prevented) by the regulation. 50 0 Both Nollan and
Dolan involved transfers of title to partial interests in land and permanent government-authorized physical invasions, but only as conditions
attached to permits. Because the landowner remained free to reject
the condition (along with the permit), these are not per se physical
invasion takings as in Loretto. Instead, the Court imposed intermediate tests, more stringent than the deferential Penn Central balancing
approach, but short of the categorical rules of Lucas and Loretto.50 1
However, the reach of the Nollan nexus and Dolan proportionality requirements remains unclear. Do they apply to all conditions on permits to develop land, or only to conditions involving transfer of title,
or perhaps to conditions interfering with the owner's right to exclude,
as in the Nollan and Dolan cases themselves? 50 2 Or, as a middle
ground, do they apply to conditions "substantially" or "significantly"
interfering with any important "stick in the owner's bundle of rights"?
And, if the latter, how are we to determine that threshold? Once
again, the cases appear to raise more questions than they answer.
The answers to those questions may be crucial to the future of
biodiversity conservation regulatory measures. Conditional permitting is already a well-trod path for regulatory approaches that attempt
to accommodate both development and conservation goals. Section
404 wetlands permits, for example, are frequently conditioned upon
mitigation measures,5 03 and even the most ambitious ESA habitat conservation plans amount to little more than a grand architecture of
conditions imposed upon incidental take permits. 50 4 Such conditions
may or may not implicate Nollan- and Dolan-type transfers of title or
interferences with the right to exclude, but they invariably implicate
the owner's right to use her land. If courts subject these conditional
500 Id- at 391. In Dolan, the municipality approved a permit to construct a store and
parking lot, on the condition that the landowner dedicate a portion of her property for
improvement of a storm drainage system and grant an easement for construction of a
bicycle path over her property. The municipality reasoned that the bikepath would help
alleviate traffic congestion caused in part by the new construction. The Court said that the
traffic congestion may provide the requisite nexus between the condition and the regulatory purpose, but the municipality had not demonstrated that the incremental benefit of
the bikepath was "roughly proportional" to the burden placed on the owner the deprivation of her right to exclude others from her property.
501 See Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin, Takings After Lucas: Growth Management, Planning and Regulatoy Implementation Will Work Better Than Before, in A=R Lucas,
supra note 467, at 53, 57-58 (explaining that Nollan employs heightened scrutiny, shifting
the burden to the government to justify the regulation by showing the requisite nexus).
502 SeeDanielJ. Curtin,Jr. etal., Nollan/Dolan: The EmergingWing in Regulatory Takings
Analysis, 28 U"n. LAw. 789, 791-95 (1996) (stating that lower courts are divided on whether
the Nollan and Dolan requirements apply to conditions other than dedications of land).
503 See supra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
504
See supra notes 313-25 and accompanying text.
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permits to heightened judicial scrutiny under the Nollan-Dolannexus
and proportionality requirements, they may find that a good many
50 5
more are takings than if Penn Centralwerethe governing precedent.
Ironically, then, conditional permitting under the Clean Water Act
and ESA-devices that were intended to provide regulatory flexibility
and to ease the burden on landowners by allowing development
where flat prohibitory regulation would not-may be subject to
stricterjudicial scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan than prohibitory regulations, which the courts will presumably continue to review under the
more deferential Penn Centralbalancing test.
As a result, the status of takings jurisprudence and its implications
for biodiversity conservation policy remain highly unsettled. Furthermore, even if biodiversity protection policies can survive takings challenges, the ferocity of opposition to wetlands and endangered species
legislation among private landowners should give us pause. What future can there be in the broader regulation of private land use, in the
name of biodiversity protection, if even the current limited and inadequate measures face so much resistance? And what is the source of
this opposition? Although the jagged edges of contemporary takings
jurisprudence may offer little comfort to regulated landowners,
deeper principles that animate the Takings Clause are nonetheless implicated in their claims, and should inform our design of a larger biodiversity conservation policy.
Landowners often perceive wetlands and endangered species regulations as unfalir for several important and related reasons. First,
from the landowner's perspective, the regulations often appear to fall
arbitrarily, with unjust distributional consequences. For example, the
owner of one parcel of vacant, semi-arid land in the path of development in southern California may find his land declared habitat for the
Stevens' kangaroo rat-a listed species-and therefore subject to
stringent federal regulation, while the owner of an otherwise similar
parcel a few miles away may escape such designation. 50 6 Neighboring
parcels, now developed, may have provided habitat for the kangaroo
505 See generally Stephen M. Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The Continuing Constitutionality of Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 6 FoRDHAm ENvrrL. LJ. 689, 726
(1995) (arguing that some mitigation conditions may be vulnerable to challenge as "disproportional" under Dolan). Habitat conservation plans under the ESA may also be vulnerable to challenge, especially where the Interior Department has used the conditional
permitting process to leverage ecosystem-wide, multi-species conservation plans. HCP requirements aimed at protecting species not listed as threatened or endangered arguably
may not even meet the Nollan "essential nexus" test because they overreach the congressionaily authorized purposes of the statute.
506 See Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supra note 2, at 602 (describing what he calls the
"equal protection" implications of biodiversity regulation: land developers see land as a
fungible commodity, but conservation biologists see two tracts of land as performing distinct ecosystem functions).
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rat at one time, but they suffer no regulatory burden because development took place before the kangaroo rat was listed. In other words,
only latecomers bear the cost of protecting listed species, even
though, from a broader perspective, it is the early developers who
brought the species to near extinction in the first place.5 0 7 Of course,
many other kinds of land-use restrictions also treat land differently
depending upon its location. Often, these restrictions apply prospectively while "grandfathering" pre-existing uses. In the case of protected habitats (for species listed under the ESA) or ecosystems (like
wetlands), however, the regulated area is often quite small and isolated, and regulation is the exception and not the norm.50 8 Finally,
both the ESA listing process and the Clean Water Act section 404 wetlands delineation process often appear so lacking in predictability and
uniformity from the landowners' perspective as to be almost random
in their application. 50 9 This perception undoubtedly contributes to a
sense that the regulations are not of general applicability, and that the
costs fall arbitrarily on some landowners but not on others.
The second and related point concerns the distribution of the
costs and benefits of biodiversity protection. We saw in Part IV that
biodiversity's benefits are principally national or global, while its costs
are principally local, thus raising important federalism concerns. This
principle also has a takings dimension because the costs of biodiversity
protection are extremely local, falling in the first instance on the
owner of a parcel of land who suffers the opportunity cost of foregoing habitat-altering conversion or development. When such land is
privately owned, the result is that individual landowners absorb the
cost of producing a global public good.5 10 The problem of biodivers507 See generally Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its
Effects on Man and Prospectsfor Reform, 24 CUMB. L.RE;v. 1 (1993) (arguing that the ESA is
unconstitutional as applied because it effectuates takings from landowners without
compensation).
508 This may suggest that the perceived unfairness stems from too little federal regulation, rather than from too much, in that landowners who are subject to habitat- or ecosystem-protective regulation would not feel so unfairly burdened if all landowners were
subject to similar restrictions. But only the most tortured logic would argue for burdening
all landowners to alleviate the perceived unfairness of the burdens now placed on a few.
509 See supranotes 72-75, 97-103, 326 and accompanying text (ESA listing); supra note
349 (wetlands delineation).
510 See Robert L.Carlton, PropertyRights and Incentives in the PreservationofSpecies, in THE
PRESERVATION OF SPECIES: THE VALUE OF BIoLOGICAL. Dimsrrv 255, 258-59 (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986); Charles Perrings et al.,
Introduction:Framingthe Problem of Biodiversity Loss, in
BloDrv asrrY Loss, supra note 24, at 1, 14-15; Robert D. Weaver, Economic Valuation of Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSrTY AND LANDSCAPES: A PARADox OF HUMANITY 255, 263-64 (Ke
Chung Kim & Robert D. Weaver eds., 1994). Pure public goods, like lighthouses and na-

tional defense, are both non-rival (one person's use of the good does not diminish another's ability to use it) and non-excludable (once provided, it is available to all). The
earth's biodiversity in its purest form-the variety of genes, species, and ecosystems-fits

this description. Although the information contained in the genetic codes of diverse orga-
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ity loss is the typical problem of public goods-not one of overconsumption, but of inadequate provision. Because producers of
biodiversity-that is, owners of land producing biodiversity-capture
at best only a small fraction of its benefits, no one has an adequate
incentive to produce that good in socially optimal quantities. 51 '
On the other hand, as we have seen, there are costs to producing
biodiversity, the most important of which is the opportunity cost of
foregoing development. 512 Biodiversity conservation measures may be
relatively inexpensive, and there will often be a net social benefit once
nonpecuniary benefits are factored in, if there are readily available
development alternatives that do not also result in comparable or
greater biodiversity loss. 513 For example, if the choice is between
building a shopping mall in a biodiversity-rich wetland or in a nearby
biodiversity-poor cornfield, building the mall in the cornfield may not
cost any more in pecuniary terms, and there will likely be a net social
benefit. However, that decision has important distributional consequences. For the private owner of the wetland who is called upon to
forego development, the cost may be very great indeed, while the benefits he receives from the biodiversity thereby conserved may be no
greater than the benefits received by a resident of Brooklyn or
51 4
Timbuktu.
nisms can be appropriated to produce extractive benefits such as new pharmaceutical and
agricultural products, the genetic information that produces these benefits is non-rival and
non-excludable, absent special intellectual property protection, which is not currently
available for naturally occurring biological resources. Many of biodiversity's other benefits-aesthetic, scientific and educational value; existence value; bequest value; and option
value-are also public goods. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 5, at 11-24; Scott Barrett, On
Biodiversity Conservation,in BIODv7ERsrry Loss, supra note 24, at 283, 289. Nonetheless, biodiversity can also be understood as the sum of tangible biological resources and those
biological resources that typically produce additional benefits, some of them public goods,
some private, and others mixed. See BEATLE-Y, supra note 4, at 206-08; BROWN Elr AL., supra
note 5, at 12; EDWARDS, supra note 136, at 21.
511 It is often assumed that biodiversity loss results from a Hardin-type tragedy of the

commons, based on individual incentives to over-exploit rival resources in an open-access
regime. Over-exploitation is a factor in the loss of some marine species and a handful of
terrestrial species such as elephants and rhinoceroses, but for most terrestrial species and
ecosystems, the problem is one of incidental loss, essentially a form of underinvestment
due to the inability of landowners to capture returns on the conservation investments required to maintain biodiversity. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 5, at 37; Barrett, supra note
510, at 284; Perrings et al., supra note 510, at 15 (because biodiversity is a public good,
"[t]here is a systematic bias against private investment in diversity, and in favor of investment in the specific populations whose benefits can be captured").
512
See supra notes 410-11 and accompanying text.
513
See R. Kerry Turner, Policy Failures in Managing Wetlands, in MARKET AND GOVERNMENT FAILUREs IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT. WETLANDS AND FoRESrs 9, 24 (1992) (raising this argument in the context of wetlands protection).
514
Of course, the landowner may receive other benefits, such as recreational use or
aesthetic enjoyment of the wetland, perhaps some commercial hunting or fishing fees, and
the psychological gratification of knowing he has helped save global biodiversity; but in
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Because markets typically underprovide public goods, we expect
governments to provide them (for example, lighthouses or national
defense) ;515 to subsidize private parties to provide them (for example,
grants for scientific research); or to create new incentives, such as new
forms of property rights, and thereby establish markets that will provide them (for example, intellectual property protection for published works, musical compositions, and inventions). We could enact
regulations to require private landowners of suitably situated parcels
to build lighthouses, defense installations, or scenic and recreational
parks, but typically we do not. We do sometimes provide public goods
through governmental regulation of private activity, but usually only
in such a way that the burden falls more or less equally on all beneficiaries (for example, compulsory universal education) or, in some
cases, randomly, so that the likelihood of the burden falls more or less
equally on all beneficiaries (for example, compulsory military service
by universal lottery or compulsory jury duty by drawing from a list).
However, the burden of compulsory production of biodiversity is distributed neither equally nor randomly, nor by any other mechanism
perceived to be fair. The costs are heavily concentrated on a relatively
small number of individuals that compose a distinct subgroup of a
much larger beneficiary class.
This discussion returns us to the normative underpinnings of takings law. William K. Jones suggests that three underlying purposes are
served by the just compensation requirement of the Takings Clause: it
alleviates insecurity among property owners, encourages private investment, and imposes a measure of fiscal discipline on government
officials who must secure public funding to achieve governmental
objectives. 5 16 Jones concludes that when "the government seeks to
employ [land use regulation], not to preclude inharmonious land development, but to lighten the burden on the public treasury.., by
compelling the land to be used for some public purpose ... the courts
will find an improper taking."517 Frank Michelman, in his landmark
1967 article, similarly identifies fairness as a critical dimension of takings law, and specifically names landowners' "demoralization costs" as
a principal determinant of whether a taking had occurred. 5 18 Jed
many cases these will fall far short of the cost of the lost development opportunity. See
EDWARDs, supra note 136, at 26-27.
515 See Baden, supra note 413, at 138.
516 William Y Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFsTRA L. REv.
1, 4-5 (1995).
517
Id. at 43-44.
518
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the EthicalFoundations
of "JustCompensation"Law,80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1214-15 (1967). In Michelman's formulation, if the landowner's "demoralization cost" exceeds the government's "settlement
cost," i.e., what it would cost to satisfy the landowner's objections to the regulation, then
the government must provide compensation.
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Rubenfeld argues that compensation is owed when government appropriates the use-value of property to achieve a public purpose. 5 19
Justice Scalia, in his majority opinion in Lucas, says that the overriding
goal of takings law is to minimize the risk that "private property is
being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm." 520 Numerous commentators have
52
struck similar themes. '
These commentaries, in my view, are more helpful in illuminating the animating spirit behind the Takings Clause than in delineating its doctrinal contours. They reveal why, to many landowners,
biodiversity-conserving regulation of private land use may feel like a
taking even when the courts say it is not.522 To these landowners, the

regulatory approach to biodiversity conservation appears costly, arbitrary, and fundamentally unfair. It requires a few private parties to
absorb concentrated and heavy costs of a kind that, in other contexts,
we expect government (or the public generally) to absorb. This
scheme allows the government to operate "on the cheap" by compelling a few private parties to provide goods that benefit the broader
public, without expending public funds. 52 3 By shifting the costs to
private parties, this approach obscures the true costs of biodiversity
conservation, removing any incentive for fiscal discipline and making
it difficult for even the best-intentioned government decisionmakers
to make informed judgments about conservation priorities and acceptable trade-offs. Thus, the argument that protection of biodiversity
through government ownership and management of biological resources would be prohibitively expensive misses this critical point; reg519

Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1114-18 (1993).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
521 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice andJust Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY
279, 280 (1992); William A. Fischel, Introduction:UtilitarianBalancingand Formalism in Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1581, 1583-85 (1988); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings,
Insurance,and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretationsof "JustCompensation"Law, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 269, 281-83 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation
Principle,80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1561, 1577-85 (1986) (reviewing RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)).
520

522

See Leigh Raymond, The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, andJustice, 23 EcoL-

ocw L.Q. 577, 587-600 (1996) (discussing the ethical foundations of takings doctrine in
utilitarian and contractarian theories ofjustice, and attributing doctrinal confusion to the
failure to distinguish these ethical theories and their implications); Note, The Principleof

Equality in Takings ClauseJurisprudenc, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1044-47 (1996) (contending that equality norms underlie much of takings jurisprudence and should be incorporated more explicitly into takings doctrine).
523 See Sugg, supranote 507, at 12 (arguing that under the ESA "private property owners... are providing habitat for the majority of the public's interest in wildlife free of
charge," which amounts to "nothing less than a subsidy to the public-the provision of a

public good at private expense"). Cf Esty, supra note 416, at 589 (describing as a "potential taking" the situation in which "the regulating entity provides benefits broadly but con-

centrates costs unfairly on a narrow group").
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ulation of private landowners may be equally expensive, or perhaps
even more so, but we are less likely to know its true cost.
Our current approach to biodiversity conservation-an approach
generally of inaction, except for panicked, last-ditch, costs-be-damned
efforts to save individual species once they have reached the brink of
extinction-may prove to be the most costly of all. The adverse consequences of land conversion only increase over time. Natural resource
economists point out that converting the first half of any given species' habitat is typically relatively costless from a biodiversity conservation perspective because, in most cases, ample habitat remains to
ensure the continued vitality of the species, its role in the ecosystem,
and the diversity of its gene pool. 524 Converting the next forty percent is much more costly, however, because it pushes the species to
the threatened or endangered category, creating a significant risk of
extinction and limiting our options for recovery. Converting the final
ten percent is the most costly of all, because it results in irreversible
extinction. By waiting until the last minute to conserve, we effectively
decide to conserve only the last bit of habitat, regardless of the cost,
which is often considerably higher than it might have been under
more timely and foresighted intervention. 5 25 Under the approach
recommended in this Article, the government would intervene at an
earlier stage in the process, acting as a market participant to purchase
and set aside in advance viable reserves, at times and in places where it
5 26
is cost-effective to do so.

Asking the government to pay for biodiversity conservation out of
public funds invites and, indeed, demands case-by-case judgments as
to whether the benefits outweigh the costs, and where any proposed
conservation investment stacks up against others in a ranking of priorities. 5 27 Of course, the govemment will not always answer these
questions correctly. It may overinvest or underinvest in the aggregate,
and it may overestimate or underestimate the relative value of particular projects. More fundamentally, we may find it difficult to agree on
common conservation goals, objectives, and metrics. Nonetheless, at
least an open, public discussion of the appropriate allocation of conservation dollars invites us to wrestle with those questions, in a way
that prohibitory land-use regulation does not.

See BROWN r AL., supra note 5, at 38.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
Cf BROWN ET AL., supranote 5, at 38-39 (raising a similar argument, in the context
voluntary cooperation of individual countries).
Cf Smith, supranote 292, at 86 (raising a similar argument in the context of endan527
gered species habitat).
524
525
526
of the
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VI
ANCILLARY REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ECOSYSTEM

CONSERVATION PLANNING

Although considerations of federalism and fairness counsel
against reliance on regulation of private land use as the foundation
for a federal biodiversity conservation strategy, a more limited federal
regulatory role may nonetheless be necessary. As we saw in Part I.A.,
the conservation value of reserves is limited by their size, as well as by
the spillover effects from land uses on neighboring parcels. 528 Recognizing that practical limitations on reserve size stem not only from
fiscal constraints but also from the necessity that land be available for
other essential and economically valuable uses, the scientific and policy literature has long recommended that core reserves be surrounded by buffer zones, in which land may be put to productive uses
5 29
compatible with the protection and functioning of the core reserve.
Properly designed buffer zones can thus, in principle, provide a range
of residential, recreational, agricultural, silvicultural, and even industrial uses, while also providing supplemental wildlife habitats, contributing to ongoing ecosystem functions, and limiting adverse spillovers
5 0
to the core reserves.
This goal is most likely to be achieved through ancillary federal
regulation of lands adjacent to core federally owned reserves. 531 By
limiting the federal government's assertion of land-use regulatory authority to identified buffer areas, and its purpose to prevention of adverse spillover effects on adjacent federal lands, this approach cabins
the federal regulatory role, both geographically and conceptually.
Thus confined, federal regulation is narrowly tailored, contextualized,
localized, and concrete. Rather than calling upon landowners to sacrifice their economic interests to advance an amorphous global public
good, 5 2 federal regulation fits squarely within the widely understood
and broadly accepted traditional purpose of land-use regulation: the
prevention of adverse, nuisance-like spillovers from one parcel of land
5 3
onto its neighbors.
528 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
529 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
530 See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
531 For reasons we saw in Part IV, see supra notes 412-14 and accompanying text, state
and local governments are likely to underinvest in biodiversity conservation.
532 See supra notes 510-14 and accompanying text.
533 See, e.g., EPSTaIN, supra note 464, at 112-21. Cf Tarlock, Local Biodiversity, supranote
2, at 595 (arguing that the goal of biodiversity regulation is to "prevent long term harm to
the sustainability of similarly situated parcels of larger ecosystems"). Tarlock thus attempts
to place all biodiversity-conserving regulation within the traditional nuisance-prevention
paradigm, under the rubric of preventing harm to neighboring parcels. But if biodiversity
protection relies solely, or even principally, on regulation of private land use, the owners of
neighboring parcels are similarly burdened, not mutually benefited, by the regulation.
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Under such a system, the precise nature and scope of land-use
regulation would vary depending on the nature and extent of the reserve to be protected, the nature and boundaries of the ecosystem of
which it is a part, and the nature and degree of local needs and opportunities. The menu of regulatory options could include, for example,
density limitations, open space requirements, restrictions on landscaping of residential developments to prevent introduction of harmful
exotic species, exclusive agricultural or silvicultural zoning, restrictions on potentially adverse agricultural or silvicultural practices, and
restrictions on industrial or mineral extraction practices upstream or
upwind from the protected core reserve.
To achieve biodiversity conservation goals, commentators have
recommended a variety of market-based incentives as an alternative to
command-and-control regulation. Farrier, for example, suggests a
combination of conservation easements, tax exemptions, land exchanges, and market-based mitigation banks. 534 A leading environmentalist group, Defenders of Wildlife, has argued for a broad menu
of tax credits for habitat improvements, and tax penalties for habitat
conversion, coupled with tradeable development rights and impact
fees. 53 5 Todd G. Olson argues for a market-based "habitat transaction

method" in which conservation planners would assign to every parcel
of land within a landscape a numerical "conservation value" based on
its contribution to the ecosystem, and establish an overall target level
of biodiversity protection. 53 6 A would-be developer could then mitigate the adverse effects of her development by setting aside her own
or other parcels to protect ecosystem functions.5 37 These proposals
have considerable merit. They promote flexibility and efficiency, and,
in these respects, may be superior to traditional command-and-control regulatory approaches. Standing alone, however, these mechanisms are likely to prove inadequate. Some of these proposals
The nuisance-prevention rationale is more apt if the government regulates in order to
protect its interests as owner of neighboring lands set aside for biodiversity protection.
534 Farrier, supranote 2, at 323-27, 389-405; see also GRUMBINE, supranote 44, at 12-13
(stating that the "[clurrent laws are deeply flawed" and must be replaced with a combination of different programs); EUNOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990).
535

DEFENDERS OFWILDuFE, BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES INTO THE ENDANGERED SPE-

cIES ACr (Wendy E. Hudson ed., 2d ed. 1993).

536 Olson, supranote 46, at 72-78. Olson proposes a two-step process in which conservation planners would first assign a numerical "habitat quality" value to each parcel, based
on "the extent to which the land is characteristic of the subject habitat type," considering
such factors as soil types, elevation, characteristic vegetation, and presence or absence of
"indicator species." Id. at 73. Then they would make upward or downward adjustments
based on the size, shape, and contiguity of the habitat patch of which the parcel is a part,
with higher values for larger, more contiguous, and "rounder" patches. Id. at 73-75.
537 Note, however, that like other transferable development rights schemes, this one
presupposes that development is generally prohibited unless authorized by the accumulation of sufficient "credits."
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incorrectly assume that all lands are of equal conservation value. They
would reward (or penalize) particular kinds of conservation measures
adopted by individual landowners, regardless of any parcel's relative
value for conservation purposes, and without regard to the existence
or absence of a coherent, regionwide ecosystem plan.
Nonetheless, some of the specific market-based mechanisms proposed in this literature could be easily adapted to the core-and-buffer
approach recommended in this Article, and should be on the menu
of regulatory options available to decisionmakers in tailoring the most
efficient and effective regulatory protection in the buffer zone. For
example, a scaled system of tax penalties and tax credits-with tax
penalties for adverse habitat modification and tax credits for conservation measures calibrated to distance from the core reserve or other
ecosystem-specific considerations 53 8-might prove to be an efficiencyenhancing and, from the landowners' perspective, relatively painless
way to steer adverse development away from biodiversity reserves.
This system would also encourage conservation where it will be most
effective-in areas immediately adjacent to the core reserve. By thus
contextualizing application of the tax incentive tool, this approach
honors the principle that not all conservation investments are equally
productive; the more valuable ones ought to be identified in a decentralized, ecosystem-specific planning process and especially encouraged. Similarly, Olson's tradeable development rights concept
can be easily adapted to the core-and-buffer scheme by assigning such
rights within the regulated buffer zone, based on distance from the
core reserve or other metrics of the potential adverse impact on biological resources to be protected. 5 9 Following this approach, the cost
of converting land farther away from the core reserve and the cost of
conservation-damaging spillovers from developments in the buffer
zones would be reduced.
Even such narrowly tailored and contextualized regulation is not
without its problems, of course. State and local governments may still
be concerned that the federal regulatory process would not adequately protect state- and local-level interests. Affected landowners
may also feel unfairly inconvenienced by a federal decision to locate a
reserve in their vicinity and consequently, to impose special regulatory
burdens upon them not shared by landowners generally.
538 Other context-specific ecosystemic factors could also be drawn into the equation.
For example, it might be advantageous to steer certain kinds of developments downstream
(or downwind) from the core reserve, rather than upstream (or upwind), where the negative spillovers are potentially more harmful; or to encourage certain developments in second-growth rather than in old-growth forests.
539 Again, as with tax incentives, other factors such as direction of air or water flow
could be calculated into the equation.
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An ecosystem-level conservation planning approach, involving a
collaborative, consensus-oriented process bringing together all the
"stakeholders" in conservation and land development within the regional ecosystem, may help to alleviate these concerns and produce
superior substantive results. Such a decentralized, participatory process would allow landowners, state and local governments, conservation organizations, and other affected parties to see that their interests
are represented and addressed in the decisionmaking process. It
would also facilitate the acquisition and consideration of relevant information on local conditions and individual needs that otherwise
might not be readily available to agency officials. In short, it would
allow regulation to be tailored to local conditions in a way that gen540
eral, nationwide regulation is unlikely to be.

Despite its many shortcomings, 54 1 the Habitat Conservation Planning ("HCP") process that has evolved out of the ESA's incidental
take permit requirements54 2 provides a useful prototype for this kind
of planning process. It should be noted that the HCP process has
been most successful when the plan has called for setting aside corehabitat reserves, accompanied by some level of development restrictions on surrounding lands. 543 Thus, the end result bears a striking

similarity to the core-and-buffer approach recommended in this
Article.
Although under ESA habitat conservation plans the reserves are
not always federally owned,5 44 federal land acquisitions have often
played a critical role. For example, in the Balcones Canyonlands regional HCP, the new forty-one thousand acre National Wildlife Refuge, a twenty-nine thousand acre network of local and private
reserves, and appropriate use restrictions on surrounding private
lands play a central role in the preservation plan. 545 Clearly there is a
creative synergy at work here; neither the federal wildlife refuge nor
the network of private preserves and land use restrictions alone would
See supranotes 444-46, 453 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 316-25 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 313-15 and accompanying text.
See BsATru, supra note 4, at 177-82 (stating that the main components of the Balcones Canyonlands habitat conservation plan include a new National Wildlife Refuge and
a linked network of private and local government reserves); Cone, supra note 277 (reporting that the San Diego coastal sage scrub conservation plan creates a 172,000 acre habitat
preserve, combining areas closed to development with areas where development is permitted, subject to a 75% open space set-aside).
544 See BEA=TEY, supra note 4, at 206-09 (recounting that the federal government has
purchased reserves for a number of habitat conservation plans, but that others are created
and funded in whole or in part by developer impact fees, dedications of developer-owned
land, state and local government bonding authorities, special taxing districts, dedicated
taxes, or general state or local government revenues).
545 See id- at 180, 190 (describing the habitat conservation planning process as an "important catalyst in establishing [the national wildlife] refuge").
540
541
542
543
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be adequate to address the habitat needs of the species at risk in the
Balcones Canyonlands, but together they go a long way toward achieving ecosystem-level conservation objectives and suggest a promising
model for the future.
For better or worse, the ESA thus far has provided the best entree
for the federal government to play a role in promoting local and regional land-use planning for biodiversity conservation. In the absence
of the regulatory club held over the heads of private parties and governmental entities by virtue of the prohibitory potential of the ESA,
federal authorities are rarely in a position to bring parties to the bargaining table or to force consensus or compromise. However, the
HCP process is currently available only when triggered by a threat to a
listed species; consequently, it cannot be used proactively to protect
conservation-worthy ecosystems that have not already been so damaged as to push resident species to extinction's door. 54 6 Even where a
listed species is present, its habitat may not be sufficiently extensive, or
the necessary protective measures sufficiently stringent or far-reaching, to bring all the relevant parties to the bargaining table.
Nevertheless, the limitations of the ESA's HCP process should
not be confused with the merits of regional ecosystem conservation
planning. By most accounts, the approach is a promising one. It can
be advanced by my proposal for core federal reserves, surrounded by
regulated adjacent buffers. By identifying and setting aside biological
reserves, the federal government creates a place for itself at the table
of stakeholders in regional conservation planning. By asserting regulatory authority over adjacent lands, the federal government wields
the club that may be necessary to bring other stakeholders to the table
and to advance the discussion toward consensus when, absent such
authority, negotiation might otherwise break down.
Intelligent design of land-use regulations that simultaneously
serve both the federal interest in biodiversity conservation and local
and private interests in development will require the kind of dialogue
that the ecosystem conservation planning process is intended to foster. Although such dialogue by no means guarantees elimination of
local opposition to federal land ownership and regulation, it is at least
likely to mitigate it by increasing local understanding of federal objectives and accommodating, to the extent feasible, local concerns. A
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See i.

at 191 (stating that the Balcones Canyonlands habitat conservation plan,

widely hailed as a model of regional multispecies planning, fails to protect the adjacent,
increasingly rare blackland prairie ecosystem because no listed species reside there). Notable examples of failed or only partially successful efforts at regional ecosystem conservation
planning in the absence of ESA-inspired urgency are the efforts undertaken in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem, see Keiter, Yellowstone, supranote 211, at 926-28, and in the Northem Forest of New England and upstate New York, see Breckenridge, supra note 20, at 36467.
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congressionally authorized system of federal biological reserves therefore ought to include a requirement that federal land managers engage in an ecosystem-wide management planning process prior to
promulgating regulations affecting nonfederal lands.
CONCLUSION

This Article proposes a system of federally owned core biological
reserves-selected on the basis of such features as ecosystem and species representativeness, endemism, and species richness-surrounded
by buffer zones in which the federal government would permit private
ownership and compatible economic activities, but would regulate
land use to limit and control adverse spillover effects in the protected
core reserves. The proposal thus offers a way of giving legal and practical effect to UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program concept of
"biosphere reserves"-core reserve areas selected for the importance
of their biological resources, surrounded by "buffer" zones of limited
5 47
economic activity compatible with conservation of the core.

Since its unveiling in 1968, the biosphere reserve concept has remained little more than a widely hailed idea. In this country, as
throughout much of the world, "biosphere reserve" designation currently does not confer any special protections or binding legal obligations. Instead, the designation merely serves to signal interested
parties that an area is of special concern for the value of its biological
riches. 548 Under my proposal, compatible (and therefore permissible) land uses permitted in the buffer areas certainly could include
such activities as scientific research, education, and some recreational
uses, even in areas immediately adjacent to the protected core.5 49 Farther away from the core, the government could permit (or encourage) increasingly intensive forms of economic activity on a
sustainable basis, through application of traditional land-use planning
techniques, participatory ecosystem-level planning by private stakeholders and affected units of state and local government, and creative
use of innovative market-based approaches.
So long as the government permits viable economic uses on private lands in 'these outer concentric zones, the takings doctrine should
not pose any problems to this scheme. And although this proposal
does envision a strong federal role in land-use planning, that role
would be much more confined, both in geographical scope and regu.547 See Peter Bridgewater et al., CreatingPolicy on LandscapeDiversity, in MANAGED LANDscaEs, supra note 58, at 711, 719; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., BIOSPHERE RESERVES:
FACr SHEET 2 (June 6, 1996) (96-517 ENR) [hereinafter BIOSPHERE RESERVES].
548 See BIOSPHERE RESERVES, supra note 547, at 2; GRuMBiNE,supra note 44, at 157-58;

Sax & Keiter, supra note 220, at 253-57.
549 See Bridgewater et al., supranote 547, at 719.
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latory ambition, than in other, more expansive proposals for direct
federal regulation of private lands for biodiversity conservation. With
the federal role in land use regulation aimed primarily at protecting
federally owned biodiversity reserves against negative spillovers from
adjacent lands, the federalism and takings concerns of the kinds discussed in Parts IV and V may not be eliminated entirely, but would at
least be cabined. This approach therefore represents a reasonable accommodation of the inherent tension between the global nature of
the benefits of biodiversity conservation and the localized nature of its
costs.
Finally, this Article suggests that it is time to move beyond our
current thinking about the respective roles of "publicly owned lands"
and "private lands" in biodiversity conservation-that some impenetrable and immovable barrier exists between these two categories.
Although some lands that public land management agencies currently
hold are extremely valuable for biodiversity conservation purposes,
others are less so, and the same may be said of lands that private landowners currently hold. The challenge is to identify the most biologically valuable lands and devise workable strategies to protect them.
This Article proposes a core-and-buffer approach, with publicly
owned lands (or, where appropriate, public ownership of less-than-fee
interests) as the centerpiece. This would require a major overhaul of
our public lands management strategy, placing biodiversity conservation at the pinnacle of public values to be served by federal land ownership and management. It also would necessitate a major reshuffling
of the federal land portfolio, divesting lands of lesser biological value
in favor of acquisitions of higher biological value. Admittedly, this approach necessitates a massive undertaking. Many will think the federal government is not up to the task. It is a daunting task, but the
leading alternatives-continuing to muddle through on the road to
extinction, or conducting a massive and unprecedented federal intervention in land-use regulation on a generalized and nationwide basis-are almost certainly worse.

